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Abstract 
This thesis investigates contagion risk for the global and local banking 
environment using three different distance to risk measures (distance to default - 
DD, distance to capital – DC and distance to inefficiency- DI). In order to achieve 
this goal, the research has been divided into three parts (each will have its own 
chapter) to study the contagion effect in the global and local market. In the first 
part (chapter 4), the thesis investigates the contagion effect among the top 20 
countries of the world. The sample consists of 91 banks from 20 countries across 
the globe including all G8 and BRICS countries. A list of all these countries and 
their corresponding banks is included later. The sample also includes all the G-
SIB (Global systematically important banks) banks excluding Group BPCE of 
France (given that Group BPCE originated in year 2009 by merging Caisse 
nationale des caisses d'épargne and Banque fédérale des banques populaires). In 
the second part (chapter 5), the thesis examines the local contagion by studying 
the spill over among top 15 US states. The sample consist of four of the largest 
banks from each of the sample 15 US state. A list of these banks is attached in the 
sample description. In chapter 6, the thesis performs a spill over analysis using 
DD, DI and DC. In order to do so, the thesis has measured the systemic risk using 
distance to default, distance to inefficiency and distance to capital, which are 
introduced by the option pricing theory (Merton, 1976). These distance to risk 
methods are defined as the theoretical difference between the entity’s current and 
breakeven risk position (Distance to default is the difference between the current 
and default position; Distance to inefficiency is the difference between the current 
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and inefficient position and distance to capital is the difference between the 
current and default capital threshold position). Any position lower then this 
distance to risk measures is considered undesirable for the entity. The study has 
calculated 2606 daily observations for each of the different distance to risk 
measures for each bank in the sample for approximately 10 financial years from 
2006 to 2015. Then the thesis compute the probability of experiencing extreme 
shocks in these distance measures of contagion risk using extreme value 
threshold. This research categorizes these extreme shocks into sub groups for the 
first two parts and keep the extreme shock unchanged for the last part and 
examine the contagion risk ascending from the movement of these extreme 
systemic shocks all through the US and global baking environment using 
multinomial logistic regression model (MLM). Finally, in chapter 7, the thesis 
discussed a possible risk management framework based on findings of the 
previous chapters. It has taken all the banks and divided them into 4 tiers based on 
their spill over impact. The study suggests that any bank in the 1st tier of the short 
term or long-term contagion capacity table should be referred to a high degree of 
regulatory control to enforce not only better capital governance or liquidity 
requirement but to also enforce overall financial governance as they have a huge 
impact on the other financial institutions. For the banks in the second and third 
tier, the authority may adopt a more gradually enforceable governance control in 
lieu with the current practice and the last tier can do their business in the current 
regulation, as they pose no real threat to the other peers. At the end, the study also 
suggests a new generic risk management framework for financial institutions. 
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1.1 Introduction 
Financial contagion refers to a “value shock” spreading mechanism whereby the 
operational difficulties of one financial institution (due to decline in market value) 
spread to other financial institutions in the system and eventually lead to total 
economic meltdown. These spillovers within the system can spread from native 
banks to foreign banks or vice versa (V. Acharya, Drechsler, & Schnabl, 2014). 
Globalisation suggests that all financial institutions in the world are now linked 
with each other, even though they operate in different parts of the world (Ghosh, 
2016). The global financial crisis (GFC) is the best example of contagion risk in 
current times (Aloui, Aïssa, & Nguyen, 2011). The impact of this crisis went so 
deep that not only did it affect the financial and banking system of developed 
countries (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2014), it also pushed back the economic 
development of developing and underdeveloped economies (Berkmen, Gelos, 
Rennhack, & Walsh, 2012). Thus, the contagious nature of risks to the global 
banking system highlights a serious concern about the future financial stability of 
the world (Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, & Tahbaz-Salehi, 2015; Elliott, Golub, & 
Jackson, 2014; Rogers & Veraart, 2013). The research question of this thesis is to 
find out and measure the magnitude of contagion risk in the global and local 
financial system to prevent any future large-scale financial meltdown.  
In order to pursue this avenue of research, it is important to measure the spillover 
effects of contagion between the systematically important banks operating in 
various geographic locations. This investigation will open up new avenues to 
protect the global and local economies from systemic contagion risks. 
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Understanding how and where these shocks are transmitted throughout “the global 
and local banking system” can also help the policy makers better equip 
themselves for these unwanted scenarios. The findings of this thesis can help 
future micro- and macro-level risk management practices involving reliance on 
long-term wholesale or operational banking transformations that aim to minimise 
the risk in the cross-border financial activities at a global or local level.  
1.2 Conceptual Framework 
The built-in risk related to the contagious nature of modern day finance is long 
established and well researched by previous academics (Feldkircher, 2014; 
Kenourgios & Dimitriou, 2015; Longin & Solnik, 2001). There are number of 
studies that examine contagion risk in the financial sector (Carlson & Wheelock, 
2016b; Hasman, 2013; Ladley, 2013; Tonzer, 2015). These studies investigate 
various issues in the contagion risk domain in an attempt to understand the links 
between financial institutions and to predict contagion across financial systems. 
Unfortunately these avenue of research is typically difficult for the researchers 
given the nature of jurisdictional domain differs from global to local context (J. 
Berrospide, Correa, Goldberg, & Niepmann, 2016; J. M. Berrospide, Black, & 
Keeton, 2016) For example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and European 
Central Bank (ECB) have taken interest in cross-border contagion between the 
major global economies as part of their chartered mandate. The ECB has found 
that systemic risk in the US is greater than in Europe and has increased gradually 
since 1990 (Straetmans, Hartmann, & de Vries, 2005). On the other hand, in its 
pioneer research publication on contagion risk using Extreme Value Theory, the 
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IMF found that the contagion risk among big banks displays a generic home bias, 
whereas smaller banks are more likely to be affected by their larger counterparts 
(Chan‐Lau, Mitra, & Ong, 2012; Ong, Mitra, & Chan-Lau, 2007). Given this 
scenario, the IMF has pushed for higher cross-border co-operation on banking 
supervision to control any future damage arising from spillover risk (Cihak & 
Ong, 2007). A more recent paper on the same issue and methodology by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) confirms the 
previous findings (Blundell-Wignall & Roulet, 2013).  
This research differs from previous studies in terms of innovation, methodology, 
practical implications and coverage. Previous studies in this field mostly focused 
on three methodologies – cross-country correlation (CCC), vector auto-regression 
(VAR) and Extreme Value Theory (EVT) to study contagion in various micro- or 
macro-level setups. But CCC- and VAR-based models have been discovered to 
have serious limitations (Boyer, Kumagai, & Yuan, 2006; Forbes & Rigobon, 
2002). CCC-based studies have mistakenly identified market co-movement as 
contagion across different entities (Akhter & Daly, 2017). They also have a 
synthetic upward bias in their correlation coefficient result, created by the hyper-
volatility of their sample. Their results are also affected by the feedback effect and 
common shocks of the model (Forbes & Rigobon, 2002). The early 1990s saw an 
increase in interest in the Extreme Value Theory framework in regard to 
transmitting volatility between different markets and countries (M. Baker, 
Wurgler, & Yuan, 2012), given EVT’s ability to understand the association of 
concurrent extreme events or co-exceedances across different geographical 
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settings (Jobst, 2014). At the same time, it has the ability to capture the 
transmission of large shocks within the prescribed model boundaries (Dias, 2014). 
In this thesis, EVT framework has been used given its inherent ability to capture 
the differences between the impacts of large and small shocks on the underlying 
entity, and thus may offer a new viewpoint on cross-border contagion (Bollerslev 
& Todorov, 2014; Kellner & Gatzert, 2013; Tolikas, 2014). However, other 
distance to risk measures have also been introduced (Distance to default, distance 
to inefficiency and distance to capital) to study contagion, where past researchers 
used only distance to default. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there are 
no previous studies that specifically employ distance to inefficiency (DI) and 
distance to capital (DC) measures along with the measure of distance to default 
(DD) to investigate the contagion risk of banks at global and local level.  
1.3 Research Objective 
As stated above, this thesis investigates contagion risk for the global and local 
banking environment using three different distance to risk measures (DD, DI and 
DC). The research question can be states as “Is there any systemic risk spill over 
among the sample entities’ of this research?” In order to achieve this research 
goal, the research has been divided into three major parts to study the contagion 
effect in the global and local banking sector. In the first part (Chapter 4), the 
thesis researches contagion effect among the largest 20 economies of the world. 
The sample consists of 91 banks from 20 countries across the globe, including all 
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G81 and BRICS2 countries. A list of all these countries and their corresponding 
banks is included later in the thesis. The sample also includes all the G-SIB3 
(Global systematically important banks) banks, excluding Group BPCE of France 
(given that Group BPCE originated in 2009 with the merger of Caisse nationale 
des caisses d'épargne and Banque fédérale des banques populaires). Netaxis has 
been taken as a substitute for Group BPCE, which is also the primary subsidiary 
of this deducted bank. In the second part (Chapter 5), the thesis looks into local 
contagion by studying the spillover among the top 15 US states. The sample 
consists of the four largest banks from each of the 15 sample US states. A list of 
these banks is provided in the sample description section. Finally, in Chapter 6, 
using the same 60 banks from US, a cross-bank spillover analysis is performed.  
Moving on, in this research, DD, DI and DC are introduced as systemic risk 
measurement created by the option pricing theory (Merton, 1976). These distance 
to risk methods are defined as the theoretical difference between the entity’s 
current and breakeven risk position. Distance to default is the difference between 
the current and default position; distance to inefficiency is the difference between 
the current and inefficient position; and distance to capital is the difference 
                                                 
1 Refers to the group of eight strongest economies of the world: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.  
2 Refers to Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa as the top most developing countries of 
the world. The study has excluded Russia because of highly volatile nature of their banking sector 
data. 
3 Global systematically important banks refer to the large financial entities which are operating in 
multiple countries and are considered too big to fail.  
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between the current and default capital threshold position. Any position lower 
than this distance to risk measures is considered undesirable for the entity. The 
procedure gives 2606 daily observations for each of these different distance to risk 
measures for each bank in the sample over approximately 10 financial years, from 
2006 to 2015. In the next step, the probability of experiencing extreme shocks in 
these distance measures of contagion risk using EVT is calculated. The model 
then categorise these extreme shocks into sub-groups for the first two parts and 
keep the extreme shock unchanged for the last part of the research, where the 
thesis examines the contagion risk arising from the movement of these extreme 
systemic shocks all through the US and global baking environment using a 
multinomial logistic regression model (MLM). Some mutual underlying variables 
of the banking system variability has also been chose for the first two parts of this 
thesis to study their influence upon the sample states’ and countries’ financial 
health.  
1.4. Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured in eight chapters, as briefly outlined below. 
Chapter 1 – Introduction. Sets out the foundation and the beginning of the thesis. 
This chapter encapsulates the research by providing a theoretical background and 
a discussion on what can be anticipated from the thesis. 
Chapter 2– Literature review. This chapter deals with the previous academic 
contributions to the subject of contagion in the financial environment. Most 
articles significant to the research have been collected and communicated in a 
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systematic manner to clarify the research agenda. The chapter identifies a need for 
broader research into contagion risk analysis on a global scale.  
Chapter 3 – Research methodology. This chapter discusses the research 
procedures used in this thesis. It describes the methodology related to calculation 
of DD, DI and DC using the Black Scholes Option Pricing model as proxy of 
systemic risk then how to use multinomial logistic regression model to look into 
possible contagion in the global banking sector using these different measures of 
systemic risk as input variable. This procedure opens up a completely new avenue 
of systemic risk calculation for academics and practitioners. The emphasis here is 
on the procedures used by previous researchers and connecting them to the 
research goals identified in Chapter 1. 
Chapter 4 – Contagion risk in the global banking sector. This chapter 
investigates contagion risk for the global banking environment using three 
different distance to risk measures (DD, DI and DC) described in the 
methodology section. 
Chapter 5 – Local contagion risk in US banking. This chapter investigates 
contagion risk for the local (US) interstate banking environment using three 
different distance to risk measures (DD, DI and DC) described in the 
methodology section. 
Chapter 6 – Interbank contagion in US. This chapter discusses the contagion risk 
for the US banking sector divided by sixty of their largest banks using three 
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assorted distance to risk procedures (DD, DI and DC) described at the 
methodology. 
Chapter 7 – Recommendations: Contagion Risk, Regulation and Risk 
Management. This chapter takes a deep look inside the findings of the previous 
three body chapters and brings together all of the findings to create a modern-day 
risk management and risk regulation framework at both micro- and macro-levels.  
Chapter 8 – Conclusion. The final chapter summarises the total research 
discoveries from all the chapters, recapitulates the findings, limitations and future 
research agenda. 
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2.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, a semi-systematic literature review on the topic of “financial 
contagion” and “risk management” is undertaken as part of the thesis. In this 
regard, the study has systemically explored the publications of previous 
researchers in the field of contagion risk analysis and later synthesise them for a 
clearer research agenda. The objective is to look into the concept of modern day 
risk and its connection to the contagious nature of global banking industry by 
charting the movement of value shocks with in the global and local banking 
sector. 
2.2. Conceptualisation of the key terminologies 
2.2.1. Contagion 
Contagion is generally described as an extreme domino effect, where the failure of 
one financial intermediary causes failure of a whole financial network with in that 
particular geographical location (Akhtaruzzaman & Shamsuddin, 2016; Freixas et 
al., 2015). Other authors take a more macro approach in which contagion occurs 
when economic shock of one country moves into another country, causing a 
spillover effect among the economies (Carlson & Wheelock, 2016a; Dornbusch, 
Park, & Claessens, 2000). It thus triggers a financial catastrophe or increases the 
likelihood of a financial catastrophe. As an example, at the time of global 
financial crisis there was a total breakdown of the global credit mechanism and 
failure across all the financial industries, including banking, mortgage and equity 
sectors. This was the single biggest example of contagion in the study’s time 
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frame (Mensi, Hammoudeh, Nguyen, & Kang, 2016). In some ways, contagion is 
a cycle where the financial stress depends on the fragility of the banking system, 
and the fragility of the banking system in turn depends on the extent of the 
contagious effect, thus allowing the risk to move from one financial institution to 
another in a very short time. For example, at the beginning of the GFC, large 
banks pulled their money out of other banks and investments to limit their losses; 
this moved the shock from one bank to another, a perfect example of contagious 
spillover. Academics have stated that this contagion effect, and the failure of 
credit agencies with financial intermediation services, caused the greatest 
financial meltdown in history (Aloui et al., 2011).  
2.2.2. Risk in banking 
Risk has been defined in numerous ways in relation to financial services (Douglas 
& Wildavsky, 1983). If examined current approaches to risk, one will see a highly 
methodological field employing complex mathematics to reduce risks to statistics 
and dimensions (Power, 2008). Researchers have described the core of risk as the 
negative effect of uncertainty (He, Li, Wei, & Yu, 2013). This has implications 
for the mechanisms of risk management which have been created based on a 
different understanding of risk (Deguest, Martellini, & Meucci, 2013). 
The goal of this section is to provide a broad review of the literature on the 
concept of risk from a methodological point of view. Different researchers have 
different point of view when it comes to explaining risk. McGoun (1995) has 
explored the concept through financial products and markets. Another approach is 
to examine systematic financial risk associated with the banking sector (Shah, 
 30 
1997) where researchers have used available boundaries to define risk. However, 
the very nature of risk, varying and idiosyncratic, is the biggest obstacle in this 
regard. Thus, to identify and define risk one must look inside the mechanism of 
risk. A key example of this strategy is the reduction of regulation for financial 
entities (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). The following table shows definitions of risk 
used by previous authors and researchers, with critical analysis.  
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Table 2.1. Definitions of Risk 
Author and Year 
published 
Definition Country or Settings Critical analysis 
1 Markowitz, 1952 Variance of return.  USA The definition is too subjective. It totally excludes  
objective perceptions of risk. 
2 Holton, 2004 Risk is a human condition which 
cannot be observed by 
organisations. 
USA Undermines the whole conceptualisation of modern 
financial risk frameworks. 
3 He et al., 2013 The negative effect of uncertainty. USA Like previous authors, too subjective a definition. 
4 Douglas and 
Wildavsky, 1983 
Combined creation of knowledge 
about the future and agreement 
about the relative status of certain 
consequences. 
USA Too complex to use in financial field given the 
abstract ideology. 
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Looking at the table, the main challenge is to bring all the definitions together into 
one formulation. Thus, when it comes to defining the characteristics of the modern 
day concept of risk, Baker (2015) argued that  
Risk is a highly subjective idea which requires knowledge of alternative value and 
activities. It is primarily a social and cultural phenomenon. Finance’s determination 
to ‘objectify’ it and ‘measure’ selective aspects of risk is shown to be biased and 
driven by hidden operational imperatives rather than fundamental scientific goals. 
It seems to be ideologically motivated by a desire to protect a particular academic 
hegemony in finance. 
He further added that, in order to understand risk, one must look into the subdivision 
of risks that are currently in use (C. R. Baker, 2015; Eiteman, Stonehill, & Moffett, 
2016; Hopkin, 2018), pointing to the following topics for further academic research 
and discussion: 
 Individual preferences and attitudes (Risk adverse, risk neutral, risk seeker). 
 Portfolio theory – risk as variance of return; risk reduction through 
diversification; Beta risk and the Capital Asset Pricing Model. 
 Option volatility and the risk of derivative securities – Black-Scholes Option 
Pricing model. 
 Measuring risk using probability theory or state-preference theory. 
 Risk management (hedging strategies). 
 Bond duration and volatility. 
 Portfolio insurance. 
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 Different types of risk (e.g. interest rate risk, market risk, credit/default risk). 
This shows how risk has truly become a cross-sectional concept. On the other hand, 
there are researchers who object to this ideology of defining risk. These authors have 
described risk as more a macro social phenomenon (Kasperson et al., 1988; 
Rasmussen, 1997). Based on all these judgements, Dionne (2013) devided modern 
day financial risk into following categories: 
 pure risk (insurable or not, and not necessarily exogenous in the presence of 
moral hazard); 
 market risk (variation in prices of commodities, exchange rates, asset 
returns); 
 default risk (probability of default, recovery rate, exposure at default); 
 operational risk (employee errors, fraud, IT system breakdown); and 
 liquidity risk (risk of not possessing sufficient funds to meet short-term 
financial obligations without affecting prices).  
Working within similar frameworks, most researchers have divided risks specific to 
the banking industry into eight categories: credit, market, operational, liquidity, 
reputational, business, moral hazard and systematic risk. The following paragraphs 
briefly describe these risk categories in more detail. 
Credit risk is regarded as the most important of the eight categories for banks 
(Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen, & Singleton, 2011). It has many variations, but the 
underlying concept is the same. It is the risk of debtors’ failure to repay a loan or 
meet contractual obligations, with potentially significant financial impacts. It arises 
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whenever a borrower is expecting to use future cash flows to repay an existing debt. 
For most banks, balance sheet credits are the major and most recognisable symbol of 
credit risk. Still, there are other forms of credit risk, both on and off the balance 
sheet; for example, like letters of credit, unfunded loan commitments, lines of credit, 
credit derivatives, foreign exchange and cash management services (Committee, 
2010). 
Market risk incorporates the risk of monetary forfeiture caused by negative 
movements in market prices. It is rated based upon, but not restricted to, a valuation 
of limited estimation features (Hannoun, 2010), namely the commercial assessment 
of capital, which is subject to adverse fluctuations in interest rates, foreign exchange 
rates, commodity prices and equity prices in stock markets. In US, the market risk is 
calculated through the Federal Reserve’s Market Risk Rule (MRR), which sets 
supervisory capital requirements for all Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) and state 
member banks (together known as banking establishments). The MRR also sets out 
specific key market-risk supervision requirements for banks, using stress testing and 
autonomous market risk management (Malloy, 2011).  
Operational risk arises from the prospect that poor technological infrastructure, 
operational glitches, cracks in internal controls, fraud or other unforeseen calamities 
will result in unexpected losses. The concept of operational risk was identified in the 
BASEL II regulations. It is also described as hybrid risk and associated with 
operations across multiple environments (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013). It unites 
many contemporary “risk and control issues” – fraudulent practice, system error, 
product line discontinuation effects and human resource disputes, as well as strategic 
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infrastructure risk. It is unique in spanning capital management and corporate 
governance issues at a macro level.  
Liquidity is a bank’s ability to meet its cash and collateral commitments without 
experiencing undesirable losses (Drehmann & Nikolaou, 2013). Satisfactory liquidity 
is reliant upon the organisation’s capacity to meet both anticipated and unexpected 
cash flows and indemnity requirements without adversely affecting the daily 
operations of the bank (Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, & Tehranian, 2011). As most 
banks use a substantial amount of leverage in their running operations, and are 
obligated to meet promised debts in order to maintain the confidence of clients and 
fund benefactors, liquidity risk control is crucial to a bank’s productivity and 
trustworthiness (V. Acharya & Naqvi, 2012). Fund managers have divided liquidity 
risk into two aspects – market liquidity risk (market liquidity deteriorates when one 
is required to unwind a position) and funding liquidity risk (a bank cannot fund its 
position and is required to unwind). BASEL uses two ratios to calculate and control 
liquidity risk, the liquidity coverage ratio and net stable funding ratio (Supervision, 
2010). Nevertheless, there are other ways to calculate and control liquidity risk. 
Market liquidity risk can be calculated or measured in three ways – bid–ask spread, 
market depth and market resiliency, while funding liquidity risk can be measured 
through margin funding risk, rollover risk and redemption risk.  
Reputational risk is defined as the threat arising from adverse perceptions on the 
part of clients, stockholders, financiers, debt-holders, market experts, industry 
regulators and other relevant parties, and can adversely affect a bank’s capacity to 
sustain existing, or inaugurate new, business associations and access to sources of 
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capital (Cantor, 2001). The issue of reputational risk has never been more important 
than at present, given the increase in reporting of fraudulent activities by banks in the 
last decade or so (e.g. Allied Irish Bank, Barings and Daiwa Bank Ltd, The Republic 
New York Corp etc.). Previous researchers have identified six underlying or 
contributing factors of reputational risk: bank riskiness, profitability, level of 
intangible assets, capitalisation, size, the source of operational loss and the business 
units that suffer operational loss (Fiordelisi, Soana, & Schwizer, 2013). This is 
consistent with the common view that reputational risk is multidimensional and 
reflects the perception of other market participants (Sturm, 2013). 
Business risk is more commonly known as non-systematic or diversifiable risk. It is 
the risk attributable to business elements that affect all business, and it can be 
eradicated through diversification of the firm’s portfolio. It is the mathematically 
calculated residual risk after deducting the market or systematic risk. The asset 
pricing model, more commonly known as the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), 
first provided the theoretical linkage to non-systematic or non-diversifiable risk 
(Dempsey, 2013), which was subsequently elaborated through the Black-Scholes 
model (Albrecher, Binder, Lautscham, & Mayer, 2013). Most previous researchers 
recognised that, given its entity-specific nature, business risk is largely unique to 
each financial institution (McNeil, Frey, & Embrechts, 2015). 
Systematic risk, or market risk, is the portion of risk that cannot be diversified 
through market operations given its macro-level impact. This thesis deals specifically 
with this sub-division of risk using three different distance-to-risk measures. The 
modern corporate world largely relies on two measures of systematic risk, the Value-
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at-Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES) methods (Kratz, Lok, & McNeil, 2018; 
Krause & Paolella, 2014; May & Arinaminpathy, 2010). These models generate the 
residual of total risk minus non-systematic risk to define systemic risk. Individual 
banks cannot totally protect themselves from systematic risk given the 
interconnected nature of the current global banking industry (Ariss, 2010). Previous 
writers have identified numerous factors as contributors to this risk – alterations in 
investment policy, foreign investment strategy, modifications in taxation clauses, 
altering of socioeconomic considerations, international security threats etc. (Ewens, 
Jones, & Rhodes-Kropf, 2013; Hall & Woodward, 2010). Researchers have also 
shown that it is difficult to find a systemic risk measure that is at the same time both 
relevant and totally acceptable by a general equilibrium model (V. V. Acharya, 
Pedersen, Philippon, & Richardson, 2010). The problem is the gap between academic 
models and the requirements for application by regulators. To overcome these 
shortcomings, this study uses three different measures of systematic risk (distance to 
default, distance to inefficiency and distance to capital) rather than VAR and ES. 
Detailed descriptions of these measures are provided in subsequent chapters. 
Moral hazard risk is the risk created by a lack of ethical standards in financial the 
industry. It is being described as a state in which a firm gets involved in high-risk 
activities with hedged protection against that risk, meaning that in the end only the 
other party will experience any loss (Dam & Koetter, 2012). Like other abstract 
risks, it is hard to measure moral hazard in an quantifiable way (Farhi & Tirole, 
2012), although in insurance price elasticity of demand has been used to calculate 
moral hazard (Joseph, 1972). As identified by previous researchers, the scope of 
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moral hazard hinges on the sensitivity of the hedged position and price changes 
(Boyd & De Nicolo, 2005).  
2.2.3. Risk management  
Risk management is defined as a set of financial or operational mechanisms that 
maximise the value of a company or a portfolio by maintaining the costs associated 
with cash flow volatility (Stulz, 2003). The goal of modern-day risk management is 
to create a reference framework to control risk and uncertainty (Dionne, 2013). It 
should be integrated to provide total control over evaluating and monitoring all 
uncertainties in the institution. Figure 2.1 shows the currently used ISO 31000 risk 
management framework (Purdy, 2010).  
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Figure 2.1. Risk Management Framework ISO 31000 
 
Previous researchers have noted that measurable risk is controllable risk, thus 
connecting measurement and management of risk (Das, 2011). This view is reflected 
in the embedded nature of modern day risk management practices by institutions 
(Hayne & Free, 2014; Power, 2008), albeit not always successfully – forensic 
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analysis has shown that the inability to understand risk was one of the precipitators 
of the global failure of financial institutions during the GFC (Peston, 2008). The birth 
of modern-day risk management can attributed to Markowitz, who first proposed 
measuring risk using standard deviations, assuming they are normally distributed 
(Markowitz, 1952). The total risk scenario can easily be described by two variables, 
standard deviation and mean. This definition eliminates the impact of social or 
individual influences on risk management. Haldane (2012) has argued that this 
avoidance of uncertainty in the speculative models, and assumptions of rational 
behaviour, are a key flaw in the understanding of risk management (Haldane & 
Madouros, 2012).  
The following table includes some of the most prominent definitions of risk 
management used by modern theorists. 
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Table 2.2.3.1 - Risk Management definitions 
Author and Year 
published 
Definition Country or Settings Critical analysis 
1 Stulz, 2003 A set of financial or operative events that 
maximise the value of a company or a 
portfolio by reducing the costs associated 
with cash flow volatility.  
USA A pure mathematical model not appealing enough 
to control abstract risk or human factors of risk. 
2 Dionne, 2013 The goal of modern day risk management is 
to create a reference framework to control 
risk and uncertainty. 
World A good overview of risk management but too 
abstract. 
3 Kalia and Müller, 
2007 
The permanent and systematic recording of 
all kinds of risks with regard to the 
existence and the development of the 
Europe Too abstract in nature for modern-day application. 
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enterprise; it involves analysing and 
prioritising recognised risks as well as 
defining and implementing adequate 
strategic or operational measures to 
minimise non-tolerable risks. It is a holistic 
process that encompasses a modular cycle 
of communication, documentation, control, 
early warning and advancement. 
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2.2.4. Risk management techniques used by the banks 
Banks have had the same risk management objective since the beginning of the 
financial industry – reducing risk but not profit. Thus, the true objective of risk 
management practices in financial institutions is to identify current risk and decide 
how much of that risk the organisation needs to manage or minimise. But in recent 
years –following the GFC – the banking industry has undergone significant change 
in practices, particularly in the areas of risk-based governance structures and lending 
practices (Calomiris & Carlson, 2016). In its latest study, the Institute of 
International Finance has proposed three issues as key managerial concerns for a 
sound risk management approach for global banks – impact of regulations on 
business models, market volatility and sovereign debt crisis (Finance, 2012). Adding 
to that, other researchers have suggested banks need to work on several areas – role 
of boards, role of chief risk officers, size and skill level of risk teams, risk evaluation 
models, liquidity management, stress testing, risk-based culture and coping with 
regulatory reforms – to maintain a sound position (Huang, Zhou, & Zhu, 2012; 
Imbierowicz & Rauch, 2014). Examining these issues, the study has found that the 
key drivers of contemporary risk management practices are designed to meet global 
financial challenges, such as increased economic pressure in US and UK, the 
European debt crisis and the ever-changing regulatory environment of the modern 
technological world (Reason, 2016). The increased capital and liquidity buffers 
implemented through BASEL are also permanently changing the playing field 
(Dowd, Hutchinson, & Ashby, 2011). Despite these efforts, however, extant risk 
management tools and techniques have yet to produce the confidence stakeholders 
are seeking after the global financial crisis (Levine, 2012).  
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If one looks into the central risk management framework from a more practical, 
implementation viewpoint, one will find that previous researchers have mentioned 
many models – the three lines of defence model (Straub & Welke, 1998), the offence 
and defence model made of front line employees, compliance and external auditors 
(Sweeting, 2011), the policy and policing model made of check and balance 
(Caballero & Krishnamurthy, 2006) and the partnership model based on working 
together for a common goal (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002). Taking these frameworks 
together, the risk management of banks can be divided into several steps – 
identifying risk, quantifying risk, assessing risk, responding to risk and continuous 
progression. These steps – currently being implemented by financial regulators 
through adaptation of the BASEL III global regulatory framework for banks – are 
described in the following paragraphs. 
The first step of the risk identification process is to create a checklist (using 
quantitative or qualitative process) of which of the many possible risks are currently 
affecting the productivity bottom-line (Gorzeń-Mitka, 2013). Researchers have noted 
that this should be a well-defined process with proper recording procedures. Thus, 
the identification process can be further subdivided into tools, assessments and 
recording. Given the current knowledge base on risk analysis, most banks will use 
SWOT (Strengths, Weakness, Opportunities and Threats) analysis, risk checklists, 
risk trigger check-ups or risk taxa logy to identify the risks. Researchers have 
confirmed that surveys, gap analysis and the Delphi technique are also widely used 
in that regard (Rowe & Wright, 2011). The results are then transferred to a risk 
register, with specific identification, measures and descriptions of the risks including 
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identifier, category, description, quantification, severity, exposure, current status, 
linkage, cost, response, timetable and overall process (Pritchard & PMP, 2014). 
The second step is quantifying risk, which is the core principle of modern risk 
management (Cunningham, Herzog, & London, 2012). Examples of quantification in 
modern risk processes include market and liquidity risk measurement. Most banks 
use Greek letter-based mechanisms to measure market risk. Thus, the delta (Δ) of a 
portfolio is the degree of modification with respect to the value of the underlying 
portfolio. Managing risk through delta hedging includes generating a position which 
produces a delta that is neutral or zero (Gobet & Makhlouf, 2012). Another common 
measure is gamma, which is the percentage change in delta, and a third measure is 
vega. The last two can be controlled by trading options on the bank’s asset base 
(Natenberg, 2014). BASEL III prescribes the use of two ratios for liquidity risk, 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). The LCR 
emphasises a bank’s capacity to endure a 30-day period of extreme liquidity stress. It 
is calculated as: High-Quality Liquid Assets divided by Net Cash Outflows in a 30-
Day Period. NSFR is longer-term, looking at a period of 12 months. It is calculated 
by Amount of Stable Funding divided by Required Amount of Stable Funding. 
The next stage of risk management involves assessing risk. It can be defined as 
“trying to observe the effect of maximum risk” on the banking organisation within 
different parameters (Higgins et al., 2011) by evaluating different prospective or 
retrospective risk and return (income and capital) measures. A common measurement 
of risk assessment is risk tolerance (Sahm, 2012). Risk tolerance can be shown using 
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a utility function and shows the theoretical risk tolerance of the bank. Mostly it will 
be expressed as a utility or preference function, such as: 
δ2 > δ1, [u (W +δ1) −u (W)]/δ1 > [u (W +δ2) −u (W)]/δ2)            (2.2.4.1) 
Where u stands for utility, W is wealth and δ is risk tolerance. Based on this measure, 
one can create three different utility functions to express the trade-off between risk 
and return – quadratic (2.2.4.2), exponential (2.2.4.3) and power utility (2.2.4.4). 
u(W) = αE(W) − 1/ 2* E(W2)                                                    (Where W≤ α, 2.2.4.2) 
 
u(W) = − e −𝑒−𝛼𝑤/ α                                                                  (Where α>0, 2.2.4.3) 
 
𝑢(𝑊) = { (𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑎(𝑊) =
𝛼
𝑊
)
𝐼𝑛 𝑊   𝑖𝑓 𝛼=1                     
𝑊1−𝛼
1−𝛼
 𝑖𝑓 𝛼>0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼 ≠1
                                            (2.2.4.4) 
Additionally, volatility measured by standard deviation is another common measure 
of risk. It is defined as the difference between actual and standard performance 
benchmarks in a portfolio context (Bollerslev, Gibson, & Zhou, 2011). In equation 
2.2.4.5, the volatility is measured through standard deviation of returns assuming the 
average return is more than zero given most business will try to make a profit. 
Volatility =  √
1
𝑇
∑ (𝑟𝑥,𝑡 − 𝑟𝐵,𝑡)2
𝑇
𝑡=1                                                             (2.2.4.5) 
 
 47 
But the most acceptable way to measure financial risk is the calculation of VaR or 
value at risk (Hubbert, 2012). Sometimes this is also defined as the absolute 
monetary loss, as in equation 2.2.4.6. 
000 )1( VaR WWW CC                                                                     (2.2.4.6) 
Where 0W … original portfolio’s price (financial amount), C = Cut-off rate of return 
for given CI, and 0WC  = Loss analogous to the cut-off rate of return (financial 
amount). 
Once the first three steps (identifying risk, quantifying risk and assessing risk) are 
complete, a financial institution will move to risk minimisation or responding to risk. 
This involves taking steps before the risk event to minimise or control the possible 
downside (Ellul & Yerramilli, 2013). Previous researchers on risk management 
theory have shown numerous ways to reduce risk for a bank, ranging from 
diversification to risk transfer. These mechanisms can be divided into three parts: 
insurances, internal control and external control.  
The oldest way to ensure protection from financial risk is the insurance policy 
(Trenerry, 1926). A bank can protect itself against any risk through insurance up to a 
certain celling (Ai, Brockett, Cooper, & Golden, 2012). But it can be very costly and 
there are regulatory limitations. The trend over the past two decades indicates the 
banking industry is gradually losing interest in insurance as the primary instrument 
of risk management and moving more towards internal control mechanisms. This 
refers to organisational activities to prevent the risk event before it occurs using 
policies, procedures and limits (Nurullah & Staikouras, 2015). All these measures are 
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non-capital market-based and non-investment based mechanisms. Measures like 
corporate governance practices have become a key ingredient in this regard in the 
wake of the global financial crisis (Erkens, Hung, & Matos, 2012). The third and 
final risk response can be described as an external measure, where the financial 
institutions use financial products and investment strategy to minimise risk. Some of 
the most-used methods in this regard are diversification, increasing efficiency and 
hedging with derivatives such as options and futures. All these risk-managing 
instruments are used to create the global regulatory framework for the banks and 
financial institutions known as Basel Accord. 
2.2.5. Regulation – BASEL 
Basel, or the Basel Accords, is the key financial regulatory framework for all 
banking entities. The core aim of Basel is to increase the inherent stability and 
soundness of banks, given considering their impact at the macro-economic level 
(Sutorova & Teplý, 2013). By connecting the banking sector with legal framework, it 
attaches the financial entities directly to global liquidity and capital control 
mechanisms, which can be very helpful in times of financial distress (Gleeson, 
2010). Previous writers have also tied Basel in with economic development and 
large-scale poverty reduction (Calice, 2010). In this thesis, the methodology uses one 
of the most prominent safeguards from the Basel Accord – mandatory capital 
adequacy ratio of 8% to calculate distance to capital, which is part of the core 
methodology of this research. 
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2.2.5.1. Basel I – The Credit and Market risk  
The Basel committee was first formed in 1974 by the central bank regulators of the 
top ten global economies in the aftermath of the failure of the Germany’s prominent 
Bankhaus Herstatt (Levinson, 2010). The committee’s objectives were to set 
minimum criteria for central banks and standard-setting organisations all over the 
world on regulatory matters, tactics and practices; to endorse common 
understanding; to progress cross-border collaboration; and to help classify 
developing risks in the banking system. Their first achievement on a global level was 
the 1975 Basel Concordat. It was created to ensure global banks operated under 
adequate supervision, which set the stage for further development of high quality, 
coordinated banking supervision in participatory countries. The core focus 
subsequently moved to the issue of capital adequacy in order to protect general 
stakeholders in the financial system. It was found that the capital ratios of the global 
banks were decreasing at a rapid rate because of heightened political and financial 
stability risk, demonstrating the need for risk measurement using both on and off 
balance-sheet bank activities. Taking all of this into consideration, the committee 
published the first regulation accord, or Basel I, in 1988. They key feature of this 
accord was the requirement for minimum capital to risk weighted assets to be 
standardised at 8% by 1992 in all international banks. The Basel framework was 
periodically readjusted time to reflect the evolution of global regulation and capital 
adequacy. At the end of 1991, definitions of loan loss reserve were published for 
improved calculation standards in capital adequacy requirement. In late 1995, they 
made another adjustment to recognise the bilateral netting of banks’ credit risk in 
derivatives with the adding matrix factors. In 1997, they added market risk to the 
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previous credit risk, which introduced the value at risk or VaR model to measure 
capital requirement based on market risk exposure. 
2.2.5.2. Basel II – Inclusion of trading books  
From 1998 through 2004, the Basel committee undertook intensive research on 
global banking regulation, using in-depth interviews with banking sector legislatures, 
managerial agencies, central banks and stakeholders. Their objective was to increase 
the regulatory boundaries for better risk management. In the middle of 2004, they 
issued a new standard, known as Basel II (I. Basel, 2010). This comprised three 
pillars or focal points for regulation – minimum capital requirement (as in the 
previous 1988 accord), supervisory review of internal capital adequacy and effective 
disclosure based on sound practices. In 2005, they added the regulation of trading 
books to banking or accounting books and published a comprehensive version of 
another set of revised standards, with the help of International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO). 
2.2.5.3. Basel III – After the GFC  
During and after the global financial crisis, the need for consolidation of the Basel II 
charter became obvious; a combination of excessive leverage, inadequate liquidity 
buffers and poor governance undermined risk management practices and, together 
with questionable incentive structures, created a crisis that literally reduced global by 
half (Claessens, Dell’Ariccia, Igan, & Laeven, 2010). Supported by the G20 leaders, 
at the end of 2010 the latest version of the regulations was introduced as Basel III, a 
global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems. It 
included considerable changes from the past standards to protect the global financial 
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system from another crisis. Basel III added another layer of common equity as a 
capital conversion buffer. It restricted the payouts of earnings to protect the 
minimum common equity threshold. A countercyclical capital buffer was enforced to 
ensure banks did not participate in credit booms thus protecting them from credit 
busts. It also introduced leverage ratio, measured as a least amount of loss-absorbing 
capital comparative to bank’s assets and off-balance sheet risk exposures. Liquidity 
coverage ratio and net stable funding ratio were two other key aspects of Basel III. 
Liquidity coverage ratio covers the company’s cash requirement for a high-stress 30-
day period and net stable funding ration address the maturity mismatch. Other 
elements of Basel III included supplementary and contingent capital increase with 
reinforced cross-border regulation. In the thesis’s methodology, the study has 
incorporated the capital adequacy ratio from Basel III (BIS, 2017).  
2.2.6. Contagion risk  
The issue of financial contagion in the banking sector is not a new concept 
(Feldkircher, 2014; Hasman, 2013; Kenourgios & Dimitriou, 2015; Ladley, 2013). 
Previous writers have explored the impact of contagion in the financial sector from 
different viewpoints and using various parameters (Carlson & Wheelock, 2016b; 
Hasman, 2013; Ladley, 2013; Tonzer, 2015). They have also looked into the origin 
of the contagion risk and its movement through the global economy. As part of their 
core mandate, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and European Central Bank 
(ECB) have been working for several decades on geographical contagion between 
the global and local economic powerhouses. The ECB has found that financial 
spillover risk in the US is much higher than in Europe. It also pointed out that the 
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risks associated with contagion from the US have been gradually increasing since 
1990 (Straetmans et al., 2005). The IMF focused more on the interbank spillover risk 
among the larger banks of the world, particularly the global systematically important 
banks (G-SIBs). It found that these big banks show an improvised home bias and 
tend to move their value shocks to their smaller counterparts in the same region 
(Chan‐Lau et al., 2012; Ong et al., 2007). Consequently, the IMF advised financial 
regulators to push for greater cross-border co-operation on regulatory supervision to 
control any future shocks arising from contagion risk (Cihak & Ong, 2007). These 
findings have been seconded by other global regulators (Blundell-Wignall & Roulet, 
2013).  
2.3. Findings and conclusion 
The chapter started by defining contagion and then moved on to risk management 
and the Basel framework, finishing with a conceptual review of contagion risk. The 
purpose of the chapter is to provide a basic understanding of these terminologies and 
what previous writers have found in their research. In summary, contagion risk can 
be defined as an extreme macro implication of uncertainties due to spillover between 
different entities, ranging from individual banks up to countries. The chapter 
concludes that, by understanding the nature of contagiousness within the banking 
industry considered both globally and within countries, one can minimise the value 
degradation arising from these sorts of risks. Thus, the objective of this thesis is to 
examine the nature of contagion within the global and local banking industry and to 
identify the movement of value shocks within the sector to understand the contagion 
risk arising spillover.  
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3.1. Introduction 
Most previous studies dealing with the contagion effect across micro or macro level 
entities have used generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity 
(GARCH)-type volatility to define the volatility of one entity in terms of the 
volatility of others (Dungey, Milunovich, Thorp, & Yang, 2015; Primiceri, 2005). 
But the beginning of 1990s witnessed an increased interest in extreme value theory-
based frameworks focusing on contagion risk analysis between different markets and 
countries (M. Baker et al., 2012; Rocco, 2014). These extreme value theory-based 
models focus on the end of the distribution (using outliers at a specific confidence 
interval mostly at 5% or 10%) to analyse the pattern of the underlying variable 
(Diebold, Schuermann, & Stroughair, 2000). For example, researchers found that the 
behaviour of the maxima (asymptotic behaviour of the extreme realizations) is 
dependent on the three extreme value distributions (Fisher & Tippett, 1928). Past 
researchers have also suggested that extreme value theory (EVT) has the ability to 
understand the association of concurrent extreme events or co-exceedances in 
different geographical settings (Jobst, 2014), which can be used to capture the 
transmission of large extreme shocks within the prescribed model boundaries (Dias, 
2014). Current researchers has used this findings in different context but for the same 
reason (Di Clemente, 2018; Zhu, Dekker, Van Jaarsveld, Renjie, & Koning, 2017). 
This study have used these specific characteristics of EVT in the thesis’smodel to 
measure the impact of contagion risk within global and local banking sectors 
following the footsteps of similar research articles in the same domain (Akhter & 
Hasan, 2015).  
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In this research, the goal is to determine whether an extreme negative shock to one 
financial entity4 of the study’s sample is linked to similar shocks faced by other 
financial entities in the sample. The study commences by determining which banks 
have experienced shocks, and on which dates, over the period from 6 January 2006–
31 December 2015. The research parameters define a shock as an incident when an 
exceedance5 occurs for a bank in a particular time. Previous studies have 
predominantly used only distance to default to measure the default risk (Blundell-
Wignall & Roulet, 2013; Chan-Lau & Sy, 2007). However, the study uses two more 
recent default risk measures, distance to inefficiency and distance to capital, in this 
research. A detailed description of these measures (distance to default, distance to 
inefficiency and distance to capital) is provided later in this section. The study 
hypothesises that financial distress in a particular financial entity increases the 
probability of financial distress in other financial entities in the sample. The thesis 
subsequently test the hypothesis that exceedances in one financial entity are a 
function of exceedances in others in the sample. 
To test this hypothesis, the study considers a model that inputs simultaneous 
exceedances or co-exceedances in the base country’s or state’s banking sector as the 
dependent variable, and the number of co-exceedances in other country’s or state’s 
banking sector – along with common shocks – as the explanatory variables. At first it 
examines country-to-country spillover, followed by country-to-US state and US 
                                                 
4 Defined by a particular US bank or a US state represented by four banks or a country represented by 
key banks. 
5 When a bank outstrips a subjective extreme value. The study defines extreme value as the negative 
90th percentile of the change in the distance risk measurement.  
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state-to-US state spillover in the second part using STATA software. For the final 
part of this research – interbank spillover analysis of the US –the thesis considers a 
model that inputs extreme shocks in the underlying US bank as the dependent 
variable and compares it with the extreme shocks in other US banks in the thesis’s 
sample as the explanatory variables. The thesis allows a one-day lag for explanatory 
variables6. Then, for the first two parts of the research (intercountry and interstate 
contagion),the study categorises the dependent variables into four classes: tranquil 
(no bank exceeds the threshold of distance risk measure at a given point of time), 
disturbing (up to 25% of the banks exceed the threshold of distance risk measure at a 
given point of time), alarming (up to 50% of the banks exceed the threshold of 
distance risk measure at a given point of time) and crisis (over 50% of the banks 
exceed the threshold of distance risk measure at a given point of time). The study 
then inputs these variable into the multinomial logistic model (MLM) to calculate the 
likelihood of each of these discrete events for the base country or state given similar 
events occurring (allowing for a one-day lag) in other countries or states in the 
sample. At the same time, in this model explores the impact of several mutually 
explanatory variables, such as progression in the real economy (calculated using term 
structure spread) or volatility in national and international stock markets. For the 
interbank contagion analysis, the study inputs extreme shocks from banks directly 
into the multinomial logistic model (MLM) to calculate the likelihood of each of 
                                                 
6 In accordance to the current publications in finance and banking field, any news originated in one 
part of the world transmitted to the other part of the world within 24 hours (Rangel, 2011). This has 
primarily influenced us to take the 1-day lag. 
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these discrete events (extreme shocks) for the base bank given similar events 
occurring (allowing for a one-day lag) in other banks in US. 
3.2. Sample 
As described before, this research is divided into three phases. In the first part, the 
study looks into contagion risk arising from, or spreading into, 20 different countries 
of the world. After that, it looks into contagion risk between the US states and 
between US states and countries. In the final phase, the study again looks at 
contagion risk into the US, but this time at bank level. All the banks in the sample are 
chose based on their impact on the corresponding economy (calculated by their size) 
and data availability on DataStream and Bank scope, if there are multiple banks in 
similar size then the study has choose all of them for that country or state.  
For the first part of the study, the sample consists of 91 banks from 20 countries, 
including all G8 and BRICS countries. A list of all these countries and the 
corresponding banks is provided in Table 3.2.1. The sample includes all the G-SIB 
(global systematically important banks) group excluding Group BPCE of France 
(given that Group BPCE was created in 2009 by the merger of Caisse nationale des 
caisses d'épargne and Banque fédérale des banques populaires).The research has used 
Netaxis as substitute as it is the primary subsidiary of Group BPCE. 
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Table 3.2.1- List of sample countries and banks for the first phase 
Country 
Number of 
Bank 
Name of Bank 
Australia 
1 AUS.AND NZ.BANKING GP. 
2 WESTPAC BANKING 
3 COMMONIALTH BK.OF AUS. 
4 NATIONAL AUS.BANK 
Belgium 
5 BANQUE NALE.DE BELGIQUE 
6 DEXIA 
7 KBC GROUP 
8 KEYTRADE BANK 
UK 
9 BARCLAYS BANK 
10 HSBC 
11 ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND 
12 STANDARD CHARTERED BANK 
Switzerland 
13 CREDIT SUISSE GROUP 
14 UBS 
15 ST GALLER KANTONALBANK 
16 BANQUE CANTON.DE GENEVE 
Sweden 
17 NORDEA 
18 SEB 
19 SVENSKA HANDBKN 
20 SIDBANK 
Spain 
21 BANCO SANTANDER 
22 BBV.ARGENTARIA 
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23 BANCO DE SABADELL 
24 BANCO POPULAR ESPANOL 
South 
Africa 
25 FIRSTRAND 
26 NEDBANK GROUP 
27 CAPITEC BANK 
28 STANDARD BK.GP. 
Korea 
29 HANA FINANCIAL GROUP 
30 INDUSTRIAL BANK OF KOREA 
31 KB FINANCIAL GROUP 
32 SHINHAN FINL.GROUP 
Netherland 
33 ING GROEP 
34 BINCKBANK 
35 KAS BANK 
36 VAN LANSCHOT 
Mexico 
37 BANREGIO GRUPO FINANCIERO 
38 GPO FINANCE BANORTE 
39 GRUPO FINANCIERO INBURSA 
40 SANTANDER MEXICO 
Malaysia 
41 CIMB GROUP HOLDINGS 
42 MALAYAN BANKING 
43 RHB BANK 
44 ALLIANCE FINANCIAL GP. 
Japan 
45 MITSUBISHI UFJ FINL.GP. 
46 MIZUHO FINL.GP. 
47 SUMITOMO MITSUI FINL.GP. 
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48 CHIBA BANK 
Italy 
49 UNICREDIT 
50 BANCO POPOLARE 
51 INTESA SANPAOLO 
52 UNIONE DI BANCHE ITALIAN 
Germany 
53 DEUTSCHE BANK 
54 COMMERZBANK 
55 OLDENBURGISCHE 
56 UMILTBANK 
France 
57 BNP PARIBAS 
58 CREDIT AGRICOLE 
59 NATIXIS 
60 SOCIETE GENERALE 
Denmark 
61 DANSKE BANK 
62 JYSKE BANK 
63 SPAR NORD BANK 
64 SYDBANK 
Brazil 
65 BRB BANCO DE BRASILIA 
66 BANCO DO NORD ON 
67 BANCO ESTADO ESPIRITO SANTO 
68 AMAZONIA 
US 
69 BANK OF AMERICA 
70 BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON 
71 CITIGROUP 
72 GOLDMAN SACHS GP. 
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73 JP MORGAN 
74 MORGAN STANLEY 
75 STATE STREET 
76 ILLS FARGO & CO 
India 
77 BANK OF INDIA 
78 BANK OF BARODA 
79 CANARA BANK 
80 HDFC BANK 
81 ICICI BANK 
82 PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK 
83 STATE BANK OF INDIA 
China 
84 AGRICULTURAL BANK OF CHINA 
85 BANK OF CHINA 
86 CHINA CON.BANK 
87 CHINA MERCHANTS BANK 
88 CHINA MINSHENG BANKING 
89 HUAXIA BANK 
90 INDUSTRIAL & COML.BK.OF CHINA 
91 SHAI.PUDONG DEV.BK. 
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For the second and third part, the sample is comprised of four large banks from 15 
different US states compromising all the GSIB banks excluding Morgan Stanley7. A 
list of all the US sates and the corresponding banks is provided in Table 3.2.2. 
 
Table 3.2.2- List of sample countries and banks for the second and third phase 
State Number of 
Bank 
Name of Bank 
California 1 CATHAY GENERAL BANCORP INC 
2 SVB FINANCIAL GROUP 
3 ILLS FARGO & COMPANY 
4 CHARLES SCHWAB CORPORATION 
Newyork 5 BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON 
6 CITIGROUP 
7 GOLDMAN SACHS 
8 JPMORGAN CHASE 
Gorgia 9 AMERIS BANCORP 
10 SUNTRUST BANKS, INC. 
11 SYNOVUS FINANCIAL CORP 
12 UNITED COMMUNITY BANKS, INC 
Illinois 13 FIRST BUSEY CORPORATION 
14 FIRST MIDIST BANCORP, INC 
15 MB FINANCIAL INC 
16 WINTRUST FINANCIAL 
CORPORATION 
Indiana 17 1ST SM. CORPORATION 
18 FIRST MERCHANTS CORPORATION 
                                                 
7 Given that the cut-off was the largest four banks from any one state and Morgan Stanley is the fifth 
largest bank in New York state.  
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19 OLD NATIONAL BANCORP 
20 LAKELAND FINANCIAL 
CORPORATION, INDIANA 
Massachusetts 21 BERKSHIRE HILLS BANCORP INC 
22 BOSTON PRIVATE FINANCIAL 
HOLDINGS INC 
23 BROOKLINE BANCORP INC 
24 STATE STREET CORPORATION 
Michigan 25 CHEMICAL FINANCIAL 
CORPORATION 
26 ENTERPRISE FINANCIAL SERVICES 
CORP 
27 FLAGSTAR BANCORP INC 
28 INDEPENDENT BANK 
CORPORATION 
Mississippi 29 TRUSTMARK CORPORATION 
30 BANCORPSOUTH, INC. 
31 HANCOCK HOLDING COMPANY 
32 RENASANT CORPORATION 
New Jersey 33 CONNECTONE BANCORP INC 
34 LAKELAND BANCORP, INC 
35 PROVIDENT FINANCIAL SERVICES, 
INC. 
36 VALLEY NATIONAL BANCORP 
North Carolina 37 BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION 
38 BB&T CORPORATION 
39 FIRST CITIZENS BANCSHARES 
40 YADKIN FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
Ohio 41 FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 
42 FIRST DEFIANCE FINANCIAL CORP 
43 HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES INC 
44 KEYCORP 
Pennsylvania 45 NORTHIST BANCSHARES INC 
46 FULTON FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
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47 FNB CORPORATION 
48 PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP 
INC 
Taxas 49 COMERICA INCORPORATED 
50 PROSPERITY BANCSHARES, INC 
51 TEXAS CAPITAL BANCSHARES, INC 
52 CULLEN/FROST BANKERS, INC 
Virginia 53 CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL 
CORPORATION 
54 FREDDIE MAC 
55 TOWNE BANK 
56 UNION BANKSHARES 
CORPORATION 
West Virginia 57 PREMIER FINANCIAL BANCORP 
58 CITY HOLDING COMPANY 
59 ISBANCO, INC 
60 UNITED BANKSHARES, INC. 
  
3.3. Distance to risk measures 
3.3.1. Distance to default 
Distance to default (DD) is a cause and effect-based structural systemic risk model 
that represents the default risk of an entity (Saldías, 2013). The concept represents 
the distance between the entity’s given position and its hypothesised default position, 
where default is a position in which the firm’s asset value falls below the liability 
value threshold (Milne, 2014). Figure 3.3.1.1 illustrates the notion of DD where the 
horizontal (x) axis represents market value of the asset and the vertical (y) axis 
shows the liabilities (Akhter & Hasan, 2015).  
 65 
 
Figure 3.3.1.1. Distance to default 
At t = 0 (starting point) the value (Asset = equities + liabilities) of a limited liability 
entity is given as lnA0 and liabilities are lnL. Theoretically, the entity defaults when 
lnA0 falls below lnL (as illustrated in Figure 3.3.1.1). If one assume µ is the change 
in the asset value in a day with spreading of 𝜎𝐴
2, then the value of the entity for T-t 
period can be written as ))(*5.0((
2 tTALn At   . From that, one can derive 
distance to default as shown as equation 3.3.1.1.  
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This equation (3.3.1.1) is used to derive the daily value of DD for the model. 
Unfortunately, asset, liability and equity values are only available on a yearly basis 
from the balance sheet. To get the daily value of the asset, the study employs a 
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simulation-based model using an option pricing formula (Black & Scholes, 1974) as 
prescribed by the previous authors (Akhter & Hasan, 2015). Equation 3.3.1.2 shows 
the equity value as price of a call option. 
Equity value (Call price) = )dN( e L - )dN(A 2
t)-(T  R
1t
f         (3.3.1.2) 
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.t-T  - d  = d A12                       (3.3.1.4) 
 
The study assumes a firm has only one unit of equity (E) and one unit of liability 
represented by a zero-coupon bond with face value of L and maturity T. In an ideal 
world, the asset value (A) should always be greater than the value of the zero-coupon 
bond (L); thus, equity owners obtain the enduring value. On the other hand, if the 
assets value (A) goes below the liability (L), then the value of equity (E) will become 
zero since the bondholder takes all the value of the assets (Akhter & Hasan, 2015). 
This mechanism converts the equity into a call option with a long position where the 
face value of debt is the strike price. The call option will make a profit if the asset 
value goes over the liability or strike price (Akhter & Daly, 2017). The payoff 
equation is given below at equation 3.3.1.5. 
max(0, )T TE A L      (3.3.1.5) 
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Using equation 3.3.1.2, the study creates a stochastic version of the balance sheet to 
derive the daily asset and liability value for a given time period T-t where the 
liabilities are discounted on a continuous basis with a risk free rate Rf, where N(d) in 
equation 3.3.1.2 represents the standard cumulative normal distribution function for 
d. Using the iterative process, the study can now create a structure of equations to 
derive the daily asset values (Löeffler & Posch, 2011). This process involves solving 
a system containing (T+1) equations for (T+1) unknown data. At this point, the study 
choose to compute a series of At covering 260 days, given most structural models are 
based on one-year default probabilities (Akhter & Daly, 2017). This is shown in 
equation 3.3.1.6 below:  
𝐴𝑡 =
[ 𝐸𝑡 − 𝐿𝑡𝑒
−𝑟𝑡𝑁(𝑑2)]
𝑁(𝑑1)
, 𝐴𝑡−1 
=
[ 𝐸𝑡−1 − 𝐿𝑡−1𝑒
−𝑟𝑡−1𝑁(𝑑2)]
𝑁(𝑑1)
, 𝐴𝑡−260 
=
[ 𝐸𝑡−260−𝐿𝑡𝑒
−𝑟𝑡−260𝑁(𝑑2)]
𝑁(𝑑1)
                             (3.3.1.6) 
 
At the beginning, the model guesses the asset value At-a where a = 0, 1,2,3 ….…260 
and define the asset volatility (σA) as the standard deviation of log return from asset 
value (At-a multiplied by the square root of 260).The process start from base asset 
price, where asset equals to liability plus equity where liability (L) is the sum of 
deposits, short-term funds and half the long-term liabilities. The study use 
interpolation from two balance sheet dates to calculate the daily liability value of the 
firm, given most of the banks only communicate annual liability through their 
financial statements. All the data have been collected from Bankscope and 
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DataStream. The primary sample period is about 11 years, from 31 December 2004 
to 31 December 2015. At this point, the study uses iteration (k = 1,2,3….…end) to 
calculate d1 and d2 from equation 3.3.1.3 and 3.3.1.4. Then the study insert the values 
of d1 and d2 in equation 3.3.1.6 to obtain At-a. In the next step, using the At obtained 
from this process, the study calculates asset volatility (σA ) for a moving window of 
260 days. After that, using the asset values from the simulation and the daily index8, 
the study calculates the daily excess asset return and daily excess index return by 
deducting the daily risk free return. It also calculates 260 days’ time varying beta 
from these excess asset and index returns. At this point, the study calculates the 
expected daily asset return and drift rate from the previously calculated beta and risk-
free rate using a capital asset pricing model (Merton, 1973).The study calculates DD 
using equation 3.3.1.1 starting from 2 January 2006 and continuing to 31 December 
2015. Using the calculated DD values, it works out ΔDD (change in DD) over five 
days9 using equation 3.1.1.7. This methodology gives 2606 daily observations for 
approximately 10 financial years for every bank in the sample (justification is given 
at subsection 3.2), starting from 6 January 2004 for the first part of this research. 
 
∆𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡−𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡−5
|𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡−5|
                      (3.3.1.7) 
 
                                                 
8 A list of different stock indices and one-year government securities from DataStream is provided in 
Table 3.3.1.1.  
9 Past researchers reasoned that extreme financial events are more substantial in reducing noise if they 
are they are counted as a financial risk (5 days) rather than a financial day (Akhter & Daly, 2017) 
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Table 3.3.1.1- List of sample countries’ stock indices and Risk free rates 
Country Risk free rate - 1 Year Index 
Australia 
TR AUSTRALIA GVT BMK BID 
YLD 1Y (A$) - RED. 
YIELD S&P/ASX 200 - PRICE INDEX 
Belgium 
TR BELGIUM GVT BMK BID 
YLD 1Y (E) - RED. 
YIELD BEL 20 - PRICE INDEX 
UK 
TR UK T-BILLS BID YLD 12M 
(£) - RED. YIELD FTSE 100 - PRICE INDEX 
Switzerland 
TR SWITZERLAND GVT BID 
YLD 1Y (SF) - RED. 
YIELD 
SWISS MARKET (SMI) - PRICE 
INDEX 
Sweden 
TR SIDEN GVT BID YLD HIGH 
1Y (SK) - RED. YIELD 
OMX STOCKHOLM 30 (OMXS30) - 
PRICE INDEX 
Spain 
TR SPAIN GVT BMK BID YLD 
1Y (E) - RED. YIELD IBEX 35 - PRICE INDEX 
South Africa 
SA GVT BMK BID YLD 1Y (E) - 
RED. YIELD 
FTSE/JSE ALL SHARE - PRICE 
INDEX 
Netherland 
TR NETHERLANDS GVT BID 
YLD 1Y (E) - RED. 
YIELD 
NETHERLAND-DS Financials - 
PRICE INDEX 
Mexico 
TR MEXICO GVT BMK BID 
YLD 1Y (MP) - RED. 
YIELD 
MEXICO IPC (BOLSA) - PRICE 
INDEX 
Malaysia 
TR MALAYSIA GVT BMK 1Y 
BID YLD (M$) - RED. 
YIELD 
FTSE BURSA MALAYSIA KLCI - 
PRICE INDEX 
Japan 
TR JAPAN T-BILLS BID YLD 
12M (Y) - RED. YIELD TOPIX - PRICE INDEX 
Italy 
TR ITALY GVT BMK BID YLD 
1Y (E) - RED. YIELD FTSE MIB INDEX - PRICE INDEX 
Germany 
TR GERMANY T-BILLS BID 
YLD 12M (E) - RED. 
YIELD 
DAX 30 PERFORMANCE - PRICE 
INDEX 
France TR FRANCE T-BILLS BID YLD FRANCE CAC 40 - PRICE INDEX 
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12M (E) - RED. YIELD 
Denmark 
TR DENMARK T-BILLS BID 
YLD 12M (DK) - RED. 
YIELD 
OMX COPENHAGEN (OMXC20) - 
PRICE INDEX 
Brazil 
BRAZIL GVT BMK BID YLD 
1Y (E) - RED. YIELD BRAZIL BOVESPA 
US 
TR US T-BILLS BID YLD 12M 
(U$) - RED. YIELD NASDAQ 100 - PRICE INDEX 
India 
TR INDIA T-BILLS BID YLD 
12M (IR) - RED. YIELD NIFTY 500 - PRICE INDEX 
China 
TR CHINA T-BILLS BID YLD 
12M (CH) - RED. YIELD 
SHANGHAI SE A SHARE - PRICE 
INDEX 
Korea 
TR KOREA GVT BMK BID YLD 1Y 
(KW) - RED. YIELD 
KOREA SE COMPOSITE (KOSPI) - PRICE 
INDEX 
 
Following the calculation of the five-day change in DD, the study now moves to the 
calculation of exceedances within the distribution of 
iDD to convert them to country 
level for use as input variables of the multinomial logistic model (MLM). An 
extreme event or exceedance at time t for the ith sample can be simply described as a 
value beyond the 90th percentile point on the negative tail of ,i tDD . For the first two 
parts of the thesis (intercountry and interstate contagion), the methodology counts the 
number of simultaneous co-exceedances at every bank in that specific country or 
state for each day and divide them into four discrete events – tranquil, disturbing, 
alarming and crisis, as discussed above (see Section 3.1). For the interbank contagion 
analysis, the thesis keeps the extreme events as they are for use as input variables. In 
the final state, the thesis uses these input or discrete events in a multinomial logistic 
model to predict the contagion risk.  
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3.3.2. Distance to inefficiency  
Distance to inefficiency (DI) has its theoretical background in the credit risk 
structural models proposed by Merton (1974) and Leland (1994). They used DI as a 
quantitative measure of the firm’s leverage affected by the volatility of the market 
estimation of its primary asset base (Leland, 1994; Merton, 1974). The DI shows us 
the probability of the firm’s future insolvency and the distortions to stockholders’ 
initiative if insolvency occurs (Atkeson, Eisfeldt, & Weill, 2013). To describe the 
operation of this counter-efficiency measure, one needs to start from the basic 
accounting equation. As per the previous section’s discussion of distance to default, 
stochastic cash flow representation of asset and liability will be 𝐴𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐿𝑡. 
Theoretically, in a default scenario the liability of a firm will be above the current 
value of the assets, but in a perfect condition the current value of assets will be at 
least more than the value of liabilities 𝐴𝑡 ≥  𝐿𝑡, where asset volatility (𝜎𝐴) represents 
the annualised standard deviation of asset value or the business risk of the firm. This 
scenario indicates that the leverage of a firm is the gap between the value of the asset 
and liability in a percentage scale (
𝐴𝑡−𝐿𝑡
𝐴𝑡
 ) and the distance to inefficiency is the ratio 
of leverage to asset volatility at time t (as shown in equation 3.3.2.1).  
DI = (
𝐴𝑡−𝐿𝑡
𝐴𝑡
) ∗
1
𝜎𝐴
                     (3.3.2.1) 
Following the procedure outlined in the previous section to calculate distance to 
default, the study computes the DI values from 2 January 2006 to 31 December 
2015.The study also computes ΔDI over five days using equation 3.3.2.2. This 
 72 
procedure provides us with 2606 observations for approximately 10 financial years 
for all the sample banks. 
∆𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡−𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡−5
|𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡−5|
                      (3.3.2.2) 
Repeating the procedure outlined in the previous section, the study methodology 
calculates the exceedances using the 90% threshold (following the DD procedure) 
within the distribution of ∆𝐷𝐼𝑖. Then, for the first two parts (intercountry and 
interstate contagion), the study count the number of simultaneous co-exceedances for 
each of the banks in that specific country or state for each day and divide them into 
four discrete events – tranquil, disturbing, alarming and crisis, as discussed above. 
For the interbank contagion analysis, the study keeps the extreme events as they are 
for use as input variables. In the final state, the study will use these input or discrete 
events in a multinomial logistic model to predict the contagion risk.  
 
3.3.3. Distance to capital 
Policymakers and financial institution regulators depend predominantly on popular 
market-based measures such as distance to default as the quantitative measurement 
of financial institutions’ distance to risk (Blundell-Wignall & Roulet, 2013; Chan-
Lau & Sy, 2007; Milne, 2014; Saldías, 2013), thanks to the effective marketable 
execution of Moody’s KMV (Dwyer & Qu, 2007; Korablev & Dwyer, 2007). 
However, distance to default has limits when it comes to unqualified default risk 
measurement, because “the leverage pattern” differs from institution to institution 
(DeAngelo & Stulz, 2013, 2015). In the current framework of distance to default, the 
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model assigns a higher risk score to the banks regardless of their built-in requirement 
for leverage. Furthermore, distance to default uses the bank’s equity as financial 
buffer, which is less acceptable in modern scenarios (Guidara, Soumaré, & Tchana, 
2013; Jokipii & Milne, 2008). Also in light of Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) and 
the Basel framework, everyone know that regulators and supervisors should 
intervene before the total exhaustion of the capital buffer (Kocherlakota & Shim, 
2007; Mayes, Nieto, & Wall, 2008). Distance to capital (DC) is an improved 
framework that overcomes these limitations by using the relevant capital threshold in 
default risk calculations. In order to do that this research rearrange equation 3.3.1.1 
using t=1 to derive equation 3.3.3.1.  
𝐷𝐷𝑡 =
𝐿𝑛
𝐴𝑡
𝐿
+(𝜇−0.5𝜎𝐴
2 )𝑇
𝜎𝐴 √𝑇
              (3.3.3.1) 
where µ and 𝜎 are the drift rate and volatility for the underlying asset of the financial 
institution. According to equation 3.3.3.1, the default barrier for non-financial 
entities is the inability to make liability payments, where liability is the weighted 
average of short-term and long-term liabilities. In modern financial markets, a 
termination of financial establishment can materialise for reasons other than a 
deterioration of asset value past liabilities (Dabrowski, 2010; Moshirian, 2011). 
Rather than using the face value of liability as a default barrier, the study chose a 
new barrier more consistent with the current Basel and Prompt Corrective Action 
frameworks (Aggarwal & Jacques, 2001; Basel, 2010) and used by other 
contemporary studies of this field (Akhter & Daly, 2017). Equation 3.3.3.2 uses this 
new ideology to create a new generic distance risk formula: 
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𝐷𝑅𝑡 =
𝐿𝑛
𝐴𝑡
𝜆𝐿
+(𝜇−0.5𝜎𝐴
2 )𝑇
𝜎𝐴 √𝑇
                    (3.3.3.2) 
where λ is a corrective feature that explains the difference triggers rooted in the 
Basel and PCA agenda (Liu, Papakirykos, & Yuan, 2004). From this understanding, 
the study can derive equation 3.3.3.3. 
𝐷𝑅𝑡 =
𝐴𝑡−𝜆𝑇
𝐴𝑡
𝜎𝐴 √𝑇
                    (3.3.3.3) 
In this case,  
Bank Capital= Bank Equity = Asset – Liability > CAR x Asset 
where CAR stands for capital adequacy ratio at a given time t. In this case, the study 
have used 8 percent from the Basel framework10. Therefore, one can define λ as: 
𝜆 =
1
1−𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡
                       (3.3.3.4) 
Now from equation 3.3.3.2 and 3.3.3.4 distance to capital will be: 
𝐷𝐶𝑡 =
𝐿𝑛(
𝐴𝑡
1
1−𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝐿
)+(𝜇−0.5𝜎𝐴
2 )𝑇
𝜎𝐴 √𝑇
                    (3.3.3.5) 
                                                 
10 From 2013, according to Basel III guidelines, a bank’s tier 1 and tier 2 capitals must be at minimum 
8% of its risk-weighted assets. This protection is designed to shape up banks’ capital, which they 
could use in states of financial strain like global financial crisis of 2008/09. 
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Using equation 3.3.3.5, the study derives DC variables from 2 January 2006 to 31 
December 2015. Then the study computes ΔDC over five days using equation 
3.3.3.6. Just like DD, this procedure provides 2606 observations for approximately 
10 financial years for all banks in the sample. 
 
∆𝐷𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐷𝐶𝑖,𝑡−𝐷𝐶𝑖,𝑡−5
|𝐷𝐶𝑖,𝑡−5|
                      (3.3.3.6) 
Repeating the procedure outlined in the previous two sub-sections, the study now 
calculates the exceedances using a 90% threshold within the distribution of ∆𝐷𝐼𝑖. 
Then, for the first two parts of the research (intercountry and interstate contagion), 
the study counts the number of simultaneous co-exceedances across the banks in that 
specific country/state for each day and divide them into four discrete events – 
tranquil, disturbing, alarming and crisis. For the interbank contagion analysis (the 
third part of this research), the study keeps the extreme events as they are for use as 
input variables. In the final state, the study will use these input or discrete events in a 
multinomial logistic model to predict the contagion risk.  
 
3.4 Multinomial Logistic Model 
The multinomial logistic model is one of the most commonly used regression 
methods when it comes to assessing the probability of extreme shocks (Boyson, 
Stahel, & Stulz, 2010; Caggiano, Calice, & Leonida, 2014). Previous researchers 
have used the MLM method to quantify the likelihood of large changes in DD 
(Christiansen & Ranaldo, 2009; Gropp, Lo Duca, & Vesala, 2006).The thesis use 
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MLM in this research given this research has multiple discrete financial conditions. 
The MLM model considers one of the variables (first state) as the base product and 
calculates the likelihood of occurrence of the other three states given the base state. 
As the study adopt state 1 as the base, the likelihood of other variables at time t is 
demonstrated in equation 3.4.1, where 𝑥𝑡 is stated as the row vector for 𝑦𝑡 with 𝛽𝑚 
the coefficient vector.  
𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = Pr(𝑦𝑡 = 𝑖) = {
1
1+∑ exp (𝑥𝑡𝛽𝑚)
3
1
, 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 1
exp (𝑥𝑡𝛽𝑖)
1+∑ exp (𝑥𝑡𝛽𝑚)
3
𝑚=1
, 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 < 4
               (3.4.1) 
 
3.5 Explanatory Variables 
As per the discussion above, the key explanatory variable in this research is the 
extreme shock in the distance to default, distance to inefficiency and distance to 
capital of the sample entities (the details of the model will be given on the next 
subsection). The percentage amount of exceedances in the sample bank, country or 
state’s extreme shocks will give us a forecast of contagion risk within that sample. 
The thesis has included some other explanatory variables (MSCI global index, local 
stock market return volatility, development in real economy and time period for 
global financial crisis in the model for the first and second part of this thesis.  
In order to calculate the global and local stock market volatility, the study takes five 
trading day weekly log returns from the underlying index. Then, using a GARCH 
(1,1) model, the study generates conditional variance as a proxy for stock index 
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volatility. Equation 3.5.1 shows conditional GARCH volatility where 𝑋𝑡 is the 
weekly return in time t with volatility of σ. 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝑤 + 𝛼𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝛼𝑡−1
2                     (3.5.1) 
Using the same method described earlier in this chapter, the study defines the 
development in the real economy as five-day logarithmic change in the term 
structure spread as development in the real economy. The study then calculates the 
term structure spreads by taking the difference between the long-term (10 years) and 
short-term (5 years) interest rate. The difference between these rates indicate the 
difference between the time period yields. Equation 3.5.2 details this explanatory 
variable in time t. 
∆𝑦𝐶𝑡 =
𝑦𝐶𝑡−𝑦𝐶𝑡−5
|𝑦𝐶𝑡−5|
                      (3.5.2) 
In the next subsection of the chapter is comprised of the research administrative 
requirements including different pillars of quality.   
3.6 Research quality  
According to previous researchers in this field, an acceptable research result is as 
acceptable as its inherent characteristic quality (Stenbacka, 2001). Diverse 
approaches to safeguard the quality of the result are recommended in any research. In 
this thesis, three different value procedures have been used to guarantee this. These 
instruments are described below. 
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3.6.1 Factor validity 
Factor validity has been labelled as an important component of all present research. 
It has the aptitude to mark the difference amid reputable and pitiable works. Earlier 
academics note its standing given that a researcher’s subjectivity can sway the 
elucidation of the outcomes (Gefen & Straub, 2005). In this thesis, factor validity is 
based on the investigator’s all-encompassing (ten years) knowledge in the field of 
finance and proper research etiquette.   
3.6.2. Internal validity 
Internal validity can be described as the soundness of the study (research strategy, 
data collection, parameter exclusion etc.) and the certainty with which one can assert 
the results and conclusions (Mentzer & Flint, 1997). The internal validity of this 
research is assured primarily by the research methodology and data sources. In this 
regard, the study has created a firm research protocol to ensure a high standard of 
internal validity has been implemented throughout the methodology.  
3.6.3. Reliability 
Past researchers note that, in research, the conclusions must be more than a one-off 
finding – they should be repeatable (McKinnon, 1988). Further investigators must be 
capable of producing the same outcomes when performing the same investigation 
under identical circumstances (Evanschitzky, Baumgarth, Hubbard, & Armstrong, 
2007). The use of rigorous research methodologies in this thesis ensures the core 
dependability of the study.  
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3.7. Conclusion 
This chapter explained the methodologies used in this research project, describing 
the internal mechanisms of the core methodology, sample selection and composition, 
different distance to risk measures and the equations used to calculate them. It also 
discussed the multinomial regression model and descriptive statistics used in this 
thesis. The chapter, more generally, provided support for the specific quantitative 
research approaches used to address the research objectives of this thesis as 
elucidated in Chapter 1.  
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Chapter 4. Contagion risk in global banking 
sector 
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4.1. Introduction 
This chapter investigates contagion risk in the global banking environment using 
three different distance to risk measures (distance to default, distance to capital, 
distance to investment) as described in Chapter 3. The sample consists of 91 banks 
from 20 countries, including all G8 and BRICS countries. The chapter models 
extreme shocks for the top banks in a specific country as a function of extreme 
shocks experienced by other banks in country-level settings using four discrete 
conditions or financial states. The study then calculates the probability of these 
shocks moving through one country’s banking system to another’s by employing a 
multinomial logistic model. Overall, the study finds evidence of strong correlation 
between most of the sample countries’ banking systems and the UK and US. Other 
countries have a moderate effect on each other in terms of shock transfer. The results 
also indicate that less developed or developing economies less vulnerable to financial 
shocks. The findings also suggest a greater need for cross-border supervision among 
banks across the globe. 
The following discussion reports the results in terms of distance to default (Section 
4.2), distance to inefficiency (4.3) and distance to capital (4.4) value calculation. It 
then describes the findings from the exceedances calculation (4.5). Finally, in 
Section 4.6, the study describes the results of the contagion risk analysis of the 
chapter’s model. 
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4.2. Distance to default (DD) calculation 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the movement plot of distance to default (DD) for the sample 
countries. This chapter has calculated these distance to default values using the 
methodology described in Chapter 3 (sub-section 3.3.1). Given the enormous volume 
of the raw daily bank-level DD data, figure 4.2.1 plots the data for every country 
rather than every bank in the figure using simple arithmetic mean. This is just to help 
the readers to visualise the data, for the MLM model the study uses all the calculated 
DD. In general, the DDs tend to stay near the median of the distribution. This figure 
illustrates that most of the DDs for the 20 countries are stacked in between 0 to 10 
(where 1 is one standard deviation from the median). It can also be observed that 
DDs decreased slightly in the period 2008–2010, during the global financial crisis. 
However, two countries show an exception to this general trend, namely Mexico and 
Italy. Historically, Italian banks have outperformed the global leaders, mostly based 
on the innovative nature of the Italian economy, which includes a large number of 
global luxury brands (DeBresson, Sirilli, Hu, & Luk, 1994). However, during the 
GFC there was a sharp decline in their performance given the Italian government was 
unable to bail the banks out (Adler-Nissen, 2017; Fourcade, 2013). After the critical 
period of the GFC, however, the Italian banks’ DD values in recovered strongly (as 
indicated in the figure) and are currently positioned well ahead of other countries. 
Mexico, prior to the GFC, was in an economically advantageous position in virtue of 
its geographic proximity to the US. This changed dramatically after the GFC, a trend 
attributed to investor hesitation in some provinces of Mexico and a dramatic drop in 
foreign direct investment after the GFC (Hanson, 2010). 
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Figure 4.2.1. Distance to Default Values 
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4.3. Distance to inefficiency (DI) calculation 
Figure 4.3.1 illustrates the movement of distance to inefficiency (DI) for the sample 
countries. The chapter has calculated these distance to inefficiency values using the 
methodology described in Chapter 3 (sub-section 3.3.2). Most DIs are confined to a 
range between 0 to 0.06 (where each unit represent one standard deviation from the 
mean). The chart follows a similar pattern to the distance to default diagram (Figure 
4.2.1). However, it can be clearly seen that the DIs are very closely stacked 
(compared to DDs), which indicates that, for practical purposes, most banks’ 
distance to inefficiency is about the same. The most interesting feature of the figure 
is the stability over the last 10 years, including the GFC. However, the distance to 
inefficiency plots for Japan and Korea exhibit a different trend. Their distances to 
inefficiency were plotted above the global median throughout the sample, and the 
distance accelerates during the GFC (2008–2010). This trend can be attributed to the 
banking practices of these Asian countries, which historically focus more on 
financial efficiency (Drake & Hall, 2003; Park & Weber, 2006). 
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Figure 4.3.1 Distance to Inefficiency Values 
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4.4. Distance to capital (DC) calculation 
Figure 4.4.1 illustrates the calculated value of distance to capital (DC) for the sample 
countries. Most of the countries’ DCs are plotted between 0 and 20, which indicates 
a high degree of volatility in this distance measure, and therefore a highly volatile 
international banking system. Mexico, the US and Italy showed the same pattern as 
in the DD and DI measures. However, Belgium – the site of one of the safest and 
best-connected financial centres in the world – enjoys a higher capital value 
protection (Van Overfelt, Annaert, De Ceuster, & Deloof, 2009). There are two ‘drop 
zones’ in the distance to inefficiency graphs where values declined significantly: the 
period of the global financial crisis (circa 2008–2009) and a two-year period from 
2011 to 2013.  
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Figure 4.4.1 Distance to Capital Values
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4.5. Exceedances Calculation 
In this step, the study calculates the exceedances (or co-exceedances) from the 
previously calculated distance to risk measurements (distance to default, distance to 
inefficiency and distance to capital). These exceedances are used as input variables 
for the multinomial logistic regression model. As explained in Chapter 3, an extreme 
event or exceedance at time t for the ith sample can be simply described as a value 
beyond the 90th percentile point on the negative tail of the change in the distance to 
risk measures, e.g. ,i tDD . The results from the exceedances calculation show some 
interesting patterns. For most of the sample countries, distance to inefficiency and 
distance to default are more stable in lower state conditions (1 and 2). On the other 
hand, distance to capital is increases volatility at a higher rate than the other 
measures, moving into states 3 and 4 in the highest percentage. The upward trend in 
volatility increases for most sample countries over two periods, 2008–2009 and 
2012–2013). The distance risk measures for the US, India and China never reach 
state 4, while the European Union countries tend to move into states 3 and 4 more 
frequently than other countries. Overall, it appears North American and Asian 
countries’ distance risk measures tend to stay with the range of states 1 and 2 for all 
the distance measures. The results, at this stage, indicate that for all practical 
purposes the North American and Asian banks tend to be less prone to systemic risk 
than their European counterparts. 
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4.6. Contagion risk result 
4.6.1. Distance to default contagion 
The distance to default contagion (shock transfer) results show a strong correlation 
between the sample countries. The results identify contagion using the one-day 
lagged exceedances in the other nineteen countries if their Multinomial Logistic 
Model regression results are positive and substantial. The model assumes this as a 
contagion commencing in that country and moving into the dependent variable or 
host country in accordance to the thesis’s methodology from Chapter 3. Tables 
4.6.1.1 to 4.6.1.3 illustrate the shock transfer results for all the countries using this 
methodology. In order to explain them in a simplified manner, the study illustrates 
the p-value (using 5% confidence level)11 for different states excluding the base state 
112 in tables 4.6.1.1 to 4.6.1.3. In these tables, the model also includes stock market 
volatility, world index volatility, the GFC and term structure spread as explanatory 
variables, following the practice of previous studies (Chan-Lau & Sy, 2007; Daly, 
Batten, Mishra, & Choudhury, 2017). 
These results clearly show strong support for the autocorrelation of the exceedances, 
given most of the exceedances are positively significant for the sample countries. 
                                                 
11 The study discovers that the contagion effect is most substantial at the five per cent level for 
reporting the coexceedances in the thesis’smodel. This is also supported by increased Pseudo R 
Square in the thesis’sestimate outcome. It is also significant that adding the one-day lagged 
exceedances from other sample countries does not affect the majority of fluctuations in results 
compared to two- or three-day lagged variables. 
12 In a multinomial logic model, the model takes the first state as the base outcome and computes the 
possibility of other states occurring given the base state. Thus the result of the base state is omitted 
(Matejka & McKay, 2014). 
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Beyond that, there is clear evidence of a correlated global banking sector (shown by 
the p values from the tables) with some major patterns. As expected, the US is the 
most influential factor, closely followed by Mexico, France, World index, GARCH 
volatility and the GFC. The results also show clear patterns of shocks moving 
between economies with a one-day lag, consistent with the thesis’smethodology. An 
unexpected result, however, is the lack of shock transfer for the rest of the G-8 
economies. This clearly suggests that these leading global economies, such as the 
UK and Germany, are not connected to other economies at a level that was expected 
(Wong & Fong, 2011). The US, Spain, South Africa, India and China are least 
effected by other countries’ financial conditions accordance to these results. Of these 
five countries, South Africa, India and China are currently the key members of 
BRICS group, which make it reasonable to assume that, as developing economies, 
they still have not achieved same level of interconnectivity as developed nations. 
However, the fact that the US and Spain have shielded their economies from the 
external shocks of other economies is quite remarkable, especially as the US is the 
most influential economy when it comes to transmitting shocks. This indicates the 
extent to which the world economies are dependent on the US, but not vice-versa. In 
addition, Switzerland, Sweden, Mexico and Denmark transfer shocks from a large 
number of economies.  
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Table 4.6.1.1. DD state 2 Contagion 
 
 
 
US Australia Belgium UK
Switzerla
nd Sweden Spain
South 
Africa
Netherla
nd Mexico Malaysia Japan Italy Germany France Denmark Brazil India China Korea
Lag number o f exceedances : US 0.037 0.003 0.014 0.021 0.02 0.017 0.019 0.008 0.011
Lag number o f exceedances : AU 0.025
Lag number o f exceedances : BE 0.019 0.013 0.005
Lag number o f exceedances : UK 0.049
Lag number o f exceedances : SL 0.031 0.017
Lag number o f exceedances : SW 0.025
Lag number o f exceedances : SP 0.044 0.001 0.003 0.005
Lag number o f exceedances : SA 0 0.007 0.003
Lag number o f exceedances : NL 0.003
Lag number o f exceedances : MX 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.018 0
Lag number o f exceedances : MY 0.01 0.04 0.015
Lag number o f exceedances : J P 0.029 0.035
Lag number o f exceedances : IT 0.03 0.035 0.025 0.017 0.022 0.028
Lag number o f exceedances : GM 0.035
Lag number o f exceedances : FR 0.005 0.005 0.019 0.002 0.028
Lag number o f exceedances : DM
Lag number o f exceedances : BR 0.015 0.01 0.031
Lag number o f exceedances : IN 0.022
Lag number o f exceedances : CH 0.044
Lag number o f exceedances : KR
Garch Vo la tility 0.003 0.005 0.024 0.049
Wo rld index vo la tility 0.025
Term Struc ture 0.006
Co ns tant
GFC 0 0.034 0.002 0.027 0.016 0.03 0.039 0 0.043
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Table 4.6.1.2. DD state 3 Contagion 
 
 
 
US Australia Belgium UK
Switzerla
nd Sweden Spain
South 
Africa
Netherla
nd Mexico Malaysia Japan Italy Germany France Denmark Brazil India China Korea
Lag number o f exceedances : US 0.012 0 0 0 0.017 0.027 0 0.046 0.014 0.006
Lag number o f exceedances : AU 0.005
Lag number o f exceedances : BE 0.032 0.023
Lag number o f exceedances : UK 0.009 0.01 0.023
Lag number o f exceedances : SL 0.009
Lag number o f exceedances : SW 0.009 0.004
Lag number o f exceedances : SP 0.018
Lag number o f exceedances : SA 0.015 0.037 0.021
Lag number o f exceedances : NL 0.006 0.001
Lag number o f exceedances : MX 0.004 0.042 0.021 0.045 0.027 0.037
Lag number o f exceedances : MY 0.035 0.034 0.011
Lag number o f exceedances : J P 0.044 0.003 0.005
Lag number o f exceedances : IT
Lag number o f exceedances : GM 0.011 0.032
Lag number o f exceedances : FR 0.006 0.005 0.025 0.03 0.013 0.007 0.042 0.014 0.001
Lag number o f exceedances : DM
Lag number o f exceedances : BR 0.015 0.002 0.001
Lag number o f exceedances : IN
Lag number o f exceedances : CH 0.019 0.01 0.035
Lag number o f exceedances : KR 0.012
Garch Vo la tility 0.008 0.017 0.007
Wo rld index vo la tility 0.031 0.033 0.049
Term Struc ture 0.015 0.009 0.014 0.021
Co ns tant
GFC 0.001 0.022 0.044
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Table 4.6.1.3. DD state 4 Contagion 
 
 
 
US Australia Belgium UK
Switzerla
nd Sweden Spain
South 
Africa
Netherla
nd Mexico Malaysia Japan Italy Germany France Denmark Brazil India China Korea
Lag number o f exceedances : US 0 0 0.043 0.044 0.008 0.023 0.004
Lag number o f exceedances : AU 0.037
Lag number o f exceedances : BE
Lag number o f exceedances : UK
Lag number o f exceedances : SL 0.001
Lag number o f exceedances : SW
Lag number o f exceedances : SP 0.003
Lag number o f exceedances : SA 0 0.002
Lag number o f exceedances : NL 0.039
Lag number o f exceedances : MX 0.02 0 0.001 0.016
Lag number o f exceedances : MY 0.03
Lag number o f exceedances : J P 0.004 0.011 0.013
Lag number o f exceedances : IT
Lag number o f exceedances : GM
Lag number o f exceedances : FR 0.033 0.019 0
Lag number o f exceedances : DM
Lag number o f exceedances : BR
Lag number o f exceedances : IN 0.018 0.044
Lag number o f exceedances : CH 0.047 0.023 0.032
Lag number o f exceedances : KR 0.001
Garch Vo la tility 0.003 0.017 0.03 0.002 0.004 0.031 0
Wo rld index vo la tility 0.028 0.001 0.028
Term Struc ture 0.016
Co ns tant
GFC 0.008 0.043 0 0.031
 94 
The significant p-values from tables 4.6.1.1 to 4.6.1.3 are collated in table 4.6.1.4. In 
this table, one can see an overall macro-economic pattern between the countries. 
Less developed countries are more immune to external shocks from their 
counterparts and vice versa. Additionally, the higher the level of the shock the lower 
their movement throughout the economies. Among the other explanatory variables, 
the GFC played a major role as an explanatory variable, whereas others failed to 
demonstrate significance in the model. 
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Table 4.6.1.4. DD Contagion 
 
 
 
US Australia Belgium UK
Switzerla
nd Sweden Spain
South 
Africa
Netherla
nd Mexico Malaysia Japan Italy Germany France Denmark Brazil India China Korea
Lag number o f exceedances : US 234 23 234 23 2 23 3 23 34 234 4 23 4
Lag number o f exceedances : AU 4 2 3
Lag number o f exceedances : BE 2 2 2 23 3
Lag number o f exceedances : UK 23 3 3
Lag number o f exceedances : SL 2 2 3 4 2
Lag number o f exceedances : SW 3 2 3
Lag number o f exceedances : SP 4 23 2 2 2
Lag number o f exceedances : SA 23 2 3 3 2 4
Lag number o f exceedances : NL 3 3 34 2
Lag number o f exceedances : MX 3 34 23 23 234 4 24 23
Lag number o f exceedances : MY 23 23 4 2 3
Lag number o f exceedances : J P 3 4 34 2 234
Lag number o f exceedances : IT 2 2 2 2 2 2
Lag number o f exceedances : GM 2 23 3
Lag number o f exceedances : FR 2 3 3 4 34 3 23 3 23 234
Lag number o f exceedances : DM 24
Lag number o f exceedances : BR 23 2 2 3 3
Lag number o f exceedances : IN 4 4 2
Lag number o f exceedances : CH 3 4 4 2 4 3 3
Lag number o f exceedances : KR 34 3 2
Garch Vo la tility 4 4 4 34 34 2 2 4 2 4
Wo rld index vo la tility 4 34 4 23 3
Term Struc ture 4 3 3 23 3 3 4
Co ns tant
GFC 2 234 4 234 2 2 23 24
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4.6.2. Distance to inefficiency contagion 
Distance to inefficiency values show a similar pattern of shock transfer as distance to 
default (see previous section). Table 4.6.2.1 shows the overall shock transfer result 
for the sample countries for this contagion risk. Overall, the result shows a strong 
correlation between countries. The chapter uses one-day lagged exceedances as 
contagion for each of the 20 sample countries as the explanatory variables of other 
countries. The study also include stock market volatility, world index volatility, the 
GFC and term structure spread as explanatory variables. 
Other than the clear evidence of a highly correlated global banking sector (for most 
of the countries), the results show some major patterns of shock movement following 
the path of DD in the previous part. Again, the distance to inefficiency indicator from 
the US identifies that country as the global leader, being most influential variable in 
the sample  followed by distance to inefficiency in the UK, distance to inefficiency in 
Germany, stock market volatility and the GFC (as expected). Relating the result with 
the previous section, DI shows more interconnectedness among economies other than 
Belgium, Japan, Brazil and India, where shock from other countries was not 
transmitted to their financial sector. Most surprisingly, India is immune from the 
shocks from other economies. The study attributes this trend to the underlying 
characteristics of the Indian economy, which depends largely on non-financial 
business (Bosworth, Collins, & Virmani, 2007). Among the other explanatory 
variables, the GFC was most significant whereas, once again, other explanatory 
variables failed to exert a significant influence within the model. Overall, the general 
patterns are quite similar to the distance to default. Again, less developed countries 
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are more immune to external shocks and smaller shocks travel more than larger 
shocks.                                                      
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Table 4.6.2.1- DI Contagion 
 
 
 
US Australia Belgium UK
Switzerla
nd Sweden Spain
South 
Africa
Netherla
nd Mexico Malaysia Japan Italy Germany France Denmark Brazil India China Korea
Lag number o f exceedances : US 234 234 234 234 234 234 4 23 4 3 4 34 2
Lag number o f exceedances : AU 24 4 3 24
Lag number o f exceedances : BE 23 2 3 3 4 4 4
Lag number o f exceedances : UK 23 3 2 3 3 23 34 2
Lag number o f exceedances : SL 4 4 2 3
Lag number o f exceedances : SW 34 2 4 2
Lag number o f exceedances : SP 34 2 234
Lag number o f exceedances : SA 34 3 2 3 3
Lag number o f exceedances : NL 4 3 2 24
Lag number o f exceedances : MX 3 2 3 23
Lag number o f exceedances : MY 23 234 4 3 3
Lag number o f exceedances : J P 2 4 4
Lag number o f exceedances : IT 234 4 3 2
Lag number o f exceedances : GM 3 3 234 2 2 2 3 4 24 3
Lag number o f exceedances : FR 3
Lag number o f exceedances : DM 2 3 3
Lag number o f exceedances : BR 4 34 3 3
Lag number o f exceedances : IN 2
Lag number o f exceedances : CH 4 2 2 2
Lag number o f exceedances : KR 3 3 23 2
Garch Vo la tility 3 34 2 234 24 23 234 2 2 24 4
Wo rld index vo la tility 3 4 24 234 2 24
Term Struc ture 2 4 2 3 4 23 3
Co ns tant
GFC 23 234 234 23 234 2 3 234 2 3 234 2 3 2
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4.6.3. Distance to capital contagion 
The distance to capital result displays a pattern of shock transfer analogous to the 
results of the previous two distance measures. Table 4.6.3.1 shows the overall shock 
transfer results for the DCs. Overall, the result shows a robust correlation between 
the world’s economies. As before, the chapter includes one-day lagged exceedances 
as contagion for each of the 20 sample countries as the explanatory variables of other 
countries. The chapter also includes stock market volatility, world index volatility, 
the GFC and term structure spread as explanatory variables. 
The US appears to be the most influential economy at transferring shocks, followed 
by the UK and Japan. Table 4.6.3.2 also illustrates that Brazil, China and South 
Africa are immune from the extreme shocks transmitted by other countries. This 
supports the thesis’s previous findings that less developed countries are more 
immune to external shocks. However, Australia, the Netherlands, France and Korea 
are most affected by other economies’ extreme shocks according to these results. The 
distance to capital follows a similar pattern to DD and DI. The GFC has a significant 
impact on DC. Less developed countries are more immune to outside shocks and 
smaller shocks move faster than larger shocks. 
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Table 4.6.3.1. DC Contagion 
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4.6.4. Overall contagion 
Finally, putting all three sets of results together will provide a clear picture of 
international contagion in the global banking sector. As expected, the developed 
countries are more affected than the developing countries when it comes to 
transmitting extreme shocks. Among the developed economies, the UK and the US 
are the two dominant economies when it comes to spreading shockwaves throughout 
the global banking sector. The results also clearly demonstrate that whenever a 
banking meltdown happens in these economies (US and UK), it is transmitted to 
most countries around the globe. The global financial crisis and the volatility of stock 
returns also had a dominant role in contagion risk in banking sector. The results 
indicate that developing economies and BRICS countries, such as Brazil, India and 
Malaysia, are the least affected by negative market movement or extreme state shock 
transfer. However, European countries are more prone to shock transfer, i.e. 
Switzerland, the Netherlands, France and Denmark. On the other side of the globe, 
Australia is the only extreme case where an economy receives most of the shocks 
from other economies but fails to transmit their shock to other countries; this is more 
commonly a characteristic of less developed economies. The chapter concludes that 
this is due to the more conservative nature of the Australian financial sector (Davis, 
2011). 
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4.7. Conclusion 
This chapter investigated the contagion risk for the global banking environment 
using three different distance to risk measures. Extreme shocks for global top banks 
were modelled as a function of extreme shocks experienced by other banks in 
country level settings. Four separate conditions of financial states (tranquil, 
disturbing, alarming and crisis) were used in this regard. The probability of these 
states moving through one country’s economy to another was calculated using the 
multinomial logistical model.  
Overall, the findings using all three different distance to risk measures revealed 
strong correlation between the sample countries’ banking systems and the UK and 
US. Other countries’ banking systems have a moderate effect on each other when it 
comes to shock transfer. The results also indicate that less developed or developing 
economies’ banking systems more resistant to financial shock. The key challenge is 
to ensure adequate collaboration related to cross-border supervision among banks at 
the global level. These changes need to be created and implemented by global 
regulators in collaboration with their local counterparts. This will not only be 
beneficial to the financial institutions but will also significantly benefit all the 
stakeholders involved in the process. 
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Chapter 5. Local contagion risk in US banking 
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5.1. Introduction 
This chapter investigates contagion risk between US states using the three different 
distance to risk measures (distance to default, distance to capital, distance to 
investment) described in the methodology. The chapter looks into US interstate 
contagion because of the enormous impact of the US economy on the global level.  
Most of the US states have greater economic capacity than many small- to medium-
sized countries (see Figure 5.1.1). Here the chapter has examined the contagion risk 
from 15 US states to the other US states (of the chapter’s sample) and to 19 
economically important countries (from the previous chapter) using extreme shocks 
as a quantifiable instrument of systemic risk. In order to do so, the study has 
measured the systemic risk using three altered version of distance to risk methods 
(distance to default, distance to inefficiency and distance to capital) introduced by the 
option pricing theory (Merton, 1976). As like the previous chapter, this chapter 
models extreme shocks for each US state as a function of extreme shocks 
experienced by other US states (in the sample) and countries using four separate 
financial conditions. The chapter then finds the probability of these financial states 
moving from one state’s banking system to another state’s banking system or another 
country’s banking system by employing the multinomial logistical model. The results 
of this chapter illustrate a robust correlation between the sample US states’ and 
countries’ banking systems; thus, shock from one state or country affects the other 
US states and countirs in the sample within a one-day lag. The study has also 
observed that smaller states transmit and receive more value shocks than their larger 
counterparts, while larger states show a higher capacity to resist shock than their 
smaller counterparts in all DD, DI and DC spillovers.  
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In the coming subsections, the chapter outlines the results of distance to default 
(Section 5.2), distance to inefficiency (5.3) and distance to capital (5.4) value 
calculations. The study then uses the exceedances calculation (5.5) as input variables 
of the core model. Finally, (5.6), the study discusses the results of the contagion risk. 
 
Figure 5.1.1 Size of US states’ economies 
5.2. Distance to default calculation 
Figures 4.2.1 and 5.2.1 represents the graphical movement plot for the thesis’s 
calculated DDs. Rather than putting all of them together; they are represented in two 
different plots. In the first plot is for the DDs for all the US states, and the second 
one is for the DDs for all the sample countries used in this chapter. The first figure 
shows that US states follow the exact same pattern throughout the graph. They start 
on average around 5 at the beginning of 2006 then go down to 1 at the end of 2009 
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(the higher the DD value the better for the banks given it is more distant than the 
hypothetical inefficient point), which is understandable as this is the period of the 
global financial crisis (2008-10). Finally, they start to recover at the end of 2010 and 
have been positioned steadily around 5 from the end of 2015. They also show a slight 
drop period at the end of 2012, reflecting a wider slowdown in the global economy 
(Shin, 2014). This shared pattern indicates that US state economies are heavily 
correlated and tend to follow each other. This correlation pattern indicates a high risk 
for contagion among the US states. On the other hand, the DD chart for sample 
countries (Figure 4.2.1) shows a more diverse result; the DDs from different 
countries follow a similar pattern but with a high interval bracket compare to the US 
states. The DD values in this chart (5.2.1) are stacked between 0 and 10. While the 
common pattern exhibits an average of around 5, deceasing over the period of the 
GFC, two countries – Mexico and Italy – demonstrate some immunity to this overall 
trend. As noted earlier (see Section 4.2), Italian banks traditionally exceed the global 
mean based on the innovative nature of the Italian economy. There was a sharp 
deterioration at the time of the GFC, but Italian banks have since improved greatly 
and are presently placed way ahead of other countries (as shown in Figure 4.2.1). 
Again as noted in Section 4.2, prior to the global financial crisis Mexico was in a 
strong position due to its links to US, but was impacted by the crisis of 2009-2010 
and went down which also reflects investor reluctance and falls in foreign direct 
venture after global financial crisis (Hanson, 2010). 
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Figure 5.2.1 Distance to default values for US states13 
 
                                                 
13 Vertical axis represents the distance from the hypothetical default point where each unit is represented by one standard deviation from the mean. According to the 
thesis’smethodology higher the distance better for the banks. 
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5.3. Distance to inefficiency calculation 
Figures 5.3.1 and 4.3.1 represent the distance to inefficiency values for the sample 
US states and countries as like DD.  The first (Figure 5.3.1) shows the distribution of 
the DIs of US states. From the first chart, it can be seen that these state economies 
are highly correlated and tend to move together, as in the previous results from 
distance to default. They range between 0 and 0.01 of the DI scale, other than during 
the time of the global financial crisis. In the year 2009-2010, the DIs of US states 
become highly volatile and scatter both ways around the mean. An important 
observation about the state DIs is that, even in the times of greater financial distress 
(e.g. 2009), the average mean value is always the same. Four sates stayed below 0 in 
the GFC period – Virginia, Michigan, Ohio and Georgia. A special case in the chart 
is California; before the GFC, was always considerably ahead of the other states, but 
after that period stacked with the others. The next graph (5.3.1) shows the DI 
distribution for the sample countries. Compared to the US states, they are slightly 
more scattered, with values ranging between 0 and 0.06. The exceptions are Japan 
and Korea, whose DIs are plotted above the comprehensive average all through the 
ten-year period, and especially during the GFC period. This pattern can be credited to 
the different banking practices of these Asian countries where they focus on extreme 
efficiency (Drake & Hall, 2003; Park & Weber, 2006). The overall findings of the 
section indicate that, due to the extreme similarities of the distance to inefficiency 
values across the world, for practical purposes DIs will mostly remain the same in 
future. 
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Figure 5.3.1. Distance to inefficiency values for US states14 
 
                                                 
14 Vertical axis represents the distance from the hypothetical inefficient point where each unit is represented by one standard deviation from the mean. According to the 
thesis’smethodology higher the distance better it is for the banks. 
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5.4. Distance to capital calculation 
Following Chapter 3, Figure 5.4.1 and Figure 4.4.1 illustrate the distance to capital 
values for the sample US states and countries respectively. The first chart represents 
the state level DCs which follow a similar pattern to DD and DI and move together. 
They are always plotted between 5 and 10, with the exception of two states and 
during the GFC period. In 2008–09 they went back up to 0 but subsequently 
recovered gradually. The two exceptions in the first chart are New York and New 
Jersey. New York, being the financial capital of the world (Sassen, 2016), was 
always positioned higher (at times up to 10 times higher) than the mean value before 
the global financial crisis. After 2010 it exhibited rapid decline, but still managed to 
stay significantly higher than any other state throughout the sample time period. On 
the other hand, New Jersey was always lower other states; at the peak of the global 
financial crisis, it even experienced negative scores on the distance to capital scale. It 
remained between around 0 and 1 through the timetable in accordance with the 
calculation. This occurrence may come from the highly global dependent 
characteristics of New Jersey economy (Matzler, Veider, & Kathan, 2015). The next 
chart (country-level DCs) depicts a more correlated world economy, but certainly not 
as closely correlated as the US states. Maximum distance to capital values are 
situated between 0 and 20, clear proof of the increased volatility in this distance 
measure. Mexico and Italy’s DI follow the same pattern as the DD in the previous 
section. The result also shows that Belgium enjoys higher capital value security, a 
finding also supported by previous researchers (Van Overfelt et al., 2009). Again 
following the trend of distance to default, there are two drop zones in the DI chart 
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where the scores deteriorated considerably, the global financial crisis and a two-year 
period from 2011 to 2013. 
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Figure 5.4.1. Distance to capital values for US states15 
 
                                                 
15 Vertical axis represents the distance from the hypothetical capital default point where each unit is represented by one standard deviation from the mean. According to the 
thesis’s methodology, the higher the distance the better it is for the banks. 
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5.5. Exceedances Calculation 
In this phase, the study computes the exceedances (or co-exceedances) from the 
previously calculated distance measurements (DD, DI and DC) of the sample US 
states and countries. These exceedances will be used as input variables in the MLM 
model. The outcomes from the exceedances computation demonstrate several 
interesting patterns. In the case of US states, extreme events tend to occur 
simultaneously in all the states, although the number of extreme events is 
significantly higher in DI and DC in comparison to DD. Additionally, for most of the 
sample countries DI and DD are more stable in condition 1 and 2, which indicates a 
positive value contagion. On the other hand, the DC values of the sample countries 
tend to move more into states 3 and 4. As anticipated, the frequency of states 3 and 4 
is higher the period 2009–2010 across the entire sample. Additionally, the DD, DI 
and DC values or India and China never cross into state 4. On the other hand, 
European countries move into state 3 and 4 more often than their counterparts in the 
global economy. Generally, the distance to risk values of the financially important 
US states and the Asian countries demonstrate a tendency to stay within states 1 and 
2 throughout the sample period. 
5.6. Contagion risk analysis 
5.6.1 Distance to default contagion 
The results of financial contagion created by DD spillover from US states and from 
countries in the sample revealed moderate correlation across the samples. In the base 
model, it calculates contagion by one-day lagged exceedances in the other 14 US 
states and 19 countries, if their multinomial logistic outcomes are significant (Akhter 
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& Daly, 2017; Akhter & Hasan, 2015).The model recognises this affect as contagion 
from those US states or countries into the underlined US state (defined as the 
dependent variable). Tables 5.6.1.1 to 5.6.1.3 demonstrate the spillover contagion 
within the US states form the MLM model. In these tables, the model uses the p-
value (at 5% c.l.)16 as the threshold for disturbing, alarming and crisis states 
(excluding the base state)17. Using these Tables, one can see how other countries or 
US states transfer their value shocks into the target US states within a one-day lag. 
As previously discussed, the study also adds stock market volatility, world index 
volatility, GFC and term structure spread as mutual explanatory variables. 
 
                                                 
16 The study assesses the contagion influence as most significant at the 5% level for reporting the co-
exceedances in the thesis’sMLM model. This is also reinforced by amplified Pseudo R Square in the 
thesis’sestimation result. Using one-day lagged co-exceedances from other sample US states or 
countries does not result in any variations in outcomes compared to two- or three-day lagged 
variables. 
17 The MLM uses the first state as the base outcome and calculates the likelihood of the other states 
considering the base state. Thus, the outcome of the base state is absent (Matejka & McKay, 2014). 
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Table 5.6.1.1. DD state 2 Contagion (state to state) 
 
 
 
 
California Newyork Gorgia Illinois Indiana
Massach
usetts Michigan
Mississip
pi
New 
Jersey
North 
Carolina Ohio
Pennsylv
ania Taxas Virginia
West 
Virginia
Lag number o f exceedances : Califo rnia 0.001 0.003
Lag number o f exceedances : Newyo rk
Lag number o f exceedances : Go rgia 0.002 0.026 0.004
Lag number o f exceedances : Illino is 0.015
Lag number o f exceedances : Indiana 0.017 0.017 0.043 0.006
Lag number o f exceedances : Mas s achus e tts 0.031 0.005 0.002 0.012
Lag number o f exceedances : Michigan
Lag number o f exceedances : Mis s is s ippi 0.002 0.048
Lag number o f exceedances : New J ers ey
Lag number o f exceedances : No rth Caro lina 0.017
Lag number o f exceedances : Ohio
Lag number o f exceedances : P enns ylvania
Lag number o f exceedances : Taxax 0.036
Lag number o f exceedances : Virginia 0.033 0 0.021
Lag number o f exceedances : Wes t Virginia
Garch Vo la tility
Wo rld index vo la tility
Term Struc ture
GFC 0 0 0 0.003 0.001 0.008 0 0.002 0.02 0 0 0
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Table 5.6.1.2- DD state 3 Contagion (state to state) 
 
 
 
 
California Newyork Gorgia Illinois Indiana
Massach
usetts Michigan
Mississip
pi
New 
Jersey
North 
Carolina Ohio
Pennsylv
ania Taxas Virginia
West 
Virginia
Lag number o f exceedances : Califo rnia 0.001
Lag number o f exceedances : Newyo rk
Lag number o f exceedances : Go rgia 0.011 0
Lag number o f exceedances : Illino is 0.024 0.036
Lag number o f exceedances : Indiana 0.007 0.039
Lag number o f exceedances : Mas s achus e tts 0.001 0.02 0.001 0.036 0.001 0.047 0.002 0.046 0.02
Lag number o f exceedances : Michigan
Lag number o f exceedances : Mis s is s ippi 0.034 0.027 0.016
Lag number o f exceedances : New J ers ey 0.022 0.047
Lag number o f exceedances : No rth Caro lina 0.009 0
Lag number o f exceedances : Ohio 0.037
Lag number o f exceedances : P enns ylvania 0.01 0.034
Lag number o f exceedances : Taxax 0.003 0.039 0.017
Lag number o f exceedances : Virginia 0.011 0.004 0.048
Lag number o f exceedances : Wes t Virginia
Garch Vo la tility 0.003
Wo rld index vo la tility
Term Struc ture
GFC 0 0.004 0 0 0.001 0.014 0 0.019 0 0 0 0.001 0.002 0 0
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Table 5.6.1.3- DD state 4 Contagion (state to state) 
 
 
 
California Newyork Gorgia Illinois Indiana
Massach
usetts Michigan
Mississip
pi
New 
Jersey
North 
Carolina Ohio
Pennsylv
ania Taxas Virginia
West 
Virginia
Lag number o f exceedances : Califo rnia 0.018 0.061 0.023
Lag number o f exceedances : Newyo rk 0.047
Lag number o f exceedances : Go rgia 0 0.003 0.042 0.006 0 0.021
Lag number o f exceedances : Illino is 0
Lag number o f exceedances : Indiana
Lag number o f exceedances : Mas s achus e tts 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.003
Lag number o f exceedances : Michigan
Lag number o f exceedances : Mis s is s ippi 0.006 0.035 0.009 0.001 0.007 0.027 0.036 0.002 0.006 0
Lag number o f exceedances : New J ers ey
Lag number o f exceedances : No rth Caro lina
Lag number o f exceedances : Ohio 0.041
Lag number o f exceedances : P enns ylvania 0.037
Lag number o f exceedances : Taxax 0.001
Lag number o f exceedances : Virginia 0.037 0.006
Lag number o f exceedances : Wes t Virginia
Garch Vo la tility 0.036
Wo rld index vo la tility
Term Struc ture 0.049 0.017 0.033
GFC 0.002 0 0 0.008 0.003 0 0.002 0.018 0 0 0.001 0.002 0.001
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In the next phase, the study collates all the results in Table 5.6.1.4 using the 
significant p-value from the previous tables, followed by another Table (5.6.1.5) 
showing correlation among these variables. As expected, Table 5.6.1.5 shows a very 
high degree of correlation among the US states (around 60%) and a moderate 
correlation (around 30%) for the rest. Following previous researchers,The thesishave 
taken this amount of correlation as demonstrating contagion within the sample 
countries and states (Gerhart, Wright, MAHAN, & Snell, 2000; Shrout & Fleiss, 
1979). Table 5.6.5.4 shows us the movement of a particular shock (ranked by 2, 3 
and 4) from a particular country or US state to the dependent US state. Looking at 
the Table, one can observe contagion among the sample states and countries. The 
most significant finding relate to the scale of shock transmission. The study finds that 
US states are more influenced by other countries than by other US states, especially 
when it comes to transmitting extreme financial conditions or crisis states. Another 
key observation is the ineffectiveness of common explanatory variables (with the 
exception of the global financial crisis). At this point, the research methodology has 
divided the discussions into two parts – contagion arising from US states and 
contagion arising from other countries. 
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Table 5.6.1.4- DD Contagion 
 
California Newyork Gorgia Illinois Indiana MassachusettsMichigan MississippiNew Jersey North CarolinaOhio PennsylvaniaTaxas Virginia West Virginia
Lag number of exceedances: California 23 4 2
Lag number of exceedances: Newyork 4
Lag number of exceedances: Gorgia 24 4 23 4 4 34 4 2
Lag number of exceedances: Illinois 4 3 3 2
Lag number of exceedances: Indiana 3 2 23 2 2
Lag number of exceedances: Massachusetts 23 23 4 34 34 3 3 3 234 2 3
Lag number of exceedances: Michigan
Lag number of exceedances: Mississippi 4 4 4 34 34 4 34 24 4 34
Lag number of exceedances: New Jersey 3 3
Lag number of exceedances: North Carolina 3 2
Lag number of exceedances: Ohio 3 34
Lag number of exceedances: Pennsylvania 3 3 4
Lag number of exceedances: Taxax 2 3 4 3
Lag number of exceedances: Virginia 3 34 2 2 24 3
Lag number of exceedances: West Virginia
Lag number of exceedances: KR 4 3
Lag number of exceedances: CH
Lag number of exceedances: IN 4 4 4
Lag number of exceedances: BR 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 34 3 34 234
Lag number of exceedances: DM 3 234 34 4
Lag number of exceedances: FR 234 24 2 2 23 3 4
Lag number of exceedances: GM 2 3 3 2 24
Lag number of exceedances: IT 4 4 4 4 3 3
Lag number of exceedances: JP 24 3 4 2 4 3 34
Lag number of exceedances: MY 2 2
Lag number of exceedances: MX 4 4 4 4 4 4 24 4 34 4
Lag number of exceedances: NL 4 4 24 23 3 4 23 3
Lag number of exceedances: SA 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4
Lag number of exceedances: SP 2 4 3 2
Lag number of exceedances: SW 2 2
Lag number of exceedances: SL 34 4 4
Lag number of exceedances: UK 24 34 24 24 3 234 234 4
Lag number of exceedances: BE 24 4 2 4 34 234 34 4 23 4
Lag number of exceedances: AU 2 4 4 2
Garch Volatility 4 3
World index volatility
Term Structure 4 4 4
GFC 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 34 3 34 234
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Table 5.6.1.5- DD Correlation 
 
 
 
 
 
ddcal ddny ddgor ddill ddind ddmas ddmic ddmis ddnj ddnc ddoho ddpen ddtex ddvir ddwv ddus ddau ddbe dduk ddsl ddsw ddsp ddsa ddru ddnl ddmx ddmy ddjp ddit ddgm ddfr dddm ddbr ddin ddch ddkr
ddcal 1
ddny 0.7054 1
ddgor 0.6647 0.5475 1
ddill 0.7282 0.5976 0.7161 1
ddind 0.6642 0.5499 0.6016 0.7033 1
ddmas 0.7078 0.6597 0.5895 0.6863 0.6852 1
ddmic 0.569 0.5115 0.5943 0.5659 0.4995 0.551 1
ddmis 0.6985 0.6172 0.5796 0.6914 0.7173 0.7006 0.5263 1
ddnj 0.6903 0.5822 0.6089 0.6974 0.6911 0.6935 0.5356 0.6915 1
ddnc 0.6758 0.646 0.6935 0.6678 0.5851 0.6042 0.547 0.5963 0.5962 1
ddoho 0.6977 0.6157 0.7128 0.6872 0.5926 0.6368 0.551 0.5856 0.5865 0.6988 1
ddpen 0.7506 0.6621 0.6381 0.7323 0.7147 0.7142 0.53 0.7482 0.7024 0.6581 0.682 1
ddtex 0.7252 0.6624 0.5596 0.6548 0.654 0.6753 0.4974 0.7385 0.6575 0.6146 0.6138 0.7352 1
ddvir 0.5881 0.5099 0.5568 0.6112 0.5569 0.5246 0.4534 0.5632 0.5497 0.5593 0.5422 0.5632 0.5333 1
ddwv 0.6712 0.574 0.6272 0.7266 0.708 0.6934 0.5693 0.7258 0.6981 0.6139 0.6063 0.7338 0.6802 0.5662 1
ddus 0.6847 0.8932 0.5793 0.6099 0.5279 0.6357 0.5259 0.5814 0.5612 0.6969 0.6321 0.6318 0.6164 0.4996 0.5673 1
ddau 0.3386 0.3877 0.2915 0.3081 0.2721 0.3344 0.31 0.2844 0.2853 0.306 0.3575 0.311 0.2965 0.3013 0.2958 0.3783 1
ddbe 0.391 0.4219 0.3559 0.3309 0.2907 0.3447 0.2806 0.3386 0.3445 0.4057 0.3437 0.3459 0.3611 0.3034 0.336 0.4205 0.2815 1
dduk 0.5325 0.6162 0.4663 0.4704 0.4265 0.5034 0.4535 0.4457 0.4213 0.5354 0.5579 0.5015 0.4748 0.4455 0.4713 0.6072 0.4574 0.4902 1
ddsl 0.4756 0.5837 0.3239 0.3692 0.3651 0.4653 0.3504 0.4128 0.3732 0.4231 0.4206 0.4379 0.4433 0.3551 0.4007 0.5536 0.4341 0.4609 0.6066 1
ddsw 0.4136 0.4421 0.3394 0.3559 0.3217 0.3659 0.3313 0.3245 0.3373 0.3706 0.3969 0.3663 0.3425 0.3042 0.3408 0.4443 0.4017 0.4211 0.5564 0.5326 1
ddsp 0.3588 0.4052 0.2555 0.2993 0.2893 0.3423 0.2635 0.3067 0.2908 0.3186 0.2896 0.3426 0.3345 0.275 0.2869 0.3702 0.3181 0.4329 0.4758 0.4832 0.4443 1
ddsa 0.3064 0.3209 0.2287 0.2846 0.2779 0.3081 0.2174 0.3018 0.2823 0.2771 0.3012 0.3161 0.3297 0.2741 0.312 0.3103 0.4884 0.2249 0.358 0.3503 0.3044 0.2547 1
ddru 0.1398 0.1303 0.074 0.0547 0.0791 0.0988 0.0331 0.0953 0.0964 0.0917 0.0832 0.1104 0.0918 0.074 0.062 0.1476 0.1603 0.1863 0.1654 0.1994 0.2245 0.169 0.2176 1
ddnl 0.424 0.4589 0.3232 0.3576 0.356 0.3835 0.3377 0.3548 0.3581 0.3689 0.364 0.3661 0.3584 0.3097 0.3318 0.4366 0.3833 0.4672 0.5258 0.5245 0.5032 0.4493 0.3018 0.2229 1
ddmx 0.3025 0.3652 0.25 0.2776 0.2645 0.3005 0.2565 0.281 0.3097 0.2695 0.2955 0.3102 0.3001 0.2364 0.2716 0.348 0.2756 0.2535 0.3491 0.3643 0.343 0.3032 0.2518 0.1629 0.3149 1
ddmy 0.2417 0.2724 0.1602 0.1597 0.1564 0.2234 0.1503 0.1996 0.184 0.1907 0.2179 0.2175 0.2338 0.2011 0.1884 0.2426 0.2626 0.2068 0.2659 0.3282 0.2808 0.2125 0.2304 0.1857 0.2614 0.2244 1
ddjp 0.3262 0.3209 0.2386 0.2655 0.2536 0.2719 0.2403 0.2516 0.2553 0.2741 0.3211 0.3114 0.2935 0.2906 0.2647 0.3176 0.3552 0.2067 0.3607 0.3234 0.3208 0.2376 0.3101 0.1275 0.285 0.2031 0.2719 1
ddit 0.272 0.354 0.2032 0.2284 0.2138 0.2961 0.2382 0.2524 0.2613 0.2586 0.2388 0.2534 0.2737 0.19 0.2492 0.3381 0.1893 0.4292 0.4091 0.4114 0.3884 0.5093 0.1667 0.1453 0.423 0.2481 0.1768 0.1728 1
ddgm 0.4 0.4638 0.325 0.3301 0.3702 0.4004 0.3301 0.3771 0.3563 0.3909 0.359 0.3557 0.3491 0.2885 0.3533 0.4519 0.3408 0.482 0.5188 0.5009 0.4876 0.4723 0.2654 0.225 0.5168 0.3362 0.2551 0.2748 0.4758 1
ddfr 0.3675 0.4605 0.2688 0.3004 0.313 0.3511 0.287 0.3499 0.3205 0.3243 0.3349 0.3523 0.3664 0.2792 0.3158 0.4369 0.3714 0.4272 0.5318 0.5363 0.4866 0.4122 0.3076 0.1957 0.4927 0.2994 0.2737 0.3036 0.3363 0.4561 1
dddm 0.4495 0.4914 0.4105 0.3669 0.3399 0.4232 0.3901 0.3585 0.3505 0.4468 0.4644 0.4082 0.3859 0.3517 0.3813 0.4872 0.4248 0.4842 0.5802 0.552 0.514 0.4336 0.3127 0.2203 0.5293 0.3126 0.294 0.2972 0.3893 0.5201 0.4665 1
ddbr 0.1811 0.2404 0.1449 0.145 0.1896 0.199 0.1533 0.1878 0.157 0.1512 0.1971 0.1736 0.1605 0.1682 0.1737 0.219 0.2176 0.0874 0.2556 0.2798 0.2638 0.1225 0.2357 0.1345 0.2381 0.1617 0.2248 0.218 0.1048 0.1906 0.2514 0.2402 1
ddin 0.1458 0.2305 0.1192 0.1336 0.1343 0.1624 0.1213 0.1463 0.1349 0.1472 0.2004 0.1559 0.1443 0.1337 0.1255 0.2177 0.3094 0.1423 0.2631 0.2829 0.2304 0.17 0.2192 0.1155 0.2132 0.1894 0.2314 0.2263 0.1382 0.2225 0.2168 0.2345 0.1334 1
ddch 0.204 0.2875 0.142 0.1493 0.165 0.2162 0.1473 0.1899 0.1745 0.1891 0.2181 0.207 0.2291 0.207 0.1764 0.2794 0.2638 0.156 0.2693 0.3097 0.2149 0.2017 0.2058 0.0919 0.2553 0.1855 0.2179 0.2369 0.1625 0.2098 0.2918 0.2078 0.2153 0.2105 1
ddkr 0.2963 0.3462 0.2341 0.2504 0.2146 0.2565 0.2571 0.2257 0.2802 0.2601 0.2768 0.278 0.2624 0.2135 0.2444 0.3471 0.2776 0.2692 0.3534 0.3756 0.3639 0.2247 0.2293 0.2459 0.3262 0.2786 0.2358 0.3003 0.1959 0.3255 0.3401 0.3503 0.2066 0.1914 0.2284 1
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In the first part, the study looks into contagion from “state to state”. The most 
important observation regarding this part is the impact of size. The chart clearly 
shows larger states can tend to exert a strong influence on their smaller counterparts, 
as expected; the exception is Massachusetts, which appears to be immune to shocks 
from all other states excluding Indiana. Pennsylvania, at the other extreme, is the 
state most often affected by shocks from other states. Among the other large and 
economically dominant states, California and New York receive shocks from only 
four states. California, having one of the largest economies of the world, is also 
immune from level 4 value shocks, in accordance to the findings. Conversely, it 
transmits shocks to only three states – Georgia, Indiana and New Jersey – which 
indicates California enjoys a relatively insulated economic position within the USA. 
New York, the financial capital of the world, only managed to transmit its shocks to 
Illinois. Massachusetts and Mississippi are the most influential states in terms of 
transmitting shocks, followed by Georgia and Virginia. Given that Massachusetts 
experienced transmitted shocks from only one state, while having the highest 
capacity of transmitting shock to other states, it is one of the most influential states in 
this context. Notably, West Virginia failed to transmit its value shocks to any other 
states in the sample. 
In the next phase of the analysis, the study look into the contagion from foreign 
countries to the US states (Table 5.6.1.4). Surprisingly, the amount of spillover from 
international sources to US states is higher than between the states. This indicates a 
high level of contagion into the US states from the global economy. Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Illinois and Texas are the most affected by the shock transfer from 
other countries, and New York and Indiana the least affected. In most cases the US 
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states are affected by spillover of level 4 shock, rather than levels 2 or 3; this 
suggests that most US states can withstand smaller shocks from outside the world but 
are not immune to extreme value movements proofed by the previous subsections 
findings. In another unexpected result, The research has found that Brazil was the 
largest source of spillover to the US states, affecting every state in the sample and 
followed by Mexico and South Africa. These results demonstrate the ability of the 
BRICS countries to influence the US economy, previously noted by other researchers 
(Cheng, Gutierrez, Mahajan, Shachmurove, & Shahrokhi, 2007; Kocaarslan, Soytas, 
Sari, & Ugurlu, 2018).  
5.6.2. Distance to inefficiency contagion 
The distance to inefficiency contagion results show a similar pattern to the previous 
measurements. Using the same technique, the results between US states and 
countries are shown in Figure 5.6.2.1, followed by the correlation table on figure 
5.6.2.2. As expected, as with distance to default the correlation table for DI shows a 
relatively high level of association between the states, and moderate level between 
other countries and the US states. Again, other than the GFC none of the common 
explanatory variables showed any significant impact in the model. Following the 
previous section, the results are divided into two categories – contagion between US 
states and contagion between other countries and US states.  
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Table 5.6.2.1- DI Contagion 
 
California Newyork Gorgia Illinois Indiana MassachusettsMichigan MississippiNew Jersey North CarolinaOhio PennsylvaniaTaxas Virginia West Virginia
Lag number of exceedances: California 23 2 4 3 3
Lag number of exceedances: Newyork 3
Lag number of exceedances: Gorgia 4 4 2 4 234
Lag number of exceedances: Illinois 23 2
Lag number of exceedances: Indiana 2 2
Lag number of exceedances: Massachusetts 2 3 3 24 4 23 2
Lag number of exceedances: Michigan 4 34 4 4 34 4 34 4 24 4
Lag number of exceedances: Mississippi 4
Lag number of exceedances: New Jersey 4
Lag number of exceedances: North Carolina 4 3 23
Lag number of exceedances: Ohio 23 3 4
Lag number of exceedances: Pennsylvania 4 234 3 4 4 4
Lag number of exceedances: Taxax 3 234 3
Lag number of exceedances: Virginia 234 24 23 2 23 4 3 34 234 4 234
Lag number of exceedances: West Virginia 4 2 3 3 2
Lag number of exceedances: KR 24 3 234 3 2 34 3 2 3 23 234
Lag number of exceedances: CH 2 2 2 23 3 2 2 2
Lag number of exceedances: IN 3 3
Lag number of exceedances: BR 2 23 2 3
Lag number of exceedances: DM 2 2 2 4 2 3
Lag number of exceedances: FR 34 23 2 3
Lag number of exceedances: GM 34 34 4 4 2 4 3 4 4
Lag number of exceedances: IT 34 4 234 4 23 234 34
Lag number of exceedances: JP 3 2 4 2 4 3 34
Lag number of exceedances: MY 3 4 3 2
Lag number of exceedances: MX 3 4 4 4 2
Lag number of exceedances: NL 3 2 23 3
Lag number of exceedances: SA 4 4 2 34 4 4 4 34 4 3
Lag number of exceedances: SP 2 3 4 34 3
Lag number of exceedances: SW 3 34 3 24 4 4 3 34
Lag number of exceedances: SL 3 2
Lag number of exceedances: UK 34 24 24 34 4 34 4 2 234 234 24 34 4
Lag number of exceedances: BE 24 2
Lag number of exceedances: AU 234 234 4 3 3 2 2 34
Garch Volatility 4 4
World index volatility 4 24
Term Structure 34 4 2 4 4
GFC 234 234 234 234 234 234 23 24 234 234 234 234 23 34 234
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Table 5.6.2.1- DI Correlation 
 
 
 
dical diny digor diill diind dimas dimic dimis dinj dinc dioho dipen ditex divir diwv dius diau dibe diuk disl disw disp disa diru dinl dimx dimy dijp diit digm difr didm dibr diin dich dikr
dical 1
diny 0.6611 1
digor 0.5835 0.5163 1
diill 0.6841 0.5802 0.6974 1
diind 0.6188 0.5479 0.5935 0.684 1
dimas 0.6796 0.6006 0.5373 0.6541 0.6375 1
dimic 0.5065 0.4943 0.5563 0.5592 0.5111 0.5182 1
dimis 0.6748 0.582 0.5455 0.6957 0.6797 0.6787 0.5154 1
dinj 0.6393 0.5126 0.532 0.6639 0.6462 0.6633 0.5004 0.6871 1
dinc 0.6315 0.6252 0.6563 0.6573 0.5614 0.5838 0.5225 0.5666 0.5372 1
dioho 0.6354 0.6044 0.7161 0.6701 0.5821 0.5643 0.5634 0.5626 0.5224 0.6566 1
dipen 0.7075 0.622 0.5971 0.7307 0.687 0.6874 0.5011 0.7372 0.6835 0.6377 0.654 1
ditex 0.6932 0.5945 0.5159 0.6482 0.6196 0.6388 0.4778 0.7075 0.6374 0.5798 0.5721 0.7112 1
divir 0.4862 0.4684 0.5225 0.5752 0.5655 0.4834 0.4563 0.5318 0.4782 0.4905 0.5145 0.5315 0.481 1
diwv 0.6497 0.5209 0.5515 0.6816 0.7087 0.6358 0.4866 0.6901 0.6581 0.5511 0.5371 0.7018 0.6501 0.5194 1
dius 0.6565 0.887 0.5524 0.5944 0.5196 0.5869 0.5035 0.5633 0.5059 0.689 0.6273 0.6122 0.5652 0.454 0.5107 1
diau 0.3528 0.3542 0.3389 0.3313 0.2887 0.337 0.348 0.3029 0.288 0.3345 0.4069 0.3267 0.3019 0.2649 0.3085 0.3618 1
dibe 0.3128 0.3792 0.3391 0.2982 0.2158 0.2715 0.2669 0.2586 0.2421 0.3692 0.3126 0.2867 0.2718 0.2174 0.2359 0.4052 0.2352 1
diuk 0.3523 0.477 0.3714 0.4034 0.4026 0.3768 0.4199 0.3699 0.3034 0.3903 0.4694 0.4021 0.3713 0.3592 0.3535 0.4705 0.3957 0.3035 1
disl 0.4355 0.5264 0.3455 0.3666 0.316 0.4335 0.3539 0.3785 0.3146 0.4424 0.3833 0.3764 0.3773 0.307 0.3248 0.5122 0.378 0.4123 0.4419 1
disw 0.443 0.492 0.4157 0.427 0.3946 0.4263 0.4108 0.4106 0.3518 0.4596 0.4918 0.4058 0.388 0.33 0.3638 0.5064 0.4149 0.4093 0.5072 0.5084 1
disp 0.3097 0.3527 0.2138 0.2409 0.2013 0.2942 0.201 0.2901 0.2747 0.3215 0.2036 0.2894 0.3003 0.1709 0.2328 0.3459 0.2253 0.4242 0.2244 0.4075 0.3758 1
disa 0.3019 0.3395 0.2868 0.2882 0.3059 0.2825 0.2682 0.2998 0.2818 0.2971 0.3432 0.3113 0.3098 0.2623 0.2798 0.3239 0.3121 0.1888 0.3684 0.3044 0.339 0.1727 1
diru 0.0748 0.1061 0.1331 0.0946 0.0649 0.0604 0.0819 0.0821 0.0953 0.1012 0.148 0.0963 0.0966 0.1086 0.0597 0.1317 0.0667 0.1262 0.0569 0.134 0.1579 0.0832 0.1492 1
dinl 0.372 0.4273 0.3625 0.3388 0.3273 0.3206 0.3345 0.3227 0.3015 0.3965 0.3855 0.3244 0.3134 0.3037 0.2892 0.433 0.3106 0.4537 0.3862 0.4617 0.4803 0.3296 0.3022 0.177 1
dimx 0.2406 0.2824 0.2393 0.2252 0.209 0.2111 0.1771 0.2101 0.2072 0.249 0.2322 0.2252 0.2379 0.2107 0.1906 0.2819 0.1847 0.2115 0.1831 0.2515 0.2576 0.2004 0.2265 0.1715 0.2396 1
dimy 0.2343 0.2507 0.2238 0.2347 0.1985 0.2411 0.223 0.2146 0.1903 0.2363 0.2622 0.2382 0.231 0.2246 0.1967 0.2535 0.2575 0.2114 0.2224 0.2591 0.2399 0.1863 0.2067 0.186 0.2735 0.1908 1
dijp 0.047 -0.0045 -0.0113 0.0098 0.0195 0.0406 -0.0231 0.0058 0.046 -0.0245 -0.0308 -0.0099 -0.0037 -0.0021 0.0565 -0.0026 0.0069 -0.0483 -0.0417 0.0072 -0.0179 0.0082 -0.0202 -0.062 -0.0429 0.0212 0.0049 1
diit 0.2152 0.281 0.1386 0.1428 0.0923 0.1976 0.1793 0.1907 0.1755 0.2397 0.1305 0.1745 0.1969 0.0679 0.1283 0.2892 0.1552 0.4467 0.1573 0.3529 0.303 0.6184 0.1061 0.0975 0.3598 0.1457 0.1606 0.0001 1
digm 0.2238 0.3572 0.2055 0.2383 0.2798 0.2557 0.2831 0.2571 0.2251 0.242 0.2678 0.259 0.2342 0.2192 0.2534 0.3315 0.259 0.184 0.4709 0.3239 0.3387 0.1555 0.2561 -0.0119 0.2779 0.1222 0.1614 0.0158 0.1185 1
difr 0.3001 0.4369 0.3026 0.2999 0.3249 0.3047 0.3755 0.292 0.255 0.3256 0.3925 0.3152 0.3038 0.3145 0.2848 0.4093 0.3433 0.317 0.5061 0.4246 0.3968 0.2458 0.292 0.0856 0.3809 0.154 0.1881 -0.0783 0.2388 0.4275 1
didm 0.3133 0.3948 0.3503 0.2947 0.2684 0.2952 0.3692 0.2524 0.2447 0.3646 0.3937 0.2865 0.2582 0.2647 0.2493 0.4131 0.3461 0.3502 0.3712 0.3967 0.4195 0.2889 0.2663 0.1297 0.4018 0.2188 0.2402 -0.0484 0.2709 0.2446 0.363 1
dibr 0.0928 0.1476 0.0796 0.0723 0.0966 0.1184 0.0855 0.1346 0.0715 0.0967 0.1075 0.1021 0.1064 0.1201 0.0733 0.1507 0.1086 0.0987 0.1084 0.1393 0.1377 0.1125 0.1435 0.167 0.1279 0.1617 0.1357 -0.0417 0.0808 0.0771 0.0658 0.1176 1
diin 0.1257 0.1876 0.1248 0.1263 0.1299 0.1635 0.1652 0.1422 0.1126 0.1477 0.1754 0.111 0.1295 0.1155 0.1132 0.1921 0.2048 0.106 0.2107 0.1706 0.1984 0.1194 0.1498 0.0256 0.16 0.0888 0.1272 0.0096 0.0961 0.2561 0.1978 0.1726 0.0684 1
dich 0.0536 0.0816 0.0718 0.0321 0.0252 0.081 0.0564 0.0667 0.0566 0.0619 0.0943 0.0627 0.0614 0.0763 0.0353 0.094 0.0654 0.1085 0.0607 0.1487 0.102 0.1149 0.1019 0.158 0.0868 0.1485 0.1087 -0.0042 0.1113 0.0113 0.0536 0.0599 0.067 0.0575 1
dikr 0.0966 0.0235 -0.0145 0.0393 0.0499 0.0962 -0.0094 0.0578 0.0804 0.0034 -0.0159 0.0322 0.0525 -0.0546 0.0863 0.0175 0.0439 -0.031 -0.0353 0.0581 0.0266 0.0647 0.0075 -0.1148 -0.001 0.05 0.0189 0.2941 0.015 0.0266 -0.0578 -0.0174 -0.0262 0.0105 0.002 1
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The results show similar financial contagion patterns between states as the previous 
section on DD, but with a more even distribution of shocks. The size of a state’s 
economy does not appear to play a role in this measure of systemic risk. As per the 
MLM’s findings, Georgia, New York and Ohio are most affected by contagion from 
other states, followed by California, Massachusetts and Indiana. Michigan is totally 
immune from shock transfer from any other states. Additionally, economically less 
important states (based on states current economic output in US economy) such as 
North Carolina and West Virginia are also highly immune from shock transfer. From 
a different perspective, Virginia and Michigan played the most prominent role in 
transferring shocks to other states, followed by Massachusetts. In a somewhat 
surprising outcome, shocks in highly economically developed states like California 
and New York spilled over to very few states, placing them on a par with less 
significant states like Mississippi, North Carolina and Illinois. 
Turning to the spillover from the sample countries, Table 5.6.2.1 shows an increased 
movement of categorised shocks, as see before (with DD). Most countries 
transmitted their DI value shocks to the US states. The one apparent anomaly in this 
context is New York, which is able to withstand spillover from most countries. The 
chart also shows that European counties (excluding Belgium) are more capable of 
transferring their shocks to the US states, while the developing economies and 
BRICS countries, like India, Brazil and Malaysia, have less influence on the 
inefficiency measures of US states. 
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5.6.3. Distance to capital contagion 
Overall the distance to capital contagion measure presents similar results, following 
the pattern of the two previous distance measures. The estimation results and the 
correlation table are provided in Table 5.6.3.1 and Table 5.6.3.2 respectively. As 
with the previous two sets of results, the level of correlation increases in distance to 
capital contagion. The overall result displays a strong association among the 
variables; again, the GFC is the only influential common explanatory variable. To 
discuss the results, the results are again divided into two parts, contagion between the 
US states and contagion from foreign countries to US states. 
Consistent with the previous results, there is a high level of systemic risk contagion 
between the US states. Indiana, Ohio and Virginia are most affected by the systemic 
risk spillover from other states, followed by Illinois and North Carolina. On the other 
hand, only one state generated spillover to Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. 
Supersized economies like California and New York showed a very high level of 
shock resistance in relation to other states. Pennsylvania and New Jersey transmitted 
the greatest number of shocks to other states, while New York was the lowest, with 
only one shock transmission (to Indiana). Looking at country-level contagion to US 
states, the UK, Belgium, India and Mexico influenced the largest number of US 
states, while Korea, Brazil, Italy and Sweden fail to have any significant impact. At 
the other end of the spillover, smaller states experienced more shocks than their 
larger counterparts did. The results also show that all states are affected by spillover 
(using DC) from the sample countries with the sole exception of New York, which 
again resisted most extreme value shocks calculated by distance to capital. 
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Table 5.6.3.1- DC Contagion 
 
California Newyork Gorgia Illinois Indiana MassachusettsMichigan MississippiNew Jersey North CarolinaOhio PennsylvaniaTaxas Virginia West Virginia
Lag number of exceedances: California 2 4 4 2 3 23
Lag number of exceedances: Newyork 4
Lag number of exceedances: Gorgia 4 4 34 4
Lag number of exceedances: Illinois 3 3 3 2
Lag number of exceedances: Indiana 3 2 3 4
Lag number of exceedances: Massachusetts 3 4 34 24 3 4
Lag number of exceedances: Michigan 3 2
Lag number of exceedances: Mississippi 2 4 2 3 2 3 4
Lag number of exceedances: New Jersey 34 2 24 4 3 3 3 4
Lag number of exceedances: North Carolina 2 2
Lag number of exceedances: Ohio 2 3 3 3
Lag number of exceedances: Pennsylvania 24 3 4 4 24 4 4 4 4 4
Lag number of exceedances: Taxax 24 2
Lag number of exceedances: Virginia 23 3
Lag number of exceedances: West Virginia 2 23
Lag number of exceedances: KR 3 3 2
Lag number of exceedances: CH 2 2 2 234
Lag number of exceedances: IN 234 4 4 4 34 234 234 4 4 234 24 24 234
Lag number of exceedances: BR 2 4 23 2
Lag number of exceedances: DM 4 4 4 2
Lag number of exceedances: FR 2 3 24 4 4 4
Lag number of exceedances: GM 4 34 4 2 34 23 3
Lag number of exceedances: IT 2
Lag number of exceedances: JP 4 3 4 4 4 4 234
Lag number of exceedances: MY 2 3 4 2
Lag number of exceedances: MX 4 4 3 4 34 4 234 4 4 4 4 2 4
Lag number of exceedances: NL 4 2 3 4
Lag number of exceedances: SA 24 4 3 4 3 4 4 4
Lag number of exceedances: SP 3
Lag number of exceedances: SW 3 2
Lag number of exceedances: SL 34 24 24 2 4 2 2 4 4
Lag number of exceedances: UK 4 34 4 24 34 24 34 4 2 34 4 4 234 234
Lag number of exceedances: BE 3 2 24 3 24 23 2 4 2 4 234 34
Lag number of exceedances: AU 4 34 3 34
Garch Volatility 24 2 234 4 34 3
World index volatility 2 3 2 2 3
Term Structure 3 2
GFC 24 23 234 234 23 234 234 4 34 234 3 234 4
 128 
Table 5.6.3.2- DC Correlation 
 
 
 
dccal dcny dcgor dcill dcind dcmas dcmic dcmis dcnj dcnc dcoho dcpen dctex dcvir dcwv dcus dcau dcbe dcuk dcsl dcsw dcsp dcsa dcru dcnl dcmx dcmy dcjp dcit dcgm dcfr dcdm dcbr dcin dcch dckr
dccal 1
dcny 0.6836 1
dcgor 0.6895 0.5802 1
dcill 0.7034 0.574 0.7029 1
dcind 0.6693 0.5246 0.6533 0.7031 1
dcmas 0.7089 0.6145 0.6604 0.6884 0.6788 1
dcmic 0.5937 0.4914 0.6261 0.6315 0.596 0.6167 1
dcmis 0.7149 0.5819 0.6742 0.7097 0.7307 0.6968 0.6055 1
dcnj 0.5809 0.4954 0.5812 0.5911 0.61 0.5952 0.5323 0.5911 1
dcnc 0.7025 0.666 0.7006 0.673 0.6262 0.6482 0.5664 0.6386 0.5363 1
dcoho 0.7105 0.629 0.7091 0.6537 0.6108 0.6626 0.5574 0.6277 0.5119 0.7285 1
dcpen 0.7466 0.6076 0.69 0.7018 0.7054 0.683 0.5865 0.7299 0.6152 0.6582 0.6884 1
dctex 0.7334 0.6201 0.6617 0.6774 0.6666 0.6762 0.5541 0.7416 0.567 0.6738 0.68 0.713 1
dcvir 0.6134 0.5382 0.6462 0.6531 0.6081 0.6073 0.6043 0.6101 0.5137 0.6367 0.6177 0.5979 0.5448 1
dcwv 0.6502 0.5188 0.6356 0.6697 0.7047 0.6555 0.5969 0.6922 0.6141 0.6068 0.5823 0.7282 0.6615 0.5728 1
dcus 0.6603 0.8994 0.6046 0.5917 0.5204 0.6094 0.514 0.5684 0.4965 0.6928 0.6358 0.5922 0.5892 0.5498 0.5057 1
dcau 0.2837 0.3396 0.2688 0.2524 0.2295 0.2834 0.2701 0.2258 0.2075 0.2974 0.2989 0.2481 0.225 0.2772 0.2096 0.3361 1
dcbe 0.3037 0.351 0.2794 0.2647 0.2707 0.3126 0.2349 0.2884 0.2247 0.2968 0.2613 0.2576 0.255 0.2988 0.2628 0.3361 0.1849 1
dcuk 0.4469 0.5239 0.4182 0.4093 0.4126 0.4491 0.4102 0.4092 0.3217 0.4732 0.4598 0.4232 0.4251 0.4553 0.3979 0.5052 0.4191 0.3323 1
dcsl 0.4118 0.5114 0.3316 0.3062 0.3237 0.4061 0.3087 0.3598 0.2781 0.4025 0.3909 0.3577 0.3799 0.3393 0.339 0.4863 0.3943 0.4417 0.5307 1
dcsw 0.4043 0.4696 0.3125 0.3185 0.3162 0.3792 0.2847 0.322 0.274 0.3816 0.3547 0.3417 0.3561 0.2959 0.3138 0.4438 0.3676 0.3443 0.4468 0.5172 1
dcsp 0.3677 0.4156 0.3046 0.3053 0.318 0.3601 0.2784 0.2994 0.2636 0.3141 0.3073 0.3287 0.3282 0.2966 0.2882 0.3791 0.3055 0.344 0.4626 0.4815 0.5395 1
dcsa 0.3131 0.3048 0.2545 0.283 0.2852 0.3066 0.245 0.2771 0.2339 0.2949 0.2929 0.2872 0.3197 0.2798 0.288 0.3013 0.3178 0.2489 0.3661 0.343 0.3114 0.324 1
dcru 0.1397 0.1646 0.0625 0.0768 0.1056 0.1116 0.027 0.1053 0.0809 0.13 0.0962 0.1068 0.1023 0.0677 0.0851 0.1607 0.1222 0.1789 0.1458 0.1895 0.2523 0.1925 0.2434 1
dcnl 0.3234 0.4071 0.2396 0.2661 0.3212 0.3449 0.2336 0.305 0.2403 0.3096 0.2796 0.311 0.291 0.2559 0.2742 0.3686 0.3151 0.4199 0.4118 0.4855 0.4735 0.4542 0.3369 0.269 1
dcmx 0.282 0.3447 0.2539 0.2741 0.2854 0.2959 0.2482 0.2852 0.2854 0.2688 0.28 0.2716 0.2965 0.2345 0.2398 0.336 0.2367 0.2039 0.2863 0.3346 0.3033 0.3138 0.2492 0.1696 0.2828 1
dcmy 0.2174 0.2842 0.1665 0.1415 0.1419 0.2036 0.1559 0.1794 0.1536 0.2109 0.2073 0.1729 0.2217 0.1557 0.1468 0.2429 0.2248 0.1959 0.254 0.3097 0.2716 0.2288 0.2195 0.1551 0.2464 0.1969 1
dcjp 0.3389 0.3704 0.2943 0.2738 0.2962 0.3035 0.2887 0.2788 0.2 0.3493 0.3497 0.2818 0.3097 0.3354 0.25 0.3647 0.324 0.1808 0.3903 0.3275 0.3392 0.309 0.3122 0.1218 0.2289 0.2049 0.2562 1
dcit 0.304 0.3555 0.2735 0.2363 0.2366 0.3079 0.2272 0.2326 0.2429 0.2816 0.2788 0.2841 0.2739 0.2311 0.2312 0.3302 0.1987 0.3122 0.3885 0.3622 0.4025 0.4622 0.2205 0.1605 0.3398 0.2449 0.1793 0.2099 1
dcgm 0.3296 0.3705 0.2957 0.2987 0.3243 0.3381 0.3206 0.3144 0.2962 0.2872 0.2985 0.298 0.28 0.2828 0.2928 0.3763 0.2794 0.2873 0.394 0.3838 0.4202 0.4296 0.2493 0.1991 0.4353 0.2842 0.2125 0.2498 0.3482 1
dcfr 0.408 0.4786 0.3282 0.3234 0.3553 0.3754 0.3062 0.352 0.3018 0.3832 0.3457 0.3681 0.3769 0.3211 0.3246 0.4486 0.3477 0.4301 0.5389 0.525 0.5164 0.4942 0.307 0.192 0.5058 0.2884 0.253 0.3021 0.4514 0.4254 1
dcdm 0.4208 0.4884 0.3713 0.3362 0.335 0.3979 0.3327 0.3258 0.3035 0.4201 0.415 0.3721 0.3673 0.3593 0.331 0.4597 0.3843 0.3414 0.5088 0.5124 0.526 0.4821 0.3318 0.2373 0.44 0.2926 0.2756 0.3387 0.3643 0.4189 0.4843 1
dcbr 0.1915 0.2547 0.1893 0.1612 0.1936 0.2178 0.1853 0.1865 0.1456 0.2018 0.2102 0.1776 0.1773 0.233 0.1731 0.248 0.2055 0.1663 0.3913 0.2982 0.2172 0.2014 0.2142 0.1687 0.2511 0.1764 0.2034 0.2063 0.2081 0.207 0.269 0.2738 1
dcin 0.0913 0.1702 0.0959 0.0783 0.0988 0.1009 0.0663 0.0835 0.1112 0.1365 0.1157 0.0836 0.0695 0.1013 0.0661 0.1587 0.2056 0.1738 0.2662 0.2105 0.1416 0.204 0.177 0.149 0.1942 0.1254 0.1568 0.1554 0.1854 0.1523 0.1829 0.1936 0.1822 1
dcch 0.2358 0.3192 0.1944 0.1848 0.2013 0.2508 0.2188 0.2008 0.1871 0.2543 0.2498 0.2113 0.2371 0.2407 0.2053 0.3111 0.2591 0.1996 0.4083 0.296 0.2193 0.2256 0.2101 0.1057 0.2884 0.1883 0.2073 0.2388 0.2669 0.2351 0.3247 0.2692 0.3089 0.2304 1
dckr 0.3123 0.3714 0.2725 0.2643 0.2428 0.2945 0.2636 0.247 0.234 0.2921 0.2742 0.2724 0.2649 0.2627 0.2372 0.3833 0.2421 0.2563 0.3365 0.389 0.3771 0.2953 0.2346 0.2379 0.3078 0.2622 0.1988 0.3001 0.2684 0.3257 0.3378 0.363 0.2012 0.1385 0.2447 1
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5.6.4. Overall contagion 
Overall, the contagion risk analyses (based on DD, DI and DC) show a scattered but 
moderate level of contagion between the US states, and scattered but extreme 
contagion from foreign countries to US states. Smaller states are transmitting and 
receiving more value shocks than their larger counterparts, while the larger states 
show greater resistance to shock than their smaller counterparts. Two of the largest 
US states (in economic terms), California and New York, transmit the fewest shocks 
to the other states. But perhaps the most important observation of this chapter 
concerns the transmission of categorical shocks. Larger shocks are more contagious 
that the smaller shocks, given their impact. The contagion is also consistent between 
the states and countries, which indicates a high level of validation of the results.  
5.7. Conclusion 
This chapter explored the contagion risk for the US banking sector divided by states 
using three diverse distance to risk procedures. Extreme shocks for US states were 
modelled as a function of extreme shocks faced by other US states or countries. Four 
distinct settings of financial stress were formulated for this purpose. The likelihood 
of these stress conditions moving through the sample were calculated using a 
multinomial logistic model.  
Generally, the results from all three diverse distance to risk procedures indicated 
robust correlation between the US states’ banking systems and other states and 
countries. The results also indicate that larger states are immune from financial shock 
to a higher degree. The findings suggest that the critical task is to protect acceptable 
levels of correlation through cross-state regulation among banks at the international 
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level to secure a safe, stable and sound financial future. Financial institutions should 
also look into the deeper impact of credit regulation through Basel implementation 
and its impact on cross- border systemic risk spillover, given that these findings 
show contagion varies significantly between DC and DD (given DC is “DD 
calculated with Basel requirement”).   
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6.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the contagion risk for the US banking sector (as represented 
by sixty of the large US banks) using the three different distance to risk methods 
(distance to default, distance to inefficiency and distance to capital) described earlier. 
This chapter differs from the previous chapter in using a different source to identify 
contagion. In this chapter, rather than looking into geographical contagion inside the 
US, this chapter looks into bank-to-bank contagion to better understand spillover 
specifically among the banks. To address this research goal, the chapter observes the 
movement of systemic risk in the top 4 banks in each of the 15 US state in the 
thesis’s sample. The study then look into how these shocks transfer from one bank to 
another in the sample. The final results show an evenly distributed contagion 
between the US banks. They also indicate that minor banks are both diffusing and 
receiving more value shocks than their larger counterparts, while larger banks 
showing higher resistance to shock than their smaller colleagues in all three of the 
distance to risk measures. In this regard, the study has found no evidence of the 
superiority of GSIB banks; two of the largest US banks, Citi and JP Morgan, are 
among the least active. This primarily because of the nature of their business, which 
is more global then local (Demirer, Diebold, Liu, & Yilmaz, 2018; Glasserman & 
Loudis, 2015) thus these two banks reluctance to receive or spreading value shocks 
in the results. Perhaps the most important aspect of this study is the findings that 
point to the minimal amount of “extreme financial state” bias in contagion risk across 
all three distance to risk measures. The study also founds that DD has the strongest 
spillover effect (compared to DI and DC). Additionally, contagion is steady across 
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the banks for the different distance to risk measures, which validates the outcomes of 
the previous chapters. 
6.2. Extreme event calculation 
As the study has already calculated distance to default, distance to inefficiency and 
distance to capital for the individual sample banks in the previous chapter, this 
chapter starts by calculating the extreme events (exceedances) from these distance 
measurement (DD, DI and DC) values of US banks. These will be used as input 
variables in the logistic regression model. The results from the exceedances 
calculation reveal several interesting patterns. In case of most banks, extreme events 
tend to materialise simultaneously in all the states, although there are fewer extreme 
events in relation to DI and DC than there are for DD. Additionally, DC values tend 
to move more into extreme events. As expected, exceedances that are more frequent 
are detected during the GFC period.  
6.3. Contagion risk analysis 
6.3.1. Distance to default contagion 
The overall result of the contagion risk analysis using DD shows a highly correlated 
banking industry within the USA. The multinomial logistic regression results and 
correlation analysis are provided in Table 6.3.1.1 and Table 6.3.1.2. The results from 
the correlation analysis table clearly indicate high correlation across US banks (an 
average of 45%). The amount of correlation increases where there is a positive 
outcome from the logistic regression table (6.3.1.1) for those banks. In order to 
present the results in a more simplified manner, the chapter has used p-value (with 
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5% confidence interval)18 for analysis (exclusive of the base state)19. The results in 
Table 6.3.1.1 use banks moving their value shocks to the host bank within a one-day 
lag period as the criterion of financial contagion.  
On average, most of the banks receive broadly similar numbers of shocks from other 
banks. However, some banks show different trends, being affected more severely by 
their peers (e.g. Ameris Bancorp, MB Financial Inc, First Merchants Corporations 
and Towne Bank), while others are less affected (e.g. SVB Financial Group, 
Hancock Holding Company, Renasant Corporations and Isbanco Inc). Banks from 
Mississippi (for example Hancock Holding Company and Renasant Corporations) 
tend to be more affected by the movement of extreme shocks than other states. In 
terms of transmitting shocks, three banks display significantly higher impact – 
Synovus Financial Corp, First Merchants Corp and Suntrust Bank. Conversely, three 
banks – FNB Corporations, Isbanco and Comerica Incorporated – show significantly 
lower influence in generating spillover. 
Of the largest banks globally (i.e. 4th bracket GSIB banks), Citi was affected by 
shocks from JP Morgan, Synovus, First Merchants, Berkshire, PNC Financial 
Services and Premier Financial Bancorp. It transmitted its own shocks to Goldman, 
                                                 
18 The study assess that the contagion influence is most significant at 5% level for reporting the co-
exceedances in the thesis’s MLM model. Amplified Pseudo R Square in the thesis’s estimation result 
also reinforces this. Using one-day lagged co-exceedances produces no significant variations in results 
compare to two- or three-day lagged variables. 
19 The MLM uses the first state as the base outcome and calculates the probability of other states 
occurring considering the base state. Thus the outcome of the base state is absent (Matejka & McKay, 
2014). 
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Ameris, United Commercial, First Bushey, Independent and Bank of America. JP 
Morgan experienced spillover from Suntrust, Wintrust, First Merchants, Prosperity 
and Premier while transmitting its own shocks to Citi, Goldman, MB Financial, 
Connectone, Leakland, Provident, Vally National and Premier. An interesting 
observation is that JP Morgan transmitted shocks to all the sample banks in New 
Jersey suggesting a close relationship between the two.  
Overall, these results provide evidence of moderate home state bias in both receiving 
and transmitting shocks for most banks. The GSIB banks did not display a 
significantly higher level of influence in transmitting or receiving shocks; this may 
indicate that big banks in the US are more dependent on international business than 
their local counterparts (Haas & Lelyveld, 2014). 
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Table 6.3.1.1- DD Contagion 
 
cathey svb wells charles mellon citi goldman jpmorgan ameris suntrust synovus unitedcommunityfirstbusey firstmidwestmb wintrust 1stsource firstmerchantsoldnationalleaklandindianaberkshire bostonprivatebrookline statestreetchemical enterpriseflagstar independenttrustmark bancorpsouth
cathey 0.02 0.045 0.035
svb 0.023 0.016
wells 0.018 0.031 0.007 0.004
charles 0.009 0.032 0.031
mellon
citi 0.015 0.004 0.027 0.001 0.006
goldman 0.022
jpmorgan 0.017 0.004 0.039
ameris 0.003 0.042
suntrust 0.013 0.033 0.024 0.028 0 0.036 0.013 0.013 0.032 0.012 0.01
synovus 0.048 0.026 0.025 0.014 0.001 0.011 0.012
unitedcommunity 0.011 0.009 0.011
firstbusey 0.033 0.002 0.037
firstmidwest 0 0.01
mb 0.018 0 0.014
wintrust 0.036 0.044 0.035 0.049 0.002
1stsource 0.045 0.025
firstmerchants 0.001 0.041 0.031 0.007 0.003 0.016 0.001 0.028 0.01 0.003 0.001 0.026 0.038 0.02 0.011 0.006 0.001 0.017 0
oldnational 0 0.014 0.028 0.003
leaklandindiana 0.005
berkshire 0.012 0 0.041
bostonprivate 0.01 0.001 0.038 0.001 0.013 0.023 0.018
brookline 0.016 0.044
statestreet 0.013 0 0.004 0.038 0.026
chemical 0.015 0.016 0.005 0.016
enterprise
flagstar 0.003 0.035 0.001 0.005 0.028
independent 0.004 0.002 0.009 0.045 0.018
trustmark 0.003
bancorpsouth 0.003
hancock 0.032 0.043 0.03 0.025 0.017
renasant 0.03 0.007 0.024 0.005
connectone
leakland 0.048
provident 0.023
valley 0.024
bankofamerica 0.008 0.043 0.039 0.006 0.018 0.006 0.019
bbnt 0.014
firstcitizen 0.047 0
yadkin 0.042 0.029
fifththird 0.006
firstdefiance 0.046 0.039 0.033
huntington 0.048 0.04
keycorp 0.049 0.02 0.021
northwest 0.003
fulton 0.027 0.033 0.015
fnb
pnc 0.021 0 0.026
comerica
prosperity 0.005 0.017 0.01
texas 0 0.004 0.047
cullenfrost 0.042 0.03
capitalone 0.014 0.001 0.024 0.042
freddiemac 0.021 0.032
towne 0.002
union 0.005 0.009
premier 0.017 0.017 0.013 0.014 0.048 0.02 0.035
city 0.032 0.033 0.047 0.023 0.02 0.049
wesbanco
united 0.01 0.037 0.012 0.047
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hancock renasant connectoneleakland provident valley bankofamericabbnt firstcitizenyadkin fifththird firstdefiancehuntingtonkeycorp northwestfulton fnb pnc comerica prosperitytexas cullenfrostcapitalonefreddiemactowne union premier city wesbanco united
cathey 0.006 0.031 0.016
svb 0.039 0.007
wells 0.029 0.029
charles 0.035
mellon 0.004 0.042 0.027
citi 0.001
goldman 0.028 0.036
jpmorgan 0.048 0.021 0.028 0.041 0.011
ameris 0.019 0.048 0.028
suntrust 0.027 0.001 0.017 0.005 0.001 0.02 0.04 0.027 0.011 0.001 0.04 0.006 0 0.049 0.048 0.019
synovus 0.021 0.043 0 0 0.007 0.032
unitedcommunity 0.01 0.013 0.004 0.024 0.009
firstbusey 0.041
firstmidwest 0.045 0.01 0.003
mb 0.02 0.008
wintrust 0.008 0.012 0.044 0.048 0.049
1stsource 0.032 0.038
firstmerchants 0.003 0.001 0.01 0.002 0.003 0 0.022 0.042 0.011 0.009 0.045 0 0.001 0.003
oldnational 0.038 0.001 0.026 0.042
leaklandindiana 0.047 0.034
berkshire
bostonprivate 0.013 0.024
brookline 0.049 0.002 0.001
statestreet 0.006 0.005 0.016 0.002 0.021 0.005 0.009
chemical 0.013 0.013 0.014 0 0.043
enterprise
flagstar 0.007
independent 0.017
trustmark 0.01 0.023 0.016
bancorpsouth 0.044 0.002
hancock 0.012 0.015 0.003 0.001 0.02 0.037 0.008 0.044
renasant 0.001 0.027 0.013 0.04 0.034
connectone
leakland 0.015
provident 0.037 0.015
valley 0.005 0.018
bankofamerica 0.048 0.016
bbnt 0.001
firstcitizen 0.021
yadkin 0 0.02 0.014
fifththird 0.016
firstdefiance 0.007
huntington 0.005 0.01 0.048
keycorp 0.006 0.026 0.017
northwest
fulton 0.001 0.001 0.008
fnb 0.018 0.003
pnc 0.005
comerica 0.005 0.02
prosperity 0.007 0.026 0.027 0.025 0.022
texas 0.015
cullenfrost 0.035 0.008
capitalone 0
freddiemac 0.042 0.038
towne 0.043
union 0.039 0.028
premier 0.023 0.039 0.016 0.03 0.014 0.015
city 0.023 0.03  0.002
wesbanco 0.001 0.012
united 0.036 0.02 0.005 0.015 0.044 0.008
 138 
Table 6.3.1.2- DD Correlation 
 
cathey svb wells charles mellon citi goldman jpmorgan ameris suntrust synovusunitedcommunityf rstbuseyfirstmidwest mb wintrust 1stsourcefirstmerchantsoldnationalle klandindianaberkshirebostonprivatebrooklinestatestreet chemical enterprise flagstarindependentrustmarkbancorpsouth
cathey 1
svb 0.4478 1
wells 0.5557 0.4741 1
charles 0.3486 0.4386 0.3791 1
mellon 0.4124 0.4214 0.4863 0.4324 1
citi 0.4247 0.3617 0.501 0.3469 0.392 1
goldman 0.3597 0.3705 0.4674 0.4396 0.4383 0.5104 1
jpmorgan 0.4503 0.4432 0.6027 0.4283 0.4528 0.5667 0.57 1
ameris 0.4763 0.309 0.4438 0.2487 0.2984 0.3706 0.2805 0.3931 1
suntrust 0.564 0.5069 0.6147 0.3445 0.4346 0.4769 0.4112 0.5308 0.4452 1
synovus 0.5459 0.3861 0.5024 0.2471 0.3389 0.4164 0.309 0.4281 0.4143 0.587 1
unitedcommunity 0.4268 0.3158 0.366 0.2325 0.2566 0.3087 0.197 0.3106 0.3132 0.4014 0.4202 1
firstbusey 0.4887 0.3489 0.4186 0.2367 0.2918 0.3305 0.2286 0.3488 0.4098 0.4156 0.4249 0.3886 1
firstmidwest 0.6346 0.4471 0.5321 0.3379 0.4249 0.4406 0.3665 0.4502 0.4628 0.5885 0.541 0.4404 0.4942 1
mb 0.5676 0.4603 0.5144 0.3273 0.4199 0.4077 0.3466 0.4502 0.4586 0.5216 0.4262 0.3699 0.4782 0.6222 1
wintrust 0.5575 0.4338 0.5172 0.3206 0.3902 0.4149 0.3461 0.475 0.3895 0.5342 0.4803 0.3881 0.4287 0.6114 0.4997 1
1stsource 0.4681 0.3525 0.4444 0.2658 0.3446 0.337 0.3166 0.3979 0.468 0.4265 0.3859 0.3475 0.4115 0.501 0.4898 0.5059 1
firstmerchants 0.4402 0.3592 0.392 0.2602 0.3236 0.3109 0.2733 0.3635 0.4397 0.4183 0.4045 0.3327 0.3826 0.5081 0.4684 0.4454 0.4195 1
oldnational 0.5226 0.4514 0.5278 0.3626 0.3899 0.3706 0.3709 0.4813 0.4642 0.4788 0.4619 0.3735 0.4166 0.6098 0.5265 0.5576 0.4485 0.4686 1
leaklandindiana 0.3702 0.2958 0.3755 0.3223 0.3252 0.3173 0.3163 0.3371 0.3562 0.3346 0.2833 0.2808 0.3485 0.4276 0.376 0.3419 0.4692 0.3778 0.3788 1
berkshire 0.3389 0.2811 0.3284 0.2346 0.2603 0.2589 0.2686 0.2981 0.2951 0.3166 0.3247 0.2237 0.3126 0.3519 0.338 0.3567 0.3752 0.3393 0.3751 0.2477 1
bostonprivate 0.5549 0.3999 0.4663 0.2963 0.3809 0.3947 0.3091 0.4066 0.4101 0.4953 0.5013 0.4057 0.4114 0.5602 0.5112 0.4931 0.4442 0.443 0.4974 0.3713 0.3046 1
brookline 0.3936 0.3522 0.4031 0.3066 0.3311 0.3623 0.3745 0.3666 0.323 0.3578 0.3053 0.246 0.3117 0.4369 0.4231 0.4444 0.4153 0.3625 0.4686 0.3417 0.3787 0.3653 1
statestreet 0.3967 0.4373 0.4824 0.4533 0.556 0.4092 0.4245 0.4565 0.363 0.4322 0.337 0.2682 0.3339 0.4413 0.4176 0.3812 0.3421 0.3264 0.3996 0.3119 0.2225 0.346 0.376 1
chemical 0.4247 0.4393 0.4737 0.3247 0.3378 0.3821 0.3864 0.4553 0.4237 0.4332 0.3781 0.313 0.3917 0.4985 0.4869 0.498 0.5438 0.4617 0.5003 0.4716 0.4237 0.3928 0.4507 0.3587 1
enterprise 0.4444 0.3694 0.3745 0.2818 0.37 0.3115 0.2961 0.3601 0.4223 0.3866 0.3688 0.3213 0.3565 0.4462 0.4435 0.3757 0.4207 0.3804 0.4041 0.3579 0.3108 0.3993 0.3106 0.355 0.4195 1
flagstar 0.3405 0.1921 0.2384 0.1904 0.2042 0.3092 0.2455 0.2878 0.245 0.273 0.3288 0.2589 0.2108 0.2978 0.2722 0.2991 0.2835 0.2496 0.2725 0.2153 0.2552 0.3361 0.2413 0.1803 0.2914 0.2604 1
independent 0.3861 0.2294 0.2928 0.1815 0.1748 0.288 0.2277 0.2595 0.284 0.3118 0.3766 0.3268 0.2652 0.3536 0.3024 0.2681 0.2311 0.2559 0.2824 0.1727 0.2068 0.3617 0.1975 0.2121 0.2502 0.2948 0.2883 1
trustmark 0.5032 0.4356 0.5256 0.38 0.4194 0.3991 0.3836 0.4824 0.419 0.4879 0.4469 0.3649 0.3637 0.5718 0.5063 0.5128 0.5428 0.4137 0.5765 0.4385 0.3707 0.5129 0.4687 0.4239 0.5053 0.3826 0.2908 0.2758 1
bancorpsouth 0.4405 0.4228 0.4776 0.3542 0.4055 0.3848 0.3916 0.4752 0.3722 0.4683 0.3993 0.3035 0.3028 0.5057 0.4557 0.4564 0.4241 0.378 0.483 0.3929 0.2781 0.404 0.4119 0.3692 0.4633 0.3808 0.2667 0.2103 0.5433 1
hancock 0.4579 0.415 0.4165 0.3591 0.3434 0.3309 0.3157 0.4382 0.3213 0.3838 0.3608 0.313 0.3367 0.4641 0.4574 0.4414 0.402 0.3682 0.5007 0.3387 0.3295 0.399 0.3695 0.3332 0.4265 0.3639 0.2288 0.2502 0.5133 0.4762
renasant 0.4595 0.3898 0.4344 0.2935 0.3302 0.3827 0.3325 0.4231 0.4287 0.4428 0.377 0.3216 0.3757 0.4778 0.4666 0.4138 0.4373 0.3896 0.4756 0.3512 0.3417 0.4159 0.4009 0.3645 0.5125 0.3977 0.2538 0.2682 0.4412 0.393
connectone 0.2055 0.1972 0.1958 0.2399 0.182 0.1882 0.21 0.206 0.1857 0.2017 0.204 0.2052 0.2054 0.2492 0.2116 0.2067 0.2103 0.2329 0.2193 0.2435 0.2207 0.2159 0.2345 0.2201 0.2115 0.1867 0.1143 0.1391 0.2629 0.208
leakland 0.4576 0.33 0.3922 0.2809 0.2949 0.3491 0.3047 0.356 0.424 0.4073 0.3645 0.3809 0.4024 0.4518 0.4283 0.4183 0.4342 0.3772 0.4362 0.3521 0.3431 0.3975 0.3479 0.3068 0.4482 0.4255 0.246 0.3034 0.4153 0.3666
provident 0.4962 0.4162 0.4555 0.3472 0.3762 0.3617 0.3476 0.4268 0.3934 0.4667 0.3977 0.3437 0.3895 0.5458 0.464 0.4896 0.4519 0.4055 0.5191 0.3916 0.411 0.3939 0.5826 0.4097 0.4674 0.3654 0.2577 0.2192 0.5416 0.4836
valley 0.4554 0.4364 0.4924 0.3541 0.4354 0.3542 0.3497 0.426 0.3622 0.4131 0.3781 0.3127 0.344 0.4931 0.4854 0.4709 0.4081 0.3663 0.5143 0.3494 0.3339 0.3652 0.492 0.4512 0.4889 0.3558 0.228 0.2366 0.5365 0.4597
bankofamerica 0.5029 0.4247 0.6092 0.3437 0.4222 0.582 0.4846 0.5861 0.4518 0.5769 0.4811 0.3479 0.4061 0.5253 0.4898 0.482 0.4441 0.3852 0.4736 0.3693 0.3027 0.44 0.3652 0.4737 0.4436 0.3919 0.3085 0.2948 0.4251 0.4282
bbnt 0.5433 0.4809 0.6584 0.3583 0.4515 0.4804 0.4343 0.5721 0.4591 0.6403 0.5105 0.3447 0.3886 0.5484 0.5172 0.5476 0.4647 0.3982 0.535 0.3641 0.3283 0.4896 0.4333 0.4309 0.4645 0.3546 0.283 0.2773 0.5638 0.505
firstcitizen 0.3172 0.3155 0.3795 0.2618 0.2845 0.3219 0.2776 0.3689 0.2663 0.3491 0.2969 0.2109 0.2555 0.377 0.3426 0.3456 0.33 0.3292 0.3587 0.2809 0.2486 0.2913 0.3207 0.2973 0.352 0.2341 0.1435 0.1813 0.357 0.3472
yadkin 0.289 0.2434 0.2078 0.1262 0.1525 0.2084 0.1409 0.175 0.2761 0.2638 0.3118 0.2581 0.2683 0.3202 0.2594 0.1977 0.194 0.2732 0.2331 0.1636 0.1726 0.3121 0.1577 0.178 0.2425 0.2639 0.1709 0.2329 0.1666 0.1993
fifththird 0.5695 0.4737 0.5975 0.3294 0.4097 0.4795 0.4133 0.4933 0.4488 0.6915 0.5646 0.4151 0.3808 0.5532 0.4737 0.5302 0.4274 0.4153 0.4848 0.3291 0.2928 0.5504 0.363 0.3997 0.4449 0.3533 0.2976 0.2928 0.5124 0.4522
firstdefiance 0.2375 0.2352 0.194 0.1807 0.1934 0.201 0.1959 0.1756 0.2713 0.242 0.242 0.1811 0.2129 0.2488 0.1918 0.2254 0.1947 0.2198 0.2332 0.193 0.1893 0.2417 0.2338 0.2343 0.1779 0.2245 0.1825 0.2227 0.2124 0.1993
huntington 0.5588 0.4196 0.527 0.3469 0.3906 0.4603 0.3595 0.4614 0.4517 0.6026 0.5445 0.382 0.4134 0.5726 0.4668 0.5092 0.427 0.4111 0.4673 0.3191 0.3199 0.5524 0.3398 0.4579 0.4154 0.3792 0.3223 0.3069 0.4948 0.4346
keycorp 0.5431 0.4409 0.6051 0.3374 0.423 0.5036 0.3699 0.4926 0.4268 0.6328 0.536 0.3668 0.4087 0.5539 0.4832 0.4875 0.4305 0.4031 0.4771 0.344 0.2926 0.5208 0.3703 0.4106 0.391 0.3534 0.2803 0.2992 0.474 0.407
northwest 0.3373 0.3417 0.3681 0.2465 0.3714 0.298 0.2911 0.3378 0.2685 0.3131 0.2507 0.2774 0.3095 0.3713 0.3444 0.3661 0.3699 0.3235 0.3623 0.3617 0.2714 0.2903 0.4064 0.3261 0.393 0.2812 0.1699 0.1658 0.4012 0.3336
fulton 0.5483 0.4491 0.5264 0.3614 0.4232 0.4293 0.412 0.4823 0.4186 0.5262 0.4709 0.335 0.3771 0.5884 0.5234 0.54 0.4575 0.4181 0.577 0.3732 0.3677 0.4746 0.4371 0.4332 0.4881 0.3781 0.2559 0.2493 0.5247 0.4919
fnb 0.6153 0.4597 0.5626 0.3543 0.4331 0.4324 0.3717 0.4886 0.4593 0.5214 0.4909 0.3778 0.4283 0.6412 0.5862 0.5711 0.4869 0.4785 0.6505 0.3707 0.3452 0.5598 0.4655 0.4239 0.5097 0.4583 0.2975 0.2789 0.6149 0.5135
pnc 0.4542 0.5013 0.5394 0.3923 0.3871 0.4199 0.4066 0.5114 0.3674 0.5567 0.4121 0.281 0.3508 0.478 0.4704 0.4511 0.3696 0.3773 0.4823 0.3603 0.2701 0.3956 0.3557 0.4366 0.4679 0.3193 0.1665 0.2695 0.4531 0.4223
comerica 0.5324 0.4902 0.5812 0.3899 0.426 0.462 0.4127 0.5465 0.3878 0.5935 0.4885 0.3755 0.3827 0.5576 0.5343 0.5511 0.5024 0.4029 0.5194 0.3652 0.3321 0.496 0.4177 0.4575 0.4481 0.3679 0.2809 0.244 0.5384 0.4752
prosperity 0.4447 0.4295 0.4697 0.3644 0.3941 0.3837 0.3702 0.4457 0.3007 0.449 0.3725 0.288 0.3027 0.4723 0.4337 0.4489 0.3816 0.3254 0.4465 0.3544 0.3383 0.3726 0.3822 0.3748 0.4527 0.3163 0.2072 0.1793 0.495 0.4639
texas 0.3891 0.4307 0.4417 0.3791 0.3733 0.3573 0.3445 0.392 0.3438 0.4202 0.3328 0.2717 0.279 0.4592 0.4332 0.4072 0.3815 0.3343 0.4385 0.3199 0.2615 0.3629 0.3909 0.3812 0.4217 0.3487 0.2525 0.1952 0.459 0.4261
cullenfrost 0.3817 0.424 0.4298 0.3312 0.3725 0.3269 0.3504 0.4192 0.2792 0.4111 0.3031 0.2625 0.2842 0.4245 0.385 0.3883 0.3664 0.3271 0.4586 0.3543 0.2788 0.3444 0.4158 0.3635 0.4236 0.2829 0.1458 0.1444 0.4658 0.4877
capitalone 0.4935 0.4131 0.5536 0.3114 0.3964 0.4276 0.4116 0.4788 0.3675 0.5021 0.407 0.3032 0.3483 0.4928 0.437 0.4777 0.3639 0.3648 0.4126 0.3076 0.2645 0.4138 0.3377 0.4386 0.4134 0.3431 0.244 0.3012 0.4092 0.4026
freddiemac 0.0861 0.0729 0.1228 0.03 0.0273 0.1084 0.1017 0.1421 0.0393 0.0519 0.0299 0.0557 0.0285 0.1012 0.0585 0.0982 0.1218 0.0328 0.0947 0.0457 0.0652 0.0806 0.066 0.0443 0.065 0.0339 0.056 -0.0067 0.1077 0.0726
towne 0.4188 0.3003 0.3149 0.2274 0.2515 0.2325 0.1922 0.2714 0.4018 0.3452 0.3503 0.2986 0.369 0.4155 0.356 0.389 0.3961 0.3657 0.3967 0.2931 0.2526 0.3835 0.2667 0.2592 0.354 0.3228 0.1979 0.2507 0.3357 0.2793
union 0.4461 0.3213 0.3826 0.2121 0.2731 0.2852 0.2212 0.3297 0.4732 0.3854 0.3568 0.3003 0.4572 0.4716 0.4381 0.3957 0.46 0.4075 0.4127 0.3487 0.2882 0.3796 0.2959 0.2811 0.4334 0.3685 0.2366 0.2552 0.401 0.353
premier 0.2491 0.2148 0.247 0.1314 0.213 0.2655 0.1702 0.2217 0.2399 0.2243 0.2314 0.1981 0.225 0.267 0.221 0.267 0.1908 0.2711 0.2261 0.1503 0.1536 0.2593 0.1859 0.2294 0.2066 0.2266 0.2026 0.1986 0.223 0.2194
city 0.4432 0.4089 0.4156 0.2777 0.3344 0.3207 0.3078 0.3862 0.3706 0.4269 0.3446 0.3553 0.3702 0.4677 0.4738 0.4204 0.5283 0.3909 0.4623 0.3953 0.3485 0.399 0.4223 0.3226 0.4715 0.3928 0.2539 0.2474 0.4497 0.4265
wesbanco 0.5083 0.4138 0.4385 0.394 0.3575 0.3611 0.3678 0.4275 0.4674 0.4614 0.3985 0.3186 0.3931 0.5426 0.5535 0.4851 0.5596 0.4979 0.5091 0.436 0.3538 0.4953 0.4164 0.422 0.5273 0.4259 0.2865 0.2798 0.522 0.4346
united 0.5726 0.4321 0.5576 0.3319 0.3969 0.3873 0.357 0.442 0.4553 0.4918 0.4833 0.3946 0.4031 0.5955 0.5499 0.5479 0.5098 0.478 0.6047 0.3521 0.3768 0.5299 0.4964 0.4358 0.5121 0.4447 0.2761 0.2946 0.6196 0.484
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hancock renasantconnectoneleakland provident valleybankofamerica bbnt firstcitizen yadkin fifththirdfirstdefiancehuntington keycorp northwest fulton fnb pnc comerica prosperity texas cullenfrostcapitalonefreddiemac towne union premier city wesbanco united
hancock 1
renasant 0.3399 1
connectone 0.2066 0.2059 1
leakland 0.3389 0.4329 0.2268 1
provident 0.4342 0.3813 0.2198 0.4028 1
valley 0.4704 0.4112 0.1902 0.3603 0.5153 1
bankofamerica 0.3715 0.4621 0.1965 0.3784 0.3953 0.4244 1
bbnt 0.4134 0.4503 0.1877 0.3767 0.5034 0.4673 0.5553 1
firstcitizen 0.3534 0.3379 0.1738 0.2375 0.3705 0.3772 0.3498 0.3221 1
yadkin 0.1676 0.2406 0.1341 0.2689 0.1563 0.2218 0.2657 0.213 0.1878 1
fifththird 0.3814 0.4358 0.2079 0.3888 0.4596 0.4253 0.5425 0.6228 0.3485 0.2666 1
firstdefiance 0.1506 0.1878 0.237 0.224 0.2234 0.1723 0.2372 0.2214 0.1278 0.1869 0.2369 1
huntington 0.375 0.4072 0.1936 0.3774 0.4414 0.4019 0.5382 0.5625 0.352 0.2727 0.6485 0.2625 1
keycorp 0.3516 0.3921 0.184 0.3288 0.4669 0.4077 0.5314 0.6055 0.378 0.2502 0.6448 0.2079 0.6354 1
northwest 0.3032 0.3234 0.2414 0.3042 0.4179 0.3835 0.3198 0.3297 0.3015 0.1311 0.321 0.1946 0.3173 0.2802 1
fulton 0.4623 0.4525 0.2446 0.3786 0.5522 0.5547 0.5189 0.5482 0.4056 0.2391 0.5394 0.2289 0.5278 0.5084 0.3566 1
fnb 0.4876 0.497 0.2038 0.4284 0.5328 0.5075 0.4935 0.5751 0.386 0.2697 0.5564 0.1796 0.5687 0.5705 0.3719 0.5915 1
pnc 0.3741 0.4282 0.1852 0.3661 0.4209 0.4643 0.4736 0.5362 0.3632 0.2221 0.4983 0.2022 0.4737 0.4692 0.3291 0.5125 0.4921 1
comerica 0.4681 0.4469 0.2113 0.3648 0.4688 0.5099 0.5256 0.6158 0.3959 0.2162 0.5808 0.2052 0.5466 0.6079 0.324 0.5728 0.5634 0.5186 1
prosperity 0.4636 0.3626 0.1765 0.3109 0.451 0.4896 0.3999 0.4869 0.3947 0.1894 0.4886 0.1356 0.409 0.4151 0.3188 0.4947 0.4629 0.4685 0.4935 1
texas 0.4723 0.392 0.1958 0.336 0.3682 0.4451 0.4278 0.4434 0.3625 0.2008 0.4301 0.2078 0.402 0.3785 0.318 0.436 0.4756 0.4358 0.4628 0.5222 1
cullenfrost 0.4997 0.3289 0.2323 0.2706 0.4925 0.4566 0.3449 0.4239 0.3559 0.1353 0.3895 0.1646 0.3438 0.3694 0.3657 0.4567 0.4371 0.4095 0.4823 0.5455 0.4473 1
capitalone 0.3765 0.4284 0.173 0.3318 0.3774 0.4357 0.5319 0.4951 0.3007 0.225 0.471 0.1959 0.4621 0.4903 0.2703 0.4613 0.4637 0.4407 0.4622 0.3856 0.3741 0.3088 1
freddiemac 0.1149 0.0667 0.0172 0.0528 0.0569 0.0771 0.1115 0.1136 0.0594 0.0053 0.0986 -0.0056 0.0625 0.0695 0.0381 0.0947 0.0946 0.0305 0.1475 0.1215 0.0785 0.1062 0.0678 1
towne 0.277 0.3815 0.1739 0.3991 0.3049 0.295 0.326 0.335 0.2659 0.243 0.3611 0.215 0.3474 0.3236 0.2168 0.3625 0.3767 0.3042 0.3534 0.272 0.2756 0.2415 0.2978 0.0202 1
union 0.3258 0.4226 0.1472 0.4007 0.3655 0.342 0.3422 0.406 0.2614 0.2497 0.3635 0.2001 0.3564 0.363 0.278 0.3563 0.4531 0.3478 0.3433 0.2792 0.2889 0.2531 0.3305 0.0215 0.3673 1
premier 0.2146 0.2402 0.0893 0.2256 0.1802 0.2226 0.2521 0.2361 0.21 0.1929 0.233 0.191 0.2457 0.2212 0.1795 0.2091 0.2878 0.2112 0.1853 0.1545 0.1865 0.1645 0.2126 0.0139 0.1806 0.2595 1
city 0.4233 0.4074 0.2418 0.4027 0.4317 0.406 0.3747 0.4032 0.3474 0.2206 0.3783 0.2025 0.3732 0.3589 0.3329 0.449 0.4773 0.3783 0.4444 0.398 0.3558 0.4416 0.3549 0.0769 0.3575 0.3884 0.1855 1
wesbanco 0.4455 0.4544 0.223 0.4778 0.4633 0.4589 0.4189 0.4403 0.3468 0.2286 0.4131 0.2177 0.4351 0.406 0.3585 0.4844 0.548 0.434 0.5227 0.4109 0.4478 0.3842 0.3882 0.094 0.3871 0.425 0.2138 0.516 1
united 0.5106 0.5104 0.2229 0.45 0.5145 0.5646 0.4647 0.5601 0.4025 0.2479 0.5498 0.1871 0.5195 0.4893 0.3442 0.6017 0.7055 0.4726 0.5191 0.519 0.4738 0.4607 0.4632 0.1097 0.3928 0.4352 0.2654 0.4769 0.5335 1
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6.3.2. Distance to inefficiency contagion 
The distance to inefficiency contagion outcomes display a similar spillover pattern to 
the earlier measures. Overall, these outcomes provide some indication of home state 
bias in both receiving and communicating shocks for all the banks in the sample. The 
MLM results are provided in Table 6.3.2.1 and the correlation results in Table 
6.3.2.2. The results clearly show that DI displays less contagion than DD. Some 
banks – Ameris Bancorp, Suntrust, Wintrust and MB Financial – experience a very 
high degree of contagion from their peers, while others – Citi, Towne, Enterprise and 
First Citizen – are highly resistant. Conversely, some banks – Synovus, Flagstar and 
Prosperity – display a high ability to transmit shocks, and others – SVB, Keycorp, 
Northeast Bancshares and Huntington Bancshares – very limited capacity.  
Looking at the position of first bracket GSIB banks Table 6.3.2.1, as with DD the 
GSIB banks do not demonstrate particularly high outcomes in terms of either 
receiving or transmitting efficiency shocks. Citi group was one of the least affected 
banks in this category. Only three banks from the sample – Cathey, JP Morgan and 
Capital One –transmitted their shocks to Citi. Citi, on the other hand, transferred its 
value shocks to number of banks, including Cathey, Mellon, MB Financial, Wintrust 
etc. The only other fourth bracket GSIB bank, JP Morgan, transmitted their shocks to 
only four banks – Flagstar, BBNT, First Citizen and Texas Capital (two of which are 
from North Carolina). 
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Table 6.3.2.1- DI Contagion 
 
cathey svb wells charles mellon citi goldman jpmorgan ameris suntrust synovus unitedcommunityfirstbusey firstmidwestmb wintrust 1stsource firstmerchantsoldnationalleaklandindianaberkshire bostonprivatebrookline statestreetchemical enterpriseflagstar independenttrustmark bancorpsouth
cathey 0.007 0.015 0.039 0.005
svb 0.009 0.008 0 0.022 0.035
wells 0.026 0.02 0.001
charles 0.005 0.032
mellon
citi 0.012 0.006 0.006 0.012 0.005 0
goldman 0.007 0.007 0.03 0.024
jpmorgan 0.001 0.005 0.036
ameris 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 0.011 0.045 0.03
suntrust 0.021
synovus 0.01 0.013 0.012 0.041 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.015 0
unitedcommunity 0.013 0 0.003 0 0.012 0.004 0.005
firstbusey 0.002 0.044 0.044 0.031
firstmidwest 0.039 0.007 0.009 0.004 0.033 0
mb 0 0
wintrust 0.024
1stsource 0.049 0.033
firstmerchants 0.021 0.013 0.01
oldnational 0.033 0.038 0.026
leaklandindiana 0.017 0.009 0.022
berkshire 0.002 0.008 0.026 0.029
bostonprivate 0.049 0.021
brookline
statestreet 0.021 0.038 0.012
chemical 0.034 0.001 0.041
enterprise 0.002 0.044 0.019 0.012 0.047 0.013 0.01
flagstar 0 0.049 0 0.011 0.039 0.004 0.04 0.023 0.017 0.029 0.004 0
independent 0.037 0.026 0.044 0.001 0.007 0.031
trustmark 0.009 0.035
bancorpsouth 0.036 0.049 0.016 0.039
hancock 0.016 0.041
renasant 0.011 0.011
connectone
leakland 0.02
provident 0.003 0.018 0.022 0.017 0.025
valley 0.003 0.023 0.017 0.027 0 0.011
bankofamerica 0.038
bbnt 0.016 0.001 0.005 0.029 0.029 0.019 0.007 0.005
firstcitizen 0.049 0.019 0.02
yadkin 0.018 0.033 0.04 0.004 0.026 0.029
fifththird
firstdefiance 0.022 0.025 0.004 0.001
huntington 0.004
keycorp 0.001
northwest 0.013 0.029
fulton 0.026 0.049 0.029 0
fnb 0.034 0.005 0.012 0.002
pnc
comerica 0.043 0.036
prosperity 0.02 0 0.031 0 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.004 0
texas 0.026 0.048 0.039 0.009 0.009
cullenfrost 0.003 0.022 0.023 0.049
capitalone 0.016 0.026 0.019
freddiemac 0.019 0.008 0.023 0.026 0.019 0.027 0.023 0.018 0.001 0.007 0.025 0.028 0.014
towne 0.033
union 0.031 0.036 0.025 0.04
premier 0.038 0 0.002 0.016 0.042
city 0.013
wesbanco 0.017 0.01 0.014 0.006 0.006
united 0.002 0.019 0.004 0.047 0.002
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hancock renasant connectoneleakland provident valley bankofamericabbnt firstcitizenyadkin fifththird firstdefiancehuntingtonkeycorp northwestfulton fnb pnc comerica prosperitytexas cullenfrostcapitalonefreddiemactowne union premier city wesbanco united
cathey 0.044 0.005 0.002 0.037
svb
wells
charles 0.048 0.01
mellon 0.005 0.045 0.038
citi 0.046 0.03 0.019 0.003 0.011 0.039
goldman 0.048 0.031 0.018 0.025
jpmorgan 0.025
ameris 0.016 0.044 0.037 0.017 0.039 0.045
suntrust 0.021
synovus 0.001 0.004 0.019 0.032 0 0.004
unitedcommunity 0.049 0.035 0.012 0.017
firstbusey 0.011 0.042 0.034
firstmidwest 0.017 0.034 0.011
mb 0.02 0.029 0.024
wintrust 0.013
1stsource 0.029 0.009
firstmerchants 0.001
oldnational 0.038 0.046
leaklandindiana 0.021 0.004 0.002
berkshire 0.028
bostonprivate 0.019 0.009 0.03
brookline 0.028 0.001
statestreet 0.048 0.002 0.029 0.001
chemical 0.01 0.009
enterprise 0.001 0.014 0.004 0.015 0.021
flagstar 0.028 0.032 0.002 0.011 0.03 0.04 0.005
independent 0.036 0.006 0.009 0.02
trustmark 0.011 0.02 0.001 0.016
bancorpsouth 0.043 0.039 0.02
hancock 0.023 0.029 0.003 0 0.015
renasant 0.02
connectone 0.003 0.04
leakland 0.007 0.01 0.004
provident 0.011 0.026 0 0.031 0.001
valley 0.046
bankofamerica 0.016
bbnt 0.034
firstcitizen 0.025 0.008 0.04
yadkin 0.012 0.024
fifththird 0.029 0.04 0.017 0.006 0.019
firstdefiance 0.027
huntington 0.027
keycorp 0 0.026
northwest
fulton 0.023 0.006
fnb 0.021 0.006
pnc 0.025 0.012
comerica 0.013
prosperity 0 0.017 0.01 0.042 0.011 0.007 0.006 0 0.02 0.032 0.008 0.006 0.005 0 0.023 0.045 0.001 0.001 0.012
texas 0.027
cullenfrost 0.007 0.019 0.02
capitalone 0.028 0.012
freddiemac 0.009 0.001 0.037 0.028 0.004 0.008 0.045
towne 0.02
union 0.024 0.042
premier 0.006 0.004
city 0.03
wesbanco 0.014 0.024 0.014 0.04 0.038 0.036
united 0.025 0.001 0.017 0.015 0.045 0.019 0.04
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Table 6.3.2.2- DI Correlation 
 
cathey svb wells charles mellon citi goldman jpmorgan ameris suntrust synovusunitedcommunityf rstbuseyfirstmidwest mb wintrust 1stsourcefirstmerchantsoldnationalle klandindianaberkshirebostonprivatebrooklinestatestreet chemical enterprise flagstarindependentrustmarkbancorpsouth
cathey 1
svb 0.4138 1
wells 0.5171 0.4097 1
charles 0.2463 0.3614 0.2613 1
mellon 0.3685 0.3852 0.4442 0.4133 1
citi 0.4437 0.3378 0.4377 0.2829 0.3988 1
goldman 0.2996 0.2741 0.3399 0.347 0.3737 0.4373 1
jpmorgan 0.4691 0.3922 0.5678 0.3186 0.4551 0.5243 0.5349 1
ameris 0.4758 0.2955 0.3953 0.2157 0.3164 0.3654 0.3061 0.4004 1
suntrust 0.5528 0.4339 0.534 0.2774 0.4077 0.4369 0.2988 0.468 0.408 1
synovus 0.5169 0.3689 0.4388 0.2194 0.3412 0.3645 0.2389 0.3939 0.3785 0.5818 1
unitedcommunity 0.3905 0.223 0.3172 0.1372 0.234 0.2907 0.1815 0.2736 0.2815 0.4133 0.4265 1
firstbusey 0.4044 0.3063 0.3686 0.1838 0.336 0.2856 0.2007 0.3093 0.3696 0.388 0.3842 0.296 1
firstmidwest 0.5489 0.3988 0.5098 0.2681 0.408 0.3714 0.2983 0.4182 0.3919 0.5824 0.4981 0.3991 0.4277 1
mb 0.4995 0.4321 0.4567 0.2349 0.3812 0.3794 0.2954 0.421 0.4314 0.4991 0.4195 0.3354 0.4177 0.537 1
wintrust 0.5541 0.3619 0.4667 0.2164 0.3589 0.3925 0.3088 0.4516 0.3776 0.5119 0.4394 0.3505 0.3607 0.5253 0.4589 1
1stsource 0.3885 0.2474 0.3224 0.1468 0.2574 0.2793 0.2481 0.3282 0.4333 0.3572 0.3307 0.2806 0.3328 0.3598 0.3516 0.4054 1
firstmerchants 0.4675 0.3612 0.3838 0.2462 0.3588 0.3445 0.2721 0.3981 0.4338 0.4479 0.4 0.3439 0.3672 0.4796 0.4238 0.4528 0.4189 1
oldnational 0.4525 0.3477 0.4429 0.2645 0.3776 0.3153 0.3219 0.4637 0.416 0.4134 0.3759 0.3266 0.3311 0.5282 0.455 0.4677 0.3595 0.4967 1
leaklandindiana 0.2712 0.213 0.2444 0.1772 0.2177 0.2214 0.2363 0.2797 0.332 0.2355 0.1897 0.2078 0.2918 0.3234 0.275 0.2732 0.4224 0.311 0.3207 1
berkshire 0.3247 0.2168 0.284 0.1577 0.2511 0.2113 0.1477 0.2144 0.2365 0.282 0.2502 0.2034 0.2889 0.3096 0.2961 0.2733 0.3017 0.3063 0.3603 0.2123 1
bostonprivate 0.5077 0.3564 0.4453 0.2599 0.368 0.3787 0.3164 0.4249 0.3843 0.4854 0.4748 0.3742 0.3518 0.5133 0.5022 0.4616 0.3736 0.4406 0.4615 0.2584 0.2717 1
brookline 0.2687 0.2522 0.2448 0.2546 0.31 0.1743 0.1968 0.1991 0.1909 0.1824 0.2069 0.1172 0.2269 0.2261 0.2429 0.2327 0.1862 0.2477 0.2863 0.1398 0.2191 0.2325 1
statestreet 0.3645 0.4126 0.4703 0.4171 0.5172 0.4165 0.3718 0.4895 0.3351 0.4137 0.3641 0.2767 0.3415 0.456 0.3983 0.3484 0.2649 0.3431 0.4031 0.2261 0.2102 0.3502 0.2693 1
chemical 0.3948 0.3635 0.4032 0.2592 0.2996 0.3347 0.3066 0.387 0.3689 0.3692 0.3258 0.2553 0.3052 0.413 0.4258 0.4274 0.4749 0.4358 0.4556 0.3617 0.3053 0.3756 0.2854 0.3526 1
enterprise 0.4317 0.3577 0.3797 0.2287 0.295 0.3256 0.3024 0.3507 0.4125 0.4051 0.3786 0.3023 0.3609 0.3944 0.3647 0.3581 0.4373 0.4145 0.3604 0.2815 0.2823 0.385 0.2421 0.348 0.3669 1
flagstar 0.3091 0.1316 0.1897 0.0769 0.1468 0.309 0.1994 0.2652 0.287 0.2481 0.2354 0.2367 0.1335 0.2218 0.2367 0.2377 0.236 0.2658 0.2166 0.1758 0.197 0.2774 0.1123 0.1434 0.2215 0.2401 1
independent 0.3768 0.2387 0.2686 0.1756 0.2078 0.2681 0.2087 0.2799 0.2773 0.3099 0.3268 0.3336 0.189 0.34 0.2707 0.3223 0.2465 0.2764 0.2662 0.1683 0.2005 0.3415 0.1415 0.2588 0.2213 0.2688 0.2413 1
trustmark 0.4531 0.359 0.4222 0.2714 0.3305 0.3024 0.2954 0.3725 0.3326 0.3913 0.3623 0.2585 0.3371 0.4358 0.3869 0.4212 0.3745 0.3724 0.4751 0.3616 0.3352 0.4284 0.3378 0.3539 0.4076 0.3419 0.2286 0.2886 1
bancorpsouth 0.3954 0.3782 0.3727 0.2728 0.3617 0.3531 0.3127 0.3938 0.3103 0.3955 0.3804 0.2952 0.3268 0.4621 0.4097 0.4057 0.3002 0.3772 0.3861 0.2427 0.261 0.3678 0.2941 0.3771 0.3697 0.3379 0.227 0.2087 0.4058 1
hancock 0.3998 0.3532 0.3481 0.264 0.3523 0.2923 0.278 0.3513 0.28 0.358 0.2907 0.2828 0.2654 0.4027 0.4241 0.3971 0.3019 0.3577 0.4087 0.2341 0.3039 0.3455 0.2669 0.3803 0.4052 0.3078 0.1865 0.2423 0.3861 0.3902
renasant 0.4226 0.3856 0.3707 0.2278 0.2855 0.3574 0.317 0.3865 0.4407 0.396 0.322 0.2645 0.3866 0.3942 0.4381 0.3425 0.3937 0.3621 0.3811 0.3212 0.2922 0.3645 0.214 0.3484 0.4129 0.4052 0.204 0.2215 0.3574 0.3421
connectone 0.1642 0.1741 0.1741 0.115 0.169 0.1079 0.126 0.132 0.0963 0.141 0.1544 0.1469 0.1766 0.1836 0.1781 0.1415 0.1437 0.1387 0.2024 0.128 0.1693 0.1643 0.1975 0.186 0.1577 0.1656 0.08 0.0914 0.2078 0.1555
leakland 0.4714 0.2844 0.3516 0.2204 0.3002 0.3421 0.2904 0.3669 0.41 0.3888 0.3516 0.3224 0.3497 0.4041 0.3732 0.3559 0.409 0.4099 0.3899 0.343 0.3248 0.3605 0.2502 0.2903 0.3973 0.4301 0.2567 0.2562 0.3246 0.304
provident 0.4493 0.3458 0.369 0.2889 0.3344 0.2933 0.2639 0.3658 0.3416 0.3669 0.359 0.2706 0.3824 0.4261 0.3968 0.4067 0.3089 0.3867 0.452 0.2849 0.399 0.3613 0.3731 0.3525 0.3879 0.3605 0.2075 0.258 0.395 0.3166
valley 0.363 0.3341 0.4035 0.2403 0.3289 0.2762 0.2567 0.3533 0.2659 0.3005 0.2861 0.2473 0.3101 0.3789 0.368 0.349 0.2387 0.3442 0.4084 0.2197 0.2722 0.3487 0.3992 0.3497 0.3699 0.3086 0.1454 0.228 0.4435 0.3844
bankofamerica 0.475 0.4335 0.5437 0.3075 0.4196 0.5718 0.3857 0.5389 0.3983 0.5967 0.4424 0.3383 0.3526 0.5288 0.4608 0.4269 0.3341 0.3956 0.3756 0.2098 0.1847 0.4253 0.204 0.4784 0.3498 0.348 0.2517 0.2931 0.3394 0.4071
bbnt 0.5249 0.4505 0.5974 0.2967 0.4055 0.4158 0.3588 0.5091 0.4025 0.5695 0.4343 0.3273 0.3664 0.5132 0.514 0.4837 0.3484 0.4093 0.4617 0.2905 0.2524 0.4741 0.202 0.4153 0.4343 0.356 0.2093 0.2916 0.4422 0.3918
firstcitizen 0.2906 0.2178 0.2648 0.1789 0.213 0.2464 0.2104 0.2725 0.2818 0.2613 0.22 0.1761 0.198 0.2893 0.2503 0.2768 0.2397 0.2921 0.3288 0.2294 0.1821 0.2592 0.1953 0.2857 0.3093 0.2112 0.1776 0.176 0.2967 0.2282
yadkin 0.2411 0.2261 0.1998 0.1484 0.2058 0.1818 0.1066 0.1584 0.2302 0.2941 0.2936 0.2637 0.2696 0.3214 0.261 0.2002 0.1415 0.239 0.2317 0.1135 0.1813 0.2716 0.1619 0.2356 0.1911 0.2672 0.1127 0.2002 0.2051 0.1903
fifththird 0.5685 0.4303 0.5508 0.2468 0.3474 0.45 0.2979 0.4503 0.3942 0.597 0.5065 0.3861 0.3282 0.4937 0.4483 0.5119 0.3491 0.4303 0.4098 0.2585 0.2632 0.5191 0.2063 0.371 0.3909 0.3555 0.2801 0.3007 0.4462 0.3973
firstdefiance 0.275 0.2309 0.192 0.1228 0.1791 0.204 0.1819 0.1963 0.2258 0.2868 0.2512 0.2175 0.2515 0.2629 0.2153 0.2713 0.1896 0.2422 0.2249 0.1798 0.1501 0.2354 0.1325 0.2928 0.1494 0.2279 0.1594 0.2156 0.1951 0.2212
huntington 0.5472 0.3532 0.4954 0.244 0.3607 0.4759 0.3349 0.4563 0.417 0.5916 0.5152 0.3782 0.3366 0.4998 0.4357 0.4839 0.3509 0.4174 0.4324 0.2575 0.2481 0.4966 0.1989 0.4076 0.3462 0.3796 0.297 0.331 0.4026 0.3306
keycorp 0.5669 0.4282 0.5653 0.2316 0.3853 0.5137 0.3374 0.4856 0.4346 0.6106 0.5075 0.3664 0.3849 0.5163 0.4774 0.5003 0.3811 0.4453 0.4207 0.2797 0.2492 0.4763 0.2087 0.3821 0.3571 0.4028 0.2533 0.3202 0.4209 0.3509
northwest 0.2858 0.2979 0.2631 0.2177 0.3054 0.2581 0.2411 0.2871 0.271 0.2524 0.1916 0.1475 0.3116 0.2812 0.2909 0.3187 0.2414 0.2713 0.2965 0.2407 0.2397 0.238 0.2973 0.2518 0.3622 0.2528 0.1084 0.1088 0.3038 0.2938
fulton 0.5052 0.3951 0.4751 0.2681 0.3824 0.3736 0.3102 0.4034 0.3647 0.4683 0.4084 0.3287 0.3737 0.5302 0.4899 0.5142 0.42 0.4542 0.485 0.2877 0.3044 0.4678 0.2681 0.3825 0.4388 0.3787 0.1712 0.2489 0.4468 0.4018
fnb 0.5284 0.3978 0.4478 0.2231 0.3526 0.3521 0.2684 0.3888 0.4242 0.4907 0.3996 0.3169 0.358 0.5288 0.5267 0.4792 0.3918 0.4727 0.5344 0.2825 0.325 0.5114 0.2972 0.3892 0.4518 0.4037 0.2252 0.2699 0.4761 0.4099
pnc 0.4516 0.4922 0.5658 0.3069 0.3601 0.4115 0.3455 0.4826 0.3456 0.5008 0.369 0.2728 0.3389 0.4791 0.4344 0.4591 0.3362 0.4059 0.443 0.2356 0.2749 0.4183 0.1994 0.4883 0.4107 0.3654 0.1524 0.2754 0.4242 0.3741
comerica 0.5019 0.388 0.5099 0.3111 0.3952 0.4257 0.3845 0.5011 0.3936 0.5036 0.4302 0.3217 0.3323 0.4772 0.4615 0.5432 0.394 0.4303 0.4234 0.2844 0.2553 0.4893 0.2424 0.4144 0.4205 0.3246 0.2262 0.291 0.4337 0.4256
prosperity 0.3572 0.3372 0.3991 0.2183 0.2459 0.2907 0.2678 0.3141 0.2806 0.3433 0.2763 0.1963 0.257 0.3418 0.3409 0.3805 0.2683 0.2877 0.3675 0.2778 0.3218 0.3382 0.2374 0.2801 0.3861 0.2589 0.1489 0.1723 0.4324 0.368
texas 0.3874 0.3393 0.3903 0.225 0.2862 0.3461 0.2939 0.4017 0.3062 0.3566 0.3014 0.2663 0.2532 0.3711 0.3994 0.3832 0.3259 0.3776 0.391 0.2566 0.2201 0.3647 0.1811 0.3427 0.3481 0.2772 0.2093 0.2091 0.3767 0.3507
cullenfrost 0.2684 0.3639 0.3216 0.3352 0.3876 0.248 0.241 0.2933 0.2475 0.2997 0.2192 0.1676 0.3157 0.3144 0.3267 0.2933 0.2396 0.2612 0.3276 0.3012 0.3012 0.2748 0.3458 0.3248 0.3063 0.2087 0.0794 0.132 0.3924 0.3523
capitalone 0.4748 0.3856 0.489 0.2333 0.3318 0.3968 0.329 0.4296 0.3269 0.4522 0.3644 0.2955 0.3285 0.4186 0.429 0.4079 0.3108 0.3417 0.3399 0.22 0.2389 0.3951 0.2152 0.3798 0.3247 0.353 0.2059 0.287 0.3412 0.3336
freddiemac 0.0933 -0.0197 0.0738 -0.0281 0.011 0.1009 0.0786 0.097 0.0842 0.0264 0.0346 0.012 0.0259 0.0549 0.0709 0.0766 0.1208 0.0606 0.084 0.0708 0.0374 0.0271 0.0141 0.0174 0.0564 0.0295 0.0913 0.0274 0.0796 0.0681
towne 0.3514 0.3055 0.2693 0.1347 0.259 0.2355 0.1856 0.2525 0.3025 0.3042 0.2988 0.2748 0.3517 0.3842 0.319 0.3442 0.3339 0.3217 0.3136 0.2506 0.2045 0.3009 0.1998 0.3003 0.3611 0.2974 0.1588 0.2177 0.2748 0.327
union 0.3962 0.3393 0.3349 0.1633 0.2584 0.28 0.2198 0.3379 0.4127 0.3588 0.3412 0.3004 0.3817 0.4192 0.3938 0.3785 0.3743 0.4468 0.4167 0.3348 0.2848 0.3741 0.2114 0.2829 0.3938 0.4151 0.219 0.2575 0.3309 0.3415
premier 0.213 0.2085 0.2511 0.1368 0.1906 0.1974 0.1376 0.1747 0.1804 0.2578 0.2173 0.1824 0.2038 0.2433 0.2384 0.2316 0.1156 0.2631 0.1833 0.133 0.0839 0.2136 0.0861 0.2171 0.1374 0.1711 0.0771 0.1932 0.1754 0.2077
city 0.4008 0.3601 0.4017 0.2665 0.3437 0.2748 0.2747 0.3897 0.3275 0.3649 0.291 0.2584 0.3015 0.3858 0.357 0.4124 0.3509 0.384 0.4698 0.3175 0.2909 0.3316 0.2684 0.3584 0.4487 0.3684 0.1862 0.1889 0.3679 0.3589
wesbanco 0.4373 0.3543 0.3446 0.2285 0.33 0.3278 0.2972 0.397 0.4459 0.3693 0.3453 0.3082 0.3473 0.4212 0.4629 0.4109 0.4759 0.4976 0.4727 0.3745 0.3032 0.4217 0.25 0.3839 0.4311 0.4174 0.2174 0.2686 0.3828 0.3755
united 0.5322 0.4006 0.4217 0.258 0.3373 0.3518 0.3005 0.4032 0.4363 0.4534 0.4024 0.323 0.3639 0.5282 0.5125 0.5033 0.419 0.51 0.5513 0.3023 0.3384 0.4904 0.2647 0.3775 0.4888 0.4033 0.2232 0.2629 0.5255 0.4449
31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
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hancock renasantconnectoneleakland provident valleybankofamerica bbnt firstcitizen yadkin fifththirdfirstdefiancehuntington keycorp northwest fulton fnb pnc comerica prosperity texas cullenfrostcapitalonefreddiemac towne union premier city wesbanco united
hancock 1
renasant 0.2982 1
connectone 0.1731 0.1756 1
leakland 0.2857 0.3691 0.1542 1
provident 0.3583 0.3511 0.1792 0.3719 1
valley 0.3999 0.3402 0.1712 0.2561 0.3942 1
bankofamerica 0.3462 0.3809 0.1133 0.3263 0.3122 0.3099 1
bbnt 0.3658 0.3984 0.1609 0.3318 0.3773 0.368 0.5388 1
firstcitizen 0.2728 0.2398 0.1041 0.2391 0.294 0.2579 0.2368 0.2078 1
yadkin 0.1682 0.1996 0.1064 0.2367 0.1929 0.1979 0.2254 0.236 0.1055 1
fifththird 0.3299 0.3632 0.1653 0.339 0.3655 0.338 0.4922 0.5769 0.2669 0.2349 1
firstdefiance 0.1457 0.1809 0.1681 0.2338 0.193 0.1527 0.2247 0.1743 0.1771 0.2276 0.2684 1
huntington 0.2911 0.3489 0.1431 0.3695 0.3675 0.3126 0.4944 0.5157 0.2804 0.2254 0.6227 0.259 1
keycorp 0.3076 0.3814 0.1262 0.3437 0.3929 0.307 0.5223 0.5734 0.2813 0.2441 0.6482 0.2353 0.6442 1
northwest 0.221 0.2803 0.1519 0.2821 0.3534 0.2721 0.2453 0.2736 0.2279 0.1249 0.2666 0.1697 0.2333 0.2484 1
fulton 0.4239 0.4058 0.1478 0.338 0.4404 0.4693 0.4604 0.4567 0.31 0.229 0.4727 0.2144 0.4631 0.47 0.3 1
fnb 0.4164 0.4447 0.1769 0.3879 0.4333 0.377 0.4107 0.516 0.236 0.2744 0.4685 0.1824 0.467 0.4939 0.3059 0.4868 1
pnc 0.3721 0.375 0.1417 0.3303 0.3744 0.4016 0.4457 0.5294 0.2652 0.2095 0.5059 0.2297 0.4758 0.4803 0.2976 0.5041 0.4554 1
comerica 0.3944 0.3676 0.1756 0.3025 0.3843 0.3865 0.4783 0.5847 0.2874 0.2002 0.5398 0.1759 0.484 0.5652 0.2726 0.5289 0.4589 0.4667 1
prosperity 0.3834 0.3533 0.1576 0.2527 0.3709 0.3729 0.2904 0.3955 0.3242 0.1594 0.3688 0.1354 0.3027 0.3329 0.2751 0.4087 0.3724 0.43 0.3935 1
texas 0.354 0.3652 0.1562 0.3342 0.2938 0.3055 0.3495 0.4135 0.2947 0.1704 0.3914 0.1684 0.3806 0.3726 0.2823 0.3711 0.4004 0.3947 0.4303 0.4074 1
cullenfrost 0.3623 0.317 0.2374 0.2717 0.315 0.3518 0.2554 0.3321 0.2565 0.1586 0.3054 0.1397 0.2238 0.2664 0.3496 0.2898 0.3343 0.3406 0.3026 0.4594 0.3202 1
capitalone 0.2838 0.3346 0.1313 0.2953 0.3264 0.3524 0.4453 0.4472 0.2167 0.2206 0.4531 0.2117 0.4316 0.4751 0.2046 0.4335 0.4115 0.4642 0.4146 0.3267 0.3368 0.2103 1
freddiemac 0.0442 0.0609 -0.0078 0.0505 0.0679 0.0396 0.0521 0.0687 0.0843 -0.0392 0.0747 0.0225 0.0877 0.064 0.0414 0.0946 0.0594 0.0446 0.1059 0.0692 0.1111 -0.0077 0.0497 1
towne 0.2609 0.3212 0.0837 0.3339 0.295 0.2278 0.2854 0.261 0.2342 0.2241 0.2683 0.2482 0.246 0.2843 0.2631 0.3231 0.3232 0.2841 0.3083 0.1909 0.2031 0.1729 0.2634 0.0484 1
union 0.295 0.3696 0.1403 0.3704 0.3448 0.2743 0.3227 0.3554 0.2365 0.2239 0.3281 0.2069 0.3449 0.34 0.2297 0.3654 0.3925 0.3318 0.3327 0.2756 0.2973 0.1928 0.3104 0.0391 0.3178 1
premier 0.1559 0.1658 0.0832 0.1573 0.1325 0.1712 0.2393 0.1996 0.1309 0.1328 0.2045 0.1905 0.2243 0.2219 0.1292 0.1551 0.2066 0.1979 0.1837 0.1528 0.13 0.1649 0.19 -0.0383 0.1347 0.2208 1
city 0.4028 0.3573 0.17 0.3735 0.3348 0.3593 0.3323 0.3624 0.3035 0.1677 0.349 0.196 0.3092 0.3212 0.2961 0.4069 0.4168 0.3603 0.3746 0.3741 0.331 0.3192 0.2837 0.0516 0.3179 0.3589 0.1749 1
wesbanco 0.3643 0.4542 0.1143 0.443 0.4081 0.3368 0.3469 0.4006 0.3114 0.2347 0.3692 0.2254 0.3607 0.3787 0.3231 0.4311 0.4835 0.3992 0.4188 0.3879 0.4351 0.3044 0.3538 0.0729 0.3336 0.4628 0.1836 0.4232 1
united 0.4677 0.4636 0.1667 0.4073 0.4294 0.4454 0.3963 0.4829 0.3116 0.2427 0.497 0.2249 0.4242 0.4423 0.3134 0.5318 0.5978 0.454 0.4829 0.4461 0.4358 0.3854 0.3707 0.084 0.3843 0.4254 0.2093 0.5104 0.5057 1
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6.3.3. Distance to capital contagion 
The distance to capital contagion outcomes display broadly similar patterns to the 
previous two distance to risk measures. Contagion outcomes and the correlation 
results are provided at Table 6.3.3.1 and Table 6.3.3.2 respectively. The overall result 
displays a strong association between the US banks, similar to distance to 
inefficiency but less than distance to default. Some banks are more affected by 
systemic risk spillover (e.g. Wells Fargo, First Midwest, Wintrust, First Source) 
whereas others are relatively immune (e.g. Mellon, Independent, Provident). In terms 
of transmitting shocks to other banks, three banks are ahead of the sample – Fulton, 
Hancock and Suntrust. Conversely, some banks – Citi, Fifth Third, Keycorp, Charles, 
Wells Fargo and Cathey – transmitted few shocks to their peers. One bank in the 
sample, Provident Financial Corp, did not transmit any shocks to any bank.  
Of the major GSIB banks (4th bracket), six transmitted their shocks to Citi – JP 
Morgan, First Bushy, First Mid-West, MB Financial, FNB and Premier. An 
interesting fact is that half of them are from the state of Illinois, suggesting the 
financial health of Citi is directly affected by the financial health of Illinois. Citi, on 
the other hand, transmitted shocks to only two other banks, United Community and 
Premier. JP Morgan transmitted its capital shocks to five banks – Citi, SVP, Charles, 
Lakeland and Premier, while receiving shocks from Mellon, Independent, Hancock, 
Keycorp, Freddie Mac, Premier and City. 
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Table 6.3.3.1- DC Contagion 
 
cathey svb wells charles mellon citi goldman jpmorgan ameris suntrust synovus unitedcommunityfirstbusey firstmidwestmb wintrust 1stsource firstmerchantsoldnationalleaklandindianaberkshire bostonprivatebrookline statestreetchemical enterpriseflagstar independenttrustmark bancorpsouth
cathey 0.022
svb 0.001 0.025 0.008
wells
charles 0.02 0.023 0.003 0.005 0.026
mellon 0.022 0.001 0.004 0.016 0.004 0.031
citi 0.006
goldman 0.033 0.001 0.01 0.045 0.038
jpmorgan 0.049 0.039 0.007 0.014
ameris
suntrust 0.009 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.028 0.028
synovus 0.045 0.035 0.007
unitedcommunity 0.003 0.01 0.009 0.047 0
firstbusey 0.026 0.017 0.017 0.029
firstmidwest 0.001 0.004 0.028 0.038 0.005 0.045 0.011 0.015 0.044
mb 0.04 0.037 0.014 0.008 0 0.034 0.003 0.015
wintrust 0.036 0.019 0.031 0.41
1stsource 0.01
firstmerchants 0.001 0.006 0.002
oldnational
leaklandindiana 0.044 0.002 0.011 0.031
berkshire 0.016 0.008 0.008
bostonprivate 0.017 0.012 0.021 0.014
brookline 0.002 0.043 0.036 0.025 0.012 0.002 0.027 0.034
statestreet 0.04 0.006 0.003 0.007 0 0.049 0.02
chemical 0.028
enterprise 0.028
flagstar 0 0.033 0.027
independent 0.019 0.009 0.008 0.014
trustmark 0.015 0.021 0.03
bancorpsouth 0.028 0.049
hancock 0.006 0 0.002 0.001 0.005 0 0.026 0.034 0.013 0.003 0.001 0.008 0.008
renasant 0.015 0.041
connectone 0.037 0.01 0.047 0.023
leakland 0.024 0.022 0.041
provident
valley
bankofamerica 0.024 0.041
bbnt
firstcitizen 0.034 0.004
yadkin 0.023 0 0.026 0.022 0.002
fifththird
firstdefiance 0.011 0.017
huntington 0.01
keycorp 0.035 0.001
northwest
fulton 0.019 0.034 0.024 0.009 0.025 0.018 0.016
fnb 0.008 0.012 0.007 0.024 0.044 0.036 0.01
pnc
comerica 0.006 0.012 0.002 0.024 0.021 0.017 0.045 0.006 0.006
prosperity
texas 0.009 0.033 0.001
cullenfrost 0.036 0.041
capitalone 0.032 0.049 0.001 0.004
freddiemac 0.042 0.017 0.002
towne 0.028
union 0.002 0.001
premier 0.01 0.011 0.003 0 0.006 0.016 0.016 0.021 0.011 0 0.007
city 0.022 0.04 0.002 0.008 0.004 0.038
wesbanco 0.005 0.034
united 0.011 0.005
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hancock renasant connectoneleakland provident valley bankofamericabbnt firstcitizenyadkin fifththird firstdefiancehuntingtonkeycorp northwestfulton fnb pnc comerica prosperitytexas cullenfrostcapitalonefreddiemactowne union premier city wesbanco united
cathey 0.048 0.039 0.017
svb 0.014 0.003 0.011
wells 0.045
charles 0.02 0.016
mellon 0.002 0.007 0.006
citi 0.044
goldman 0.026 0.049 0.002
jpmorgan 0.021
ameris 0.048 0.011 0.04
suntrust 0 0.044 0.027 0.038 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.045 0 0.017 0.021
synovus 0.018 0
unitedcommunity 0.005 0.044
firstbusey 0.003 0.046 0.035 0
firstmidwest 0 0.004 0.024 0.04 0.027
mb 0.043 0.014 0.009 0 0.013
wintrust 0.016 0.049 0.041 0.004 0.02 0.005
1stsource
firstmerchants 0.038 0.04 0.015
oldnational 0.031 0.03 0.033
leaklandindiana 0.034 0.004 0.017 0 0.024 0.006
berkshire
bostonprivate 0.016 0.004 0.045 0.047
brookline 0.01 0.017
statestreet 0.009 0 0.009 0.005 0.026
chemical 0.018
enterprise 0.036 0.022
flagstar 0.015 0.013 0.015 0.035
independent 0.039 0.008
trustmark 0.036 0.001 0.017 0.016 0.003
bancorpsouth
hancock 0.036 0.005 0.014 0.002 0.004 0.009 0.001 0.014 0 0.002 0.019 0.003 0.013 0.025 0.005 0.001
renasant
connectone 0.022
leakland 0.022 0.017
provident
valley
bankofamerica 0.035 0.048
bbnt 0.049 0.002
firstcitizen
yadkin 0.001 0.022 0 0.036 0.036 0.03 0.025 0.027
fifththird 0.028
firstdefiance 0.007 0.044
huntington 0.003
keycorp 0.007 0.002 0.001
northwest 0.001 0.035 0.038
fulton 0.033 0.002 0.021 0.048 0.01 0.002 0.001 0.016
fnb 0.035 0.007
pnc 0.013 0.026
comerica 0.005 0 0.046 0.008 0.022 0.004
prosperity 0.017 0.042 0.011
texas 0.041 0.012 0.009 0.01 0.016 0.039
cullenfrost 0.034
capitalone 0.031 0.004 0.018 0.006 0.008
freddiemac 0.004 0.021 0.035
towne 0.026
union 0.02
premier 0.008 0.027 0.011 0.039 0.04 0.019
city 0.047 0.003 0.021 0.049
wesbanco 0.02 0.018 0
united 0.01 0.023 0 0.002 0.017 0.009 0.035 0 0.045
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Table 6.3.3.2- DC Correlation 
 
cathey svb wells charles mellon citi goldman jpmorgan ameris suntrust synovusunitedcommunityf rstbuseyfirstmidwest mb wintrust 1stsourcefirstmerchantsoldnationalle klandindianaberkshirebostonprivatebrooklinestatestreet chemical enterprise flagstarindependentrustmarkbancorpsouth
cathey 1
svb 0.4663 1
wells 0.5231 0.4635 1
charles 0.4075 0.4348 0.4404 1
mellon 0.22 0.2031 0.2391 0.2355 1
citi 0.4421 0.3925 0.5368 0.3936 0.2375 1
goldman 0.3859 0.3771 0.4421 0.4658 0.337 0.4652 1
jpmorgan 0.4365 0.442 0.6043 0.4433 0.3265 0.5177 0.5266 1
ameris 0.3926 0.309 0.4044 0.3172 0.1617 0.3736 0.2503 0.3648 1
suntrust 0.5465 0.4847 0.6335 0.4365 0.2684 0.5283 0.4202 0.547 0.4237 1
synovus 0.4779 0.4275 0.5065 0.2923 0.154 0.4523 0.3018 0.3952 0.3555 0.5789 1
unitedcommunity 0.3966 0.3458 0.3729 0.2413 0.1767 0.3383 0.2167 0.2964 0.2793 0.3978 0.3861 1
firstbusey 0.4258 0.3448 0.4042 0.2764 0.1827 0.3755 0.2674 0.3527 0.3818 0.4248 0.3726 0.3281 1
firstmidwest 0.6086 0.4645 0.5459 0.4022 0.2332 0.4811 0.3733 0.4536 0.4209 0.562 0.5239 0.4101 0.463 1
mb 0.5618 0.4516 0.4695 0.3623 0.1876 0.387 0.3475 0.4206 0.4177 0.5234 0.4083 0.3622 0.4521 0.5893 1
wintrust 0.5169 0.426 0.4708 0.2978 0.2186 0.4066 0.2957 0.3896 0.3268 0.5091 0.4351 0.3572 0.355 0.5439 0.4896 1
1stsource 0.4803 0.392 0.4492 0.3485 0.2392 0.335 0.3118 0.3864 0.4312 0.4418 0.3906 0.3821 0.4042 0.5137 0.4576 0.4655 1
firstmerchants 0.3789 0.3508 0.3912 0.3283 0.1297 0.2712 0.2823 0.3585 0.3722 0.3896 0.2983 0.2838 0.3352 0.4125 0.4299 0.3562 0.4222 1
oldnational 0.5307 0.4385 0.5038 0.3772 0.2042 0.3879 0.3247 0.44 0.4205 0.4798 0.4369 0.3856 0.4025 0.5863 0.5044 0.5202 0.4295 0.4349 1
leaklandindiana 0.3689 0.3127 0.3805 0.3663 0.2598 0.2908 0.3199 0.3273 0.3015 0.3341 0.2568 0.3113 0.353 0.4199 0.3404 0.3053 0.452 0.3927 0.3571 1
berkshire 0.3529 0.3139 0.3491 0.2846 0.1917 0.2961 0.2581 0.2985 0.298 0.3669 0.3063 0.2428 0.3305 0.3905 0.3416 0.3114 0.3596 0.3163 0.3727 0.2325 1
bostonprivate 0.5088 0.4146 0.4429 0.3619 0.2007 0.4091 0.3088 0.3724 0.347 0.4631 0.4369 0.398 0.3674 0.5136 0.4617 0.4261 0.4357 0.3909 0.4956 0.3353 0.3324 1
brookline 0.4367 0.393 0.4201 0.3685 0.1737 0.3597 0.3794 0.3836 0.3446 0.4041 0.3317 0.3093 0.3113 0.476 0.445 0.4616 0.4415 0.3521 0.5034 0.3197 0.3835 0.4177 1
statestreet 0.4127 0.4071 0.4887 0.4275 0.2768 0.4163 0.4306 0.4295 0.3382 0.4443 0.3677 0.297 0.2793 0.4255 0.404 0.3768 0.3457 0.3105 0.4277 0.2763 0.2631 0.3624 0.3774 1
chemical 0.4791 0.4314 0.4537 0.3702 0.2602 0.383 0.3495 0.4111 0.3819 0.4617 0.3923 0.3577 0.4069 0.5222 0.4679 0.4464 0.5252 0.4482 0.4661 0.432 0.4334 0.4221 0.4341 0.3788 1
enterprise 0.3976 0.3472 0.351 0.3613 0.1685 0.2852 0.3031 0.3434 0.3709 0.4045 0.2952 0.2619 0.3445 0.4142 0.4272 0.3277 0.4004 0.3267 0.383 0.358 0.2803 0.3593 0.3409 0.3392 0.3741 1
flagstar 0.2963 0.2457 0.237 0.2222 0.1168 0.2693 0.175 0.1951 0.2189 0.289 0.3419 0.265 0.2472 0.3247 0.2838 0.2569 0.2555 0.2095 0.2855 0.1679 0.2391 0.3293 0.2438 0.2022 0.2783 0.2265 1
independent 0.2963 0.2334 0.3021 0.1833 0.1359 0.2516 0.2069 0.2472 0.2781 0.3505 0.3258 0.2701 0.2415 0.3258 0.2339 0.2945 0.206 0.218 0.2689 0.1786 0.2052 0.2753 0.2307 0.2171 0.2393 0.2522 0.2217 1
trustmark 0.5465 0.4572 0.5148 0.4111 0.2548 0.4055 0.3737 0.4356 0.4303 0.5033 0.4363 0.4031 0.3718 0.5657 0.511 0.4751 0.536 0.4104 0.5826 0.4042 0.391 0.5188 0.5139 0.4152 0.5224 0.4096 0.2565 0.2728 1
bancorpsouth 0.4997 0.4577 0.4626 0.4034 0.1815 0.3632 0.3679 0.4301 0.3775 0.4789 0.3923 0.307 0.3076 0.5389 0.4723 0.4322 0.4148 0.3842 0.5024 0.3534 0.3005 0.4141 0.4341 0.3742 0.4294 0.3697 0.2362 0.2109 0.5178 1
hancock 0.4949 0.4382 0.4192 0.3696 0.189 0.3373 0.3507 0.3965 0.3166 0.3854 0.3585 0.3349 0.3358 0.4673 0.4643 0.407 0.389 0.3606 0.4817 0.3458 0.3425 0.4171 0.3794 0.3347 0.3995 0.3499 0.242 0.2144 0.4925 0.4509
renasant 0.4439 0.3502 0.4088 0.3212 0.2074 0.4043 0.3233 0.3868 0.3949 0.4649 0.3563 0.309 0.3774 0.4374 0.439 0.3709 0.4238 0.3808 0.4336 0.3143 0.3482 0.389 0.3531 0.3421 0.4969 0.3751 0.2294 0.2433 0.4698 0.3462
connectone 0.1832 0.2055 0.2209 0.2149 0.2087 0.2149 0.2057 0.2189 0.1686 0.2261 0.1703 0.1995 0.1884 0.2048 0.2237 0.2068 0.1877 0.2498 0.2264 0.2054 0.2389 0.2172 0.2206 0.2176 0.2332 0.1839 0.123 0.1111 0.2327 0.1659
leakland 0.3932 0.3186 0.3595 0.291 0.2092 0.3184 0.2737 0.3218 0.3627 0.4001 0.2948 0.302 0.4083 0.4253 0.3606 0.3595 0.4159 0.3369 0.4002 0.3219 0.3323 0.3625 0.3837 0.2931 0.4139 0.3926 0.2063 0.2448 0.401 0.3263
provident -0.0331 -0.0328 -0.0095 -0.0184 -0.0063 0.0074 -0.0278 -0.0167 -0.0251 -0.0137 0.0395 -0.0079 -0.0074 -0.0241 -0.0247 -0.0016 -0.0362 -0.0211 0.0159 -0.0132 -0.013 -0.0048 -0.0365 0.0294 -0.0414 -0.0176 0.0257 -0.0145 -0.0425 -0.0261
valley 0.4927 0.4595 0.4865 0.3679 0.2194 0.3962 0.3564 0.4323 0.3357 0.4504 0.3898 0.3824 0.328 0.5276 0.4916 0.5005 0.4038 0.3623 0.5223 0.3171 0.3525 0.4194 0.4613 0.4169 0.4549 0.3586 0.2655 0.2293 0.5333 0.4735
bankofamerica 0.4907 0.4681 0.627 0.4015 0.2875 0.5637 0.4524 0.595 0.4347 0.6068 0.5038 0.3691 0.4146 0.5403 0.4782 0.4592 0.4612 0.3581 0.4873 0.3568 0.3305 0.4308 0.4049 0.4681 0.4424 0.3781 0.2765 0.3152 0.4506 0.4555
bbnt 0.5202 0.4704 0.6466 0.4232 0.2338 0.5036 0.3943 0.5354 0.4287 0.674 0.5244 0.3494 0.3913 0.5351 0.5096 0.5191 0.4397 0.3923 0.5238 0.3587 0.3508 0.463 0.4395 0.4325 0.4446 0.3596 0.2654 0.2943 0.5307 0.484
firstcitizen 0.2766 0.2907 0.3198 0.2386 0.1766 0.2783 0.2784 0.3296 0.2422 0.2983 0.2332 0.2112 0.224 0.3122 0.3003 0.2791 0.2706 0.2398 0.2619 0.2704 0.1955 0.2145 0.2305 0.2754 0.28 0.2202 0.0887 0.1253 0.2682 0.328
yadkin 0.2227 0.2425 0.2069 0.1629 0.0911 0.2394 0.152 0.1823 0.2566 0.2436 0.2876 0.2004 0.2626 0.2984 0.2507 0.1765 0.2407 0.2236 0.2188 0.1541 0.155 0.2735 0.1585 0.2184 0.2244 0.2306 0.1653 0.2275 0.1979 0.2529
fifththird 0.5473 0.4677 0.6112 0.3868 0.2459 0.4825 0.419 0.517 0.3818 0.6627 0.5379 0.3776 0.3508 0.5261 0.47 0.4763 0.4406 0.3876 0.4719 0.3341 0.3267 0.4936 0.4107 0.4175 0.4471 0.3438 0.2577 0.315 0.4991 0.4719
firstdefiance 0.1701 0.1445 0.145 0.1912 0.1474 0.1411 0.1771 0.132 0.1912 0.1591 0.1549 0.1548 0.1286 0.1823 0.1656 0.1548 0.1844 0.1392 0.1866 0.1634 0.1642 0.1836 0.223 0.2014 0.1457 0.138 0.1354 0.1737 0.1832 0.1743
huntington 0.5313 0.4625 0.5414 0.411 0.2232 0.5083 0.3489 0.4348 0.3941 0.6037 0.5076 0.3617 0.3962 0.5687 0.4649 0.4524 0.4354 0.3747 0.4793 0.3099 0.3239 0.4886 0.3588 0.4222 0.4481 0.3231 0.2915 0.2909 0.4824 0.4521
keycorp 0.4764 0.4625 0.5933 0.3747 0.2487 0.4907 0.3899 0.5074 0.3384 0.6296 0.5318 0.3692 0.3345 0.5203 0.4376 0.4462 0.4019 0.3529 0.4468 0.3214 0.2924 0.46 0.3625 0.4127 0.4052 0.2891 0.2748 0.2999 0.4573 0.4298
northwest 0.3613 0.3402 0.3473 0.2964 0.2328 0.3294 0.3328 0.3438 0.2894 0.3458 0.2466 0.2977 0.2907 0.3922 0.3661 0.3476 0.3959 0.3204 0.3438 0.3492 0.2666 0.3129 0.403 0.3118 0.4267 0.3169 0.1563 0.1428 0.402 0.3301
fulton 0.5496 0.441 0.5152 0.3754 0.2311 0.4135 0.3626 0.4377 0.3842 0.5412 0.462 0.3652 0.3652 0.5567 0.5373 0.4998 0.4942 0.3748 0.556 0.3208 0.37 0.4597 0.4478 0.4345 0.4777 0.381 0.25 0.251 0.5315 0.4959
fnb 0.5987 0.4814 0.5292 0.3903 0.2273 0.4367 0.3471 0.4476 0.4348 0.5287 0.486 0.4111 0.4096 0.6349 0.5883 0.5079 0.4948 0.4343 0.6132 0.3535 0.3641 0.5424 0.5062 0.4256 0.5083 0.4192 0.3081 0.2683 0.6126 0.5349
pnc 0.4448 0.4955 0.5635 0.4434 0.2641 0.4851 0.434 0.5083 0.3657 0.5727 0.4028 0.297 0.3265 0.4494 0.4346 0.4003 0.3826 0.3452 0.4406 0.3738 0.3005 0.3807 0.3701 0.4302 0.4357 0.3222 0.1956 0.2524 0.4784 0.3979
comerica 0.515 0.4983 0.5787 0.4225 0.2129 0.4469 0.403 0.5128 0.33 0.5719 0.4798 0.3742 0.3283 0.5532 0.4964 0.5186 0.451 0.3929 0.5018 0.3275 0.315 0.4285 0.426 0.4658 0.4663 0.3186 0.2483 0.2452 0.5 0.5055
prosperity 0.4906 0.4505 0.4557 0.3808 0.2117 0.3598 0.3725 0.4464 0.346 0.4532 0.3782 0.3317 0.2891 0.4773 0.4605 0.408 0.4164 0.3082 0.4431 0.358 0.3082 0.3781 0.383 0.3562 0.4138 0.3512 0.2033 0.2138 0.4967 0.4888
texas 0.4088 0.4166 0.4088 0.3802 0.1887 0.3331 0.3364 0.3778 0.3282 0.3998 0.3272 0.2869 0.2575 0.4533 0.4055 0.3664 0.3876 0.3295 0.4422 0.3143 0.2735 0.3626 0.4049 0.3379 0.4127 0.3458 0.2427 0.2125 0.4654 0.4393
cullenfrost 0.4632 0.4832 0.4927 0.389 0.286 0.3945 0.3999 0.4886 0.3506 0.4873 0.3772 0.3045 0.3051 0.511 0.48 0.442 0.4347 0.3259 0.4963 0.3804 0.3411 0.3815 0.4072 0.4156 0.4489 0.3607 0.1951 0.2292 0.483 0.5308
capitalone 0.4666 0.4037 0.5198 0.3446 0.156 0.4541 0.392 0.4473 0.3482 0.5135 0.3916 0.3141 0.3078 0.4921 0.4054 0.4023 0.356 0.3316 0.3971 0.2777 0.292 0.3871 0.3587 0.4355 0.4072 0.3098 0.2538 0.2877 0.4068 0.3989
freddiemac 0.2491 0.1885 0.3205 0.1665 0.0837 0.2866 0.2236 0.29 0.2493 0.3051 0.2905 0.219 0.2749 0.278 0.212 0.2292 0.2152 0.2047 0.2667 0.1429 0.1699 0.2616 0.1998 0.254 0.2153 0.219 0.2111 0.3006 0.2377 0.1946
towne 0.3507 0.26 0.2939 0.2161 0.1162 0.2823 0.1803 0.2128 0.3753 0.3123 0.3273 0.2422 0.3307 0.3533 0.323 0.3228 0.3884 0.3035 0.3347 0.242 0.2227 0.3299 0.257 0.2465 0.331 0.2768 0.2038 0.2314 0.3191 0.2158
union 0.4304 0.3268 0.3586 0.2791 0.143 0.3138 0.2053 0.2839 0.4394 0.3726 0.317 0.2906 0.4337 0.4627 0.4221 0.349 0.4211 0.3728 0.4185 0.341 0.2897 0.3417 0.3429 0.2843 0.421 0.3347 0.2355 0.249 0.4121 0.3462
premier 0.1851 0.1732 0.2106 0.0923 0.0915 0.2181 0.1853 0.1971 0.2127 0.1926 0.1946 0.1018 0.1898 0.2129 0.2195 0.2305 0.1358 0.1619 0.1478 0.107 0.1438 0.2057 0.1708 0.1671 0.157 0.181 0.173 0.1958 0.164 0.1513
city 0.459 0.4516 0.4195 0.3249 0.1982 0.3212 0.3098 0.3859 0.3461 0.4342 0.3614 0.3848 0.3795 0.4808 0.4618 0.4371 0.5003 0.3867 0.4682 0.4057 0.336 0.4224 0.4328 0.3459 0.4874 0.4106 0.2566 0.2208 0.4973 0.4441
wesbanco 0.5157 0.4156 0.4501 0.3995 0.2326 0.3782 0.3508 0.4204 0.4358 0.5065 0.3788 0.3383 0.3969 0.5263 0.5361 0.4452 0.5258 0.4719 0.4891 0.3899 0.358 0.4735 0.4205 0.4436 0.523 0.4115 0.2664 0.2759 0.5131 0.4058
united 0.588 0.4806 0.5501 0.3692 0.1621 0.4024 0.3266 0.4318 0.425 0.4914 0.4868 0.4072 0.4033 0.5758 0.5333 0.5201 0.4986 0.4411 0.6046 0.35 0.3607 0.5128 0.485 0.4195 0.471 0.4049 0.298 0.2739 0.617 0.5069
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hancock renasantconnectoneleakland provident valleybankofamerica bbnt firstcitizen yadkin fifththirdfirstdefiancehuntington keycorp northwest fulton fnb pnc comerica prosperity texas cullenfrostcapitalonefreddiemac towne union premier city wesbanco united
hancock 1
renasant 0.3408 1
connectone 0.1868 0.2104 1
leakland 0.3218 0.371 0.2298 1
provident -0.0352 -0.0461 0.0262 -0.0544 1
valley 0.4653 0.3881 0.2006 0.3591 -0.0341 1
bankofamerica 0.3799 0.4559 0.1945 0.333 -0.026 0.4615 1
bbnt 0.4101 0.4042 0.2055 0.335 -0.0184 0.4769 0.5826 1
firstcitizen 0.2583 0.2507 0.1669 0.1951 -0.0326 0.3022 0.306 0.2795 1
yadkin 0.1709 0.2525 0.1301 0.2386 -0.0208 0.2225 0.2788 0.2119 0.1733 1
fifththird 0.3981 0.4215 0.2228 0.332 -0.0323 0.4609 0.5696 0.6422 0.3277 0.2626 1
firstdefiance 0.1012 0.1264 0.1617 0.149 -0.0087 0.1349 0.1877 0.1891 0.1046 0.1541 0.1858 1
huntington 0.3831 0.4254 0.1748 0.3568 -0.0092 0.4414 0.5165 0.5795 0.3136 0.2786 0.605 0.2229 1
keycorp 0.3518 0.3815 0.1559 0.2622 -0.0062 0.419 0.5483 0.6165 0.3293 0.2622 0.6055 0.145 0.595 1
northwest 0.2816 0.3303 0.2006 0.271 -0.0172 0.3395 0.3438 0.3402 0.2545 0.0992 0.3301 0.1772 0.3156 0.3014 1
fulton 0.4509 0.4317 0.2381 0.364 -0.0285 0.566 0.5283 0.5265 0.3103 0.2445 0.5271 0.2206 0.4978 0.4774 0.3624 1
fnb 0.4855 0.4731 0.202 0.4148 -0.0239 0.5187 0.5123 0.5523 0.3035 0.2775 0.5261 0.1638 0.5696 0.5166 0.386 0.5729 1
pnc 0.3754 0.4145 0.1903 0.3495 -0.0174 0.452 0.5019 0.5397 0.3267 0.1879 0.525 0.1396 0.5039 0.5029 0.358 0.4661 0.4885 1
comerica 0.4416 0.4082 0.2173 0.2944 -0.0263 0.507 0.5203 0.5922 0.2989 0.2011 0.5669 0.1642 0.5401 0.5762 0.3315 0.5003 0.5346 0.5039 1
prosperity 0.4712 0.3667 0.179 0.3058 -0.0393 0.4816 0.4152 0.4711 0.3448 0.2152 0.4765 0.1425 0.4257 0.4209 0.3491 0.4886 0.4947 0.4335 0.491 1
texas 0.4586 0.3657 0.1859 0.3419 -0.0388 0.4499 0.402 0.3959 0.319 0.1984 0.4019 0.1625 0.3873 0.3465 0.3303 0.4101 0.4394 0.419 0.4247 0.488 1
cullenfrost 0.463 0.3636 0.2247 0.28 -0.031 0.48 0.4494 0.5012 0.3614 0.1843 0.4938 0.1663 0.4488 0.4802 0.3922 0.5036 0.4893 0.4553 0.5503 0.5424 0.4641 1
capitalone 0.4078 0.4037 0.1851 0.2943 -0.0244 0.4172 0.5223 0.4976 0.2518 0.2239 0.4868 0.1471 0.4475 0.4483 0.2739 0.4321 0.4378 0.4137 0.4382 0.3728 0.3563 0.3755 1
freddiemac 0.1743 0.2254 0.0853 0.2157 0.0424 0.2465 0.3918 0.3165 0.094 0.2409 0.3006 0.131 0.2949 0.3073 0.1291 0.2767 0.2625 0.1823 0.2625 0.1877 0.1626 0.1698 0.2652 1
towne 0.2666 0.343 0.138 0.3409 -0.0157 0.3098 0.3121 0.3274 0.1991 0.2662 0.3252 0.1697 0.3054 0.2874 0.2033 0.3554 0.3267 0.2782 0.2746 0.2496 0.2384 0.2435 0.2445 0.1808 1
union 0.3515 0.389 0.1465 0.358 -0.0113 0.3439 0.3404 0.3697 0.2019 0.2324 0.3437 0.1707 0.3512 0.2917 0.2769 0.3642 0.4031 0.3353 0.319 0.2995 0.2945 0.3043 0.3084 0.1598 0.3745 1
premier 0.1546 0.21 0.0895 0.1785 -0.0353 0.2014 0.2309 0.1893 0.1844 0.1869 0.2031 0.157 0.187 0.1801 0.1468 0.1826 0.2004 0.1776 0.1441 0.1485 0.1339 0.1433 0.1913 0.1625 0.1361 0.1845 1
city 0.4453 0.3819 0.2407 0.42 -0.0152 0.456 0.3819 0.411 0.3243 0.2179 0.4256 0.1663 0.399 0.3743 0.3453 0.4706 0.4848 0.4067 0.4517 0.4515 0.3956 0.4489 0.354 0.1698 0.3177 0.4071 0.1787 1
wesbanco 0.4298 0.4233 0.2526 0.4409 -0.0298 0.4797 0.4218 0.4494 0.2349 0.2538 0.4135 0.1968 0.4338 0.4008 0.3775 0.4785 0.5585 0.4575 0.4868 0.42 0.402 0.4249 0.3872 0.222 0.3575 0.4165 0.1505 0.4992 1
united 0.5015 0.4849 0.2062 0.4006 -0.0302 0.5534 0.4824 0.548 0.3142 0.248 0.5463 0.1541 0.5087 0.4775 0.3319 0.5857 0.6625 0.4506 0.501 0.5066 0.4636 0.4875 0.4371 0.272 0.3785 0.4221 0.1934 0.469 0.5062 1
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6.3.4. Overall contagion 
Generally, the contagion risk analysis across three different distance to risk measures 
(default, inefficiency and capital) in this chapter reveals an evenly distributed but 
detectable level of contagion between the US banks. Minor banks both transmit and 
receive more value shocks than their larger counterparts, while larger banks are more 
resistant to shock than their smaller colleagues in all three distance to risk measures. 
In this regard, there was no evidence of any superiority of GSIB banks. Two of the 
largest US banks, Citi and JP Morgan, are least active in the DD and DI measures. 
Distance to default produces the highest level of contagion compared to DI and DC.  
The results are consistent across the different distance to risk measures, which 
validates the outcomes of the previous chapters. 
6.4. Conclusion 
This chapter showed the contagion risk for sixty US banks using three different 
distance to risk procedures (distance to default, distance to inefficiency and distance 
to capital). Extreme shocks for US banks were modelled as a function of extreme 
shocks confronted by other banks in the sample. The probability of these shocks 
moving through the sample was then calculated by using multinomial logistic 
regression analysis.  
In general, the findings from all three assorted distance to risk measures showed a 
strong association between US banks. The outcomes also indicated that minor banks 
transmit and receive a higher number of shocks than their larger counterparts, while 
the bigger banks display more resistance to shock than their smaller colleagues in all 
three different distance to risk measures. There was no evidence of superiority of 
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GSIB banks. Two of the largest US banks, Citi and JP Morgan, were less active 
compared to the other banks. Perhaps the most important observation was the 
minimal amount of state bias in contagion risk across the different distance to risk 
measures when comparing bank level data. The results also showed that distance to 
default has a higher level of contagion than distance to inefficacy and distance to 
capital. Additionally, the contagion results were steady across the banks for the 
different distance to risk measures, validating the outcomes from previous chapters.  
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7.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the findings of previous chapters in a global context and how 
those findings can be used to manage systemic risk using regulatory control. The 
chapter uses qualitative deductions to look into the relationship between regulation 
and spillover of systemic risk, and proposes an extension of the current global risk 
management framework to enhance and secure better financial outcome for all the 
relevant stakeholders.  
As discussed throughout the thesis, the importance and influence of systemic risk in 
the modern financial sector was put beyond doubt by the global financial crisis of 
2008–2009 (Dungey, Matei, Luciani, & Veredas, 2017; Laseen, Pescatori, & 
Turunen, 2017). Previous authors have attributed the GFC to two major mistakes – 
lack of policy (Yellen, 2013) and lack of risk management control (McAleer, 
Jiménez-Martín, & Pérez-Amaral, 2013a, 2013b). In the aftermath of this crisis, the 
global financial community is taking more action to prevent any future financial 
catastrophe. It has accepted that prevention is a better approach than containment. In 
the three study chapters (4, 5 and 6), this thesis has established how contagious the 
current global financial system is at a both international and local settings, using the 
thesis’s framework of distance to default, distance to inefficiency and distance to 
capital spillover. The results highlight the risk of another global risk spillover, given 
the amount of interconnectedness detected in the global banks. Thus, the objective of 
this chapter is to propose a rigorous risk management framework to prevent any 
future spillover in the global and local financial sector. In this regard, the chapter has 
been divided into three sub-sections: a discussion on contemporary financial 
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regulatory issues, a proposed macro regulatory framework and a proposed inter-
organisational regulatory framework. 
7.2. A discussion on contemporary financial regulatory issues 
The history of financial regulation is as old as financial transaction (Pagano & 
Volpin, 2001) and has grown incrementally over time to enhance regulatory control. 
Previous authors have cited three main purposes of regulation (Goodhart, 2008):  
1. to constrain the use of monopoly power and the prevention of serious 
distortions to competition and the maintenance of market integrity; 
2. to protect the essential needs of ordinary people in cases where information is 
hard or costly to obtain and mistakes could devastate welfare, and 
3. where there are sufficient externalities that the social, and overall, costs of 
market failure exceed both the private costs of failure and the extra costs of 
regulation.  
The problem with his reasoning is that while 1 and 2 suggest an interconnected and 
interdependent system based on pure competition, 3 points out the downfall of this 
model using contagion risk in the global financial system. A good example of this is 
the failure of Lehman Brothers, which led to catastrophic changes in the US banking 
sector. It begs the question, how correct is the current regulatory framework? Past 
authors have clearly suggested that the current model of financial regulation is too 
narrowly confined to firm-specific liquidity-based risk control mechanisms (Borio, 
2011), when it should focus more on controlling the systemic risk spillover on a 
larger scale (Betz, Hautsch, Peltonen, & Schienle, 2016) using macro-prudential 
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regulation (Jeanne & Korinek, 2013). In this regard, using the literature review and 
the contagion risk findings from the previous three chapters, the research proposes 
the following risk framework at both macro and micro levels.  
7.3. A proposed macro regulatory framework 
The global financial crisis has pushed most countries around the world to analyse 
their macro prudential strategy given the cross-border operations of the banks (J. 
Berrospide et al., 2016). Previous authors have noted that most countries now have 
difficulties regulating the banking sector because most banks operate in global 
domain that is outside the local legal jurisdiction (J. Berrospide et al., 2016). Thus, 
the effects of a change of policy or regulation in one jurisdiction spill over to others 
(Schimmelfennig, 2016). Keeping this in mind, the study proposes that the dominant 
global and local banks be divided into four types, following the precedent of the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) requirement (Cohen & Scatigna, 2016). In order to 
convert the research outcome to practical output, the study is proposing to value a 
bank’s spillover capacity by using distance to inefficiency and distance to capital 
methods only. The distance to default method is excluded in this regard as distance to 
capital already incorporates distance to default using Basel-prescribed capital 
adequacy requirements. Given the definition of efficiency, the efficiency index will 
represent the bank’s short-term financial health and the capital index will represent 
the bank’s long-term financial health. The study has used this methodology in the 
chapter on US bank-to-bank contagion (Chapter 6). In order to construct the index, 
one needs to find out a bank’s weighted numeric position. Thus, the study has 
assigned (arbitrarily) an 80% value when a bank moves its shock to other banks and 
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a 20% value when it is infected by a shock spillover. For instance, if a bank spills 
over to five banks and received shocks from two banks, its score will be (4 x 5) + (2 
x 1), or 22.The study then put the banks into a categorical order based on their 
precise impact factor. In this regard, the study has distributed the banks into five 
categories (Tire 1 to Tire 5). Tire 1 is most active, and thus requires the highest level 
of supervisory regulation, while Tire 5 has the lowest spilling capacity and thus can 
be subjected to moderate supervisory control. The following tables (7.3.1 and 7.3.2) 
describe the output of the findings. 
Looking Table 7.3.1, which shows a categorical list of banks with short-term 
contagion capacity, it is visible that there a clear pattern indicating the superiority of 
smaller banks. Their larger counterparts, including some GSIB banks (JP Morgan, 
Wells Fargo and Bank of America), show a very different pattern, falling into the 
second-last category (Type 3) in the list. Thus, Table 7.3.1 clearly shows the amount 
of inconsistency between the smallest and largest contagion capacity (16 to 152, with 
a mean of 46). Figure 7.3.1 also illustrates the mean-centred tendency of the 
contagion values with a few outliers. This can be very helpful if regulators can create 
the figure for other countries and compare them among themselves. This issue 
clearly calls for higher regulatory control of the banks placed higher in the Table. 
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Table 7.3.1 – Chronological list of banks with short-term contagion capacity 
No Bank 
Contagion 
Value T
ie
r 
1 Prosperity Bancshares, Inc 152 
T
ie
r 
1
 2 Freddie Mac 108 
3 Flagstar Bancorp Inc 105 
4 Synovus Financial Corp 98 
5 Ameris Bancorp 85 
6 United Bankshares, Inc. 72 
T
ie
r 
2
 
7 Provident Financial Services, Inc. 68 
8 WesBanco, Inc 67 
9 Citigroup 66 
10 Enterprise Financial Services Corp 66 
11 Independent Bank Corporation 66 
12 United Community Banks, Inc 65 
13 First Midwest Bancorp, Inc 63 
14 Yadkin Financial Corporation 56 
15 State Street Corporation 55 
16 Goldman Sachs 54 
17 BB&T Corporation 53 
18 Cathay General Bancorp Inc 52 
19 First Busey Corporation 51 
20 Cullen/Frost Bankers, Inc 49 
21 Bancorpsouth, Inc. 47 
22 Hancock Holding Company 47 
23 Valley National Bancorp 47 
24 Premier Financial Bancorp 47 
25 Trustmark Corporation 46 
26 FNB Corporation 46 
27 
Boston Private Financial Holdings 
Inc 
45 
28 First Merchants Corporation 44 
29 Union Bankshares Corporation 44 
30 MB Financial Inc 43 
31 Capital One Financial Corporation 43 
32 Fulton Financial Corporation 42 
33 Bank of New York Mellon 41 
34 
Lakeland Financial Corporation, 
Indiana 
40 
T
ie
r 
3
 
35 SVB Financial Group 39 
36 Texas Capital Bancshares, Inc 38 
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37 Berkshire Hills Bancorp Inc 37 
38 Fifth Third Bancorp 37 
39 SunTrust Banks, Inc. 36 
40 First Citizens BancShares 36 
41 Old National Bancorp 35 
42 Chemical Financial Corporation 35 
43 First Defiance Financial Corp 35 
44 Wintrust Financial Corporation 34 
45 Brookline Bancorp Inc 34 
46 Renasant Corporation 31 
47 Charles Schwab Corporation 30 
48 1st Source Corporation 30 
49 Lakeland Bancorp, Inc 30 
50 JPMorgan Chase 28 
51 Huntington Bancshares Inc 28 
52 Wells Fargo & Company 27 
53 KeyCorp 25 
54 Bank of America Corporation 24 
55 PNC Financial Services Group Inc 24 
56 City Holding Company 24 
57 Comerica Incorporated 23 
58 ConnectOne Bancorp Inc 20 
59 Northwest Bancshares Inc 20 
60 Towne Bank 16 
T
ie
r 
4
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Figure 7.3.1. Spread of short-term contagion capacity 
Table 7.3.2 shows a categorical list of banks with long-term contagion capacity 
based on distance to capital. Following the pattern of the previous table, smaller 
banks still have a higher impact when it comes to transmitting and receiving shocks. 
Figure 7.3.2 illustrates the contagion value distribution of the banks. It clearly shows 
that, with the exception of some outliers, most banks stay very close to the mean with 
a marginal increase of the spread compared to the last measure. Again, the GSIBs are 
all placed in the middle two tiers. Putting the contagion value distributions figures 
together (Figure 7.3.3) provides a complete picture of overall contagion distribution 
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with moderate mean central tendency. It also shows that, excluding outliers, both 
contagion distributions show similar spillover capacity. 
Table 7.3.2 – Chronological list of banks with long-term contagion capacity 
No Bank 
Contagion 
Value T
ie
r 
1 Hancock Holding Company 153 
T
ie
r 
4
 
2 SunTrust Banks, Inc. 104 
3 Premier Financial Bancorp 99 
4 First Midwest Bancorp, Inc 92 
5 Comerica Incorporated 87 
6 Fulton Financial Corporation 85 
7 State Street Corporation 72 
T
ie
r 
3
 
8 MB Financial Inc 71 
9 Yadkin Financial Corporation 71 
10 Wintrust Financial Corporation 68 
11 FNB Corporation 67 
12 United Bankshares, Inc. 65 
13 
Lakeland Financial Corporation, 
Indiana 
64 
14 City Holding Company 62 
15 Brookline Bancorp Inc 60 
16 Trustmark Corporation 60 
17 Texas Capital Bancshares, Inc 59 
18 Capital One Financial Corporation 55 
19 Goldman Sachs 54 
20 First Merchants Corporation 50 
21 Bank of New York Mellon 49 
22 Flagstar Bancorp Inc 49 
23 First Busey Corporation 48 
24 
Boston Private Financial Holdings 
Inc 
48 
25 Charles Schwab Corporation 47 
26 United Community Banks, Inc 47 
27 SVB Financial Group 44 
28 KeyCorp 43 
29 WesBanco, Inc 43 
30 JPMorgan Chase 39 
T
ie
r 
2
 
31 Synovus Financial Corp 39 
32 ConnectOne Bancorp Inc 39 
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33 Lakeland Bancorp, Inc 39 
34 Freddie Mac 38 
35 Independent Bank Corporation 36 
36 Cullen/Frost Bankers, Inc 35 
37 Prosperity Bancshares, Inc 33 
38 Cathay General Bancorp Inc 32 
39 First Citizens BancShares 32 
40 1st Source Corporation 31 
41 Chemical Financial Corporation 30 
42 Bank of America Corporation 30 
43 Wells Fargo & Company 29 
44 Ameris Bancorp 29 
45 Renasant Corporation 28 
46 Old National Bancorp 27 
47 Berkshire Hills Bancorp Inc 27 
48 First Defiance Financial Corp 26 
49 PNC Financial Services Group Inc 26 
50 Bancorpsouth, Inc. 24 
51 Valley National Bancorp 24 
52 Huntington Bancshares Inc 24 
53 Northwest Bancshares Inc 23 
54 Union Bankshares Corporation 23 
55 Citigroup 22 
56 BB&T Corporation 22 
57 
Enterprise Financial Services 
Corp 
19 
58 Towne Bank 18 
59 Fifth Third Bancorp 17 
60 Provident Financial Services, Inc. 2 
T
ie
r 
1
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Figure 7.3.2. Spread of long-term contagion capacity 
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Figure 7.3.3. Spread of short-term and long-term contagion capacity 
The study suggests that any bank in the first category (Type 1) of the short-term or 
long-term contagion capacity table should be subject to a high degree of regulatory 
control to enforce not only better capital governance or liquidity requirements, but 
also overall financial governance, as they have a huge impact on other financial 
institutions. For the banks in the second and third categories, the regulators may 
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adopt more graduated governance control in line with the current practice, while 
Type 4 institutions can continue to conduct business under current regulations, as 
they pose no real threat to their peers. 
7.3. A proposed micro regulatory framework 
A financial institution’s contagion risk management is not only dependent on how 
shocks spread or spill over to other institutions but also on how much of the risk it 
can mitigate using internal control mechanism. Keeping this in mind, the findings 
from the literature review are used to create a modern framework for internal risk 
management for individual financial institutions (Figure 7.3.1). This divides risk 
management into two sub-components, internal and external. External pressure 
factors influence the institution’s risk management practice from outside the 
institution. They create boundaries and guidelines for the participating institutions to 
work within. Previous authors have identified such factors when considering risk 
management frameworks, including the regulatory environment, stakeholders’ 
influence, legal framework, industry standard and social norms. The regulatory 
environment generally refers to the implementation of Basel standards in the banking 
world (Young, 2013). Most countries have accepted Basel standards for their internal 
financial practices. This regulatory pressure plays an enormous role in determining 
the risk management practice standards in any country. Stakeholders are defined as 
the pressure groups outside the bank’s legal structure and can be seen as an interested 
party with regard to the risk management practices of the institution given the 
interconnected nature of the post-GFC financial world (Hopt, 2013). Legal 
framework refers to the laws governing the banks in the designated countries 
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(Neyapti & Dincer, 2014). Industry standards for risk prevention are important given 
that most banks’ first point of reference for risk management procedures is what 
other peers are doing in risk mitigation and control. Past researchers have clearly 
suggested that all banks try to maintain same standard of risk prevention in banking 
industry, as required by the Basel Accords (Powers, Hassan Al-Tamimi, & 
Mohammed Al-Mazrooei, 2007). The last of the external pressures is social norms, 
which have been proven to have significant influencing power on the risk 
management conduct of the banks (Gathergood, 2012).  
On the other hand, the internal risk management practice of the banks includes four 
process steps – identification, analysis, treatment and review. The process starts by 
identifying where the risk is. This may be trigged by an underlying situation 
recognised with the help of internal or external auditing (Gaganis, Pasiouras, & 
Spathis, 2013). Then the risk can be analysed through industry comparison-based 
impact studies (Kanagaretnam, Lim, & Lobo, 2013). Bankers may use sample 
implementation of different risk management techniques before widespread 
implementation of these measures. If the sample implementation is successful, then 
these techniques can be used throughout the financial institutions. In the final stage, 
it is highly recommended that banks periodically review their risk management 
standards to ensure a complete risk prevention guarantee. 
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Figure 7.3.1. Author’s framework for internal and external risk management 
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7.4. Conclusion 
This chapter examined the findings of the previous three chapters and integrated their 
findings to create a modern day risk management and risk regulation framework at 
both micro and macro level. Banks were categorised into four types based on their 
potential spillover impact in short and long term. It was suggested that banks in the 
first category should be subject to a high degree of regulatory control to enforce not 
only better capital governance or liquidity requirements but also overall financial 
governance, as they have a potentially huge impact on other financial institutions. 
For the banks in the second and third categories, a more graduated governance 
mechanism may be adopted in line with current practice, while the fourth category 
can continue doing business under current regulation, as they pose no significant 
threat to their peers. Finally, a new generic internal risk management framework for 
financial institutions was suggested. 
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Chapter 8. Conclusion 
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8.1. Introduction 
This chapter summarises the thesis and its contribution to the knowledge of financial 
contagion in the global and local banking industry and its policy implications. The 
limitations and opportunities of this study are also discussed to suggest avenues for 
future study. 
8.2. Summary of author’s contributions from the chapters 
Financial contagion revolves around two schools of thought, financial soundness and 
financial distress. This thesis has shown how value shock in one bank or economy 
moves into other banks or economies, creating contagion risk. However, the real 
value of this thesis is not in showing that value shocks move, but rather in showing 
how they move – where they move from, and to whom they move, which is the 
essential component of an effective risk management agenda. At the same time, this 
thesis also applies theoretical knowledge to systemic risk-based model generation 
and operational practical guidelines for supervisory authorities. The paragraphs 
below provide short summaries of the significant focuses of the preceding chapters. 
In Chapter 1, the context and background of the thesis were discussed to define the 
objective of this research, which includes an outline for possible innovation and 
upgrading of global and local contagion risk management. Past authors have clearly 
suggested that contagion risk is a crucial issue in the modern financial world (Elliott 
et al., 2014; Tonzer, 2015). Nevertheless, not enough research has been done on 
global and local contagion risk analysis using different distance to risk measures. The 
chapter outlined the methodology used in the thesis and defined the ethical and 
technical issues associated with the research.  
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The second chapter has started with the definition of risk then moved onto risk 
management through the Basel framework, finishing with a review of the existing 
literature on contagion risk. This chapter provided a basic understanding of risk and 
risk management terminologies and what past authors have said about them in their 
research. It described the very core of risk and risk management as finding 
uncertainties and minimising the damage from them. Contagion risk was defined as 
an extreme macro level phenomenon arising from spillover between different 
entities. The chapter deduced that, by understanding the nature of contagiousness 
within the global and local banking industry, it is possible to minimise the value 
degradation arising from these sorts of risks. Thus, the objective of this thesis should 
be to look into the contagious nature of the global and local banking industries and 
identify the movement of shocks to understand the risk arising from such spillover. 
The beauty of this process is that, once the movement of contagious risk is 
understood, the stakeholders can design controls to minimise its impact, thus creating 
an effective risk management framework.  
Chapter 3 detailed the methodology used in this thesis. It described the specific 
distance risk-based multinomial regression model used in this to address the research 
questions. In order to ensure the highest quality of research outcomes, four different 
aspects of the project were acknowledged: factor validity, internal validity, external 
validity and reliability. These were converted into the research protocols followed 
throughout the thesis. 
Chapter 4 investigated the contagion risk for the global banking environment using 
three different distance to risk measures from the methodology. Extreme shocks for 
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the top global top banks were modelled as a function of extreme shocks experienced 
by other banks in country-level settings. Four separate conditions of financial states 
were created in this regard. The probability of these states moving through one 
country’s economy to another was calculated using a multinomial logistic model. 
Overall, the findings using all three different distance to risk measures showed a 
strong correlation between the sample countries’ banking systems, particularly 
between the UK and the US. Other countries’ banking systems had an moderate 
effect on each other. These results also indicated that less developed or developing 
economies’ banking systems are more resistant to from financial shock contagion 
than their counterparts did. The key challenge for the future is to ensure adequate 
collaboration and cross-border supervision at the global level.  
Chapter 5 explored the contagion risk for the US banking sector based on fifteen 
states using three diverse distance to risk procedures. Extreme shocks for US states 
were modelled as a function of extreme shocks faced by other US states or foreign 
countries. Four distinct settings of financial stress were used in this regard. The 
likelihood of these stress conditions moving through the sample was calculated using 
a multinomial logistic model. Generally, the findings from all three distance to risk 
procedures indicated robust correlation between the US states and between US states 
and other countries. The results also indicated that larger states are more resistant to 
financial shock transfer.  
Chapter 6 explored the contagion risk for the US banking sector based on sixty of the 
largest US banks using three distance to risk procedures. Extreme shocks for US 
banks were modelled as a function of extreme shocks confronted by other banks in 
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the sample. The probability of these stress conditions moving through the sample 
was calculated using multinomial logistic regression analysis. In general, the findings 
from all three distance to risk measures identified strong association between the US 
banks in the sample. The outcomes also indicated that minor banks both transmit and 
receive more value shocks than their larger counterparts, and that larger banks 
exhibit higher resistance to shock than their smaller colleagues in all three distance to 
risk measures. There was no evidence of superiority of GSIB banks. The most 
important observation was the minimal amount of state bias within the sample. It was 
also found that distance to default has the highest amount of contagion (compared to 
distance to inefficacy and distance to capital).  
Chapter 8 examined the findings of the previous three chapters and integrated the 
findings to create a modern day risk management and risk regulation framework at 
both micro and macro levels. The banks were divided them into 4 types based on 
their spillover impact in the short and long term. Under the proposed framework, 
banks in the highest category of short-term or long-term contagion capacity should 
be subject to a high degree of regulatory control to enforce not only better capital 
governance and liquidity requirements but to also overall financial governance, as 
they have a huge potential impact on the other financial institutions. For the banks in 
the second and third categories may be subject to more graduated governance control 
in line with current practice, while for Type 4 banks current regulation is sufficient as 
they pose no real threat to their peers. A new generic internal risk management 
framework for financial institutions is also suggested. 
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8.3. Conclusion 
Earlier in this chapter, the subsections summarised the academic and applied input of 
this thesis based on the research undertaken. In concluding, it can be stated that 
contagion risk analysis using different distance to risk measures (DD, DI and DC) is 
still at a foundational level. The literature review chapter identifies the scarcity of 
high value research in this field. However, many modern scholars are disinclined to 
look into this subject given their deep attachment to traditional risk measurement 
tools. Table 7.1 summarises and ends the thesis, outlining the significant outcomes of 
the research together with the limitations and suggestions for future research. 
Table 7.1 The end view  
Topic Summary 
Title A study of contagion in global and local banking 
industry 
Context Global and Local (US) banking industries 
Methodology Quantitative – Multinomial logistic Regression 
Key findings  Strong correlation between sample countries’ 
banking systems especially those of the UK and US. 
Other countries’ banking systems have a moderate 
effect on each other when it comes to shock transfer.  
 Less developed or developing economies’ banking 
systems are more immune to financial shock. 
 Strong correlation between sample US states and 
banks in the sample. 
 Larger US states are more immune to financial 
shock. 
Limitations  Big data project. The printed calculation results from 
this thesis are more than 2500 pages. 
 The thesis has only used local currency given the 
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data availability but other authors has suggested to 
use both local and USD currency when calculating 
return (Mink, 2015). 
Future research agendas  To compare different models of risk calculation as 
input variables and compare them with the 
thesis’sthesis results. 
 To identify the impact of technological advancement 
in contagion risk analysis. 
 To identify the differences between the three 
different distance to risk measures global level. 
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